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Abstract:  
This thesis examines the role of business actors in networking, 
influencing and shaping the governance of China’s CDM market. By 
adopting a neo-pluralistic view of business power, it reveals how 
companies in the CDM market in China are wielding their unique 
capabilities and technics to affect policy making and implementing 
process both at the national and local level.  It is based on a qualitative 
case study strategy to investigate and reveal the detailed context and 
causes for some worrying problems around CDM in China. 42 interviews, 
plus large number of document, and field observations have been carried 
out to collect data. The study also illustrated their constraints to achieve 
their goals and strategic preferences due to the confrontational interests 
among business actors. In general, it contributes insights of the reform era 
political economy in China’s environmental and climate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
China plays a decisive role in the global effort of combating climate 
change both in terms of its sheer size of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
and the large potential for abatement options. In 2007, China overtook the 
United States to become the largest annual emitter nation even though its 
cumulative and per capita emission remains much lower than the US. 
With over six billion tons of CO2 emissions in 2010, or 24% of total 
global emissions (IEA, 2012), the volume of Chinese emission and its 
growth rate dwarfed other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, Indian, and 
South Africa) by a large margin. Hand in hand with soaring GHG 
emissions is a rapidly growing economy in the last two decades under the 
Chinese government’s unyielding backing of economic growth. Since the 
market reforms began in the early 1980s, economic development became 
the top priority of the Communist governments at all levels. Everything 
else, including environmental impacts of the rapid industrialization, are 
de facto secondary in the political agenda. According to International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2012), key economic sectors like electricity 
consumption and transport are at the same time the primary drivers for 
emission growth in China.  
Hence, how the challenges of climate change are to be tackled in China 
could serve as a role model for climate governance, particularly for other 
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developing countries. The attitude, strategy and policy tools that are 
adopted by the Chinese government and non-government entities would 
produce a profound impact not only on the domestic development path 
but the overall sustainability at global scale. It is in this context that I was 
motivated to start this PhD research on China’s newly emerged CDM 
market, which is often regarded as the most innovative governance 
‘invention’ to tackle climate change. I hoped the study of how CDM 
activities were implemented in China would shed some light on the the 
country’s climate politics and governance.   
In this introductory chapter, the history of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) is overviewed with a specific description of China’s 
CDM market and its main features. I also explain how the empirical and 
theoretical puzzles around CDM governance emerged, along with the fast 
development of the market in the last decade highlighting the rationale 
and importance of this research. In the next section, I present the research 
questions with the central inquiry seeking to investigate how powerful the 
business actors are to shape the international carbon market in a rather 
unique political and economic system like China, and what are the 
implications when the domestic and transnational business power were 
unleashed in the developing world for the first time in the history of 
global climate governance. The chapter concludes with a brief overview 
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of the thesis structure.  
1.1. Research background and the history of CDM 
Offsetting is not an innovative idea for effective environmental 
governance. It has a long conceptual tradition among eminent economists 
since Pigou (1920), who developed the externalities concepts, and later 
Coase (1960), who argued that allocating and trading property rights 
could promote efficiency. Although neither of these economists intended 
to apply their theories to addressing environmental issues, the application 
of their economic theories to pollution control was soon proposed by 
Dales (1968), who pointed out that a market in pollution rights is needed 
as a ‘third way’ for environmental governance. In general, these early 
academic works endorse the application of market instruments, such as 
taxes and emission trading, to addressing environmental challenges, 
compared to the traditional ‘command and control’ approach such as a 
pollution ban or penalty system. In general, these flexible tools are 
designed to allow polluters themselves to identify the most cost-effective 
options to control and clean up the pollution that they created (Pearce 
1989). 
These revolutionary thoughts laid the foundation of many innovative 
market instruments for environmental governance since the 1980s in 
some developed economies. Consequently, the cap and trade system of 
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GHG emission, or a flexible mechanism that created demand and supply 
of carbon reductions to be priced and exchanged between the excessive 
emitters in one place and emission savers in another (Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008), has become the centrepiece of a formal discussion of 
how to fix the problem of global climate change. Prior to the 
establishment of carbon offset markets, experiments of ‘cap and trade’ 
systems were carried out with other pollutants. For example, trading of 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (N2O) pollution permits began 
in the United States in the 1990s.  
These programs were once greeted with scepticism (Stavins, 1998), but 
are now often viewed as a success of paradigm shift from traditional 
government led approaches to a market centered policy design to deal 
with environmental crises (Keohane, 2009). The faith in market 
instruments and some rather successful piloting experience in the most 
influential and wealthy economies led to the creation of carbon offset 
market. The architects of the carbon market are in firm belief that setting 
a price for carbon could create strong incentives to reduce emissions as 
efficiently as possible (Ekins and Barker 2001; Weyant 1999).  
As a result, several governments had implemented carbon trading 
schemes, including the United Kingdom in 2002 and the Australian state 
of New South Wales in 2003 (Hepburn, 2007). The pan-Europe EU 
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Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was created in 2005, and eventually 
became the largest carbon trading system to date. The appeal of market 
instruments as a panacea reached its climax when the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) adopted three flexible mechanisms towards the end 
of negotiation, namely Emission Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These prescriptions indicate 
that the carbon offset as an experimental policy has been formally 
elevated to the international stage, and consequently, companies and state 
agencies around the globe are now allowed to trade carbon credits as a 
commodity in order to meet their emission reduction target or make 
profits from selling their emission reduction credits (Böhringer, 2003).  
Although the pervasiveness of carbon offset programs over other policy 
instruments in dealing with climate change is often believed to have a 
strong neo-liberal ideology root (Newell and Paterson, 2010), the real 
intention of adopting flexible instruments, particularly the CDM, is 
through strong political orientation at the international climate 
negotiations. Firstly, the key player during the negotiations was the US, 
which tried to utilize the market mechanism as much as possible. It is 
generally believed that the inclusion of offset programs aimed primarily 
to coax the US, then the world’s biggest emitter, to ratify the protocol and 
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endorse a legally binding emission reduction target. Secondly, flexible 
mechanisms were also designed to be a magnet for the developing 
countries, which in general opposed fiercely any legally binding 
reduction targets for the global ‘South’ since it was against the dogma of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)’ (Victor, 2004). 
However, it should be noted that targets for some parts of the global south 
do not run against the idea of CBDR. 
The first objective of luring the US to remain on board largely failed 
when the Bush administration discarded the Kyoto Protocol in late March 
2001. Nevertheless, the second aim of persuading developing countries to 
make some ‘paid’ efforts for global emission reduction turned out to be a 
huge success. Although developing countries were initially suspicious of 
the intention of any market instrument and hesitated to participate in 
CDM (Depledge, 2000), most of them gradually picked up the discourse 
of ‘win-win solutions’ and begin to show their huge appetite for CDM 
investment from the Annex 1 parties.  
Meanwhile, the direct link between Kyoto credits to the newly created 
EU-ETS enhanced developing countries’ confidence of profit prospects 
and the enthusiasm for CDM grew dramatically after 2005. By the time 
of writing, more than 10,000 projects had been proposed by developing 
countries across the world to the United Nations (UNEP, 2012). 
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Considering it was not until COP7 in Marrakesh in 2001 that the 
Executive Board (EB) for the CDM was established, and the main part of 
the ‘rule book’ was decided upon, the maturity and development of 
‘Kyoto’s surprise’ (Werksman, 2002) stunned even its designers’ eyes.   
1.1.1. China’s contribution to an explosive CDM market 
China is the largest contributor for the CDM boom since 2005. Yet the 
rationale to select China’s CDM market as the theme for this PhD 
projects not only because the nation hosts largest quantity of CDM 
activities. Rather, it is believed that understanding Chinese CDM market 
becomes particularly important for three reasons. Firstly, such case study 
would provide crucial evidence of how the role of business actors and 
host country’s political economy can affect the overall performance of 
international carbon offset activities. CDM is a new instrument designed 
in the international forum arguably without considering too much about 
local details. However, new market creates new governance vacuum, 
which needs to be taken up by various social actors eventually. Therefore, 
CDM provides an extraordinary site to examine the state-market power 
struggle and networks to legitimize their governance inputs and outputs.  
Secondly, CDM as an international mechanism has to adapt itself in the 
national and local political and market system, which eventually creates 
new layers of collaborations or confrontations within the existing 
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governance arrangement. Hence, it becomes a perfect site to investigate 
the relationship between the rising carbon elites and existing state or 
market institutions. I hereby echo with Peter Newell’s argument that the 
governance of carbon offset has to be examined in a broader range of 
governance system (Newell, 2009), and CDM market provides an 
excellent opportunity for such analytical approach. Last but not least, 
CDM is by nature a cross-sectoral market and hence provide a good 
window of understanding cross-sectoral and cross-ministerial 
coordination or conflicts in China’s climate governance, which is rarely 
examined previously. 
In May 2012, during a seminar attended by the author on the CDM 
approval system in Beijing, a government officer from the China 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, China’s Designated 
National Authority for CDM project approvals) pleaded for appreciation 
and understanding of NDRC’s work in front of an audience of a dozen or 
so CDM stakeholders, for the latter often criticise NDRC’s low efficiency 
and delay in CDM project approval through various channels. China’s 
Designated National Authority (or ‘DNA’ in CDM terminology) is 
operating under a tremendous workload and the officers had been trying 
their best to meet the applicants’ tight time schedule (Sohu News, 2012). 
The officer’s remark during the seminar is by no means one of those 
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bureaucratic talks often heard among Chinese state officers, as documents 
from the NDRC website reveal that since the beginning of 2012, the 
NDRC doubled its speed of project approval and increased the average 
speed of Letter of Approval (LOA) issuance from around 50 projects per 
month to 100 plus (NDRC, 2012). Considering the CDM office is a rather 
small office with only four formal employees, Chinese officials appear to 
have exhibited very high efficiency in dealing with CDM project 
approvals. However, such high speed of project approval also leads to 
concerns about the quality of supervision of project proposals.  
Figure 1.2: Total registered CDM projects distribution by host country 
 
(Source: UNFCCC, 2012) 
First of all, it partly explains the main drivers of the explosive market in 
China 50.94%
India 19.15%
Brazil 4.45%
Viet Nam 3.18%
Mexico 3.00%
Malaysia 2.33% Others 16.94%
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India
Brazil
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China. Linking Kyoto credits to the world’s largest carbon market (EU-
ETS) opened up the demand side for carbon offset credits, but China’s 
keenness for delivering these credits is believed to be the most important 
factor from the supply side of the market (see Figure 1.2). Since the first 
quarter of 2007, China has overtaken India to become the biggest CER 
supplier not only in terms of CDM project numbers but also in terms of 
CER volume (Figure 1.2). However, this is not a surprise to many 
scholars and policy makers, given the huge emission reduction potential 
and large size of the country. Earlier researchers have successfully 
predicted the share of Chinese projects at around 60% by the end of 2010 
(World Bank 2004; Zhang 2006). These predictions are surprisingly 
precise when looking at today’s CDM portfolio (see Figure 1.3).  
Secondly, the comment at seminar in Beijing also reveals the relentless 
support for CDM development from the Chinese government and 
regulators. In earlier stages of development the governing institutions 
were established and regulatory policies were crafted out (Schroeder, 
2009). In addition, government even acts like ‘volunteer’ market 
promoter and business developer by presenting and explaining CDM 
benefits to the Chinese enterprises through some bilateral and multilateral 
capacity building efforts (see Chapter 5 for a detailed account of the 
state’s role in promoting CDM). Chinese regulation also allows the 
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government to tax CER revenues according to different project types 
(NDRC 2004), which makes the state essentially one of the stakeholders 
together with the business companies within the project cycle (see 
Chapter 5 for detailed analysis). In general, Chinese officers’ strong 
interests in promoting CDM activities present a sharp contrast to the 
government’s suspicious attitude towards market instruments in previous 
years.  
Yet government support for CDM is only a necessary condition but not a 
sufficient condition for the market expansion. The NDRC officer’s 
comment in the beginning of this section indicates that without dynamic 
support and involvement from the business community such rapid market 
growth would have been impossible. As a matter of fact, the idea of CDM 
was quickly picked up by both international and Chinese companies who 
sensed the profit opportunities from this ‘win-win solution’. Many 
domestic companies interpreted it as a free lunch from the developed 
countries or entities, or ‘cakes falling from the sky’ (Schroeder, 2009). 
Hundreds of carbon funds and consultancy companies emerged to hunt 
for potential project activities that might be eligible for CDM criteria. The 
research will show how project investors also acknowledged the 
mechanism swiftly and realized the possibility of making extra profit 
from selling carbon credits to Annex-1 parties and how they then started 
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to package their existing or planned projects into CDM projects, as 
explained in detail in Chapter 4. A Chinese CDM boom finally took off in 
2005 (Figure 1.3).  
Figure 1.3: Major host countries’ share of registered CDM projects  
 
     India                   China                 Brazil                    Mexico 
 
(Source: UNEP Risoe, 2012)  
Perhaps a surprising feature of China’s CDM market is the high 
concentration on renewable energy projects in the portfolio. Renewable 
CDMs account for more than 83% of the total numbers of registered 
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projects (NDRC, 2012). Taking wind energy as an example, China 
developed 1519 projects with total installed capacity of 84086mw 
(UNEP, 2013). Given the country’s tremendous emission reduction 
potential and abatement options across various industries and sectors one 
might expect a more balanced distribution of CDM projects. For example, 
China relies heavily on coal and has a large number of relatively old and 
low efficiency power plants (Jotzo & Michaelowa, 2002), but there are 
very few CDM projects aiming to improve the efficiency of these out-
dated power plants with new technology. Other large emitting sectors 
such as transportation and building efficiency are also rarely approached 
by the CDM project developers due to the lack of approved 
methodologies. The disproportional distribution of CDM projects also 
leads to an unbalanced geographic allocation within China because most 
of the projects are eventually implemented in China’s western inland 
provinces, due to the abundant clean energy resources in the area, such as 
hydro, solar and wind power, compared to the more dense populated and 
economically well-developed coastal regions.  
As China started to dominate the project pipeline, criticism grew over the 
dubious quality of some Chinese projects among academics and NGOs. 
In general, there was a split view of the Chinese contribution and 
implications for the global carbon offset market. Some view it as a major 
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part of a successful story of CDM (Figueres and Streck, 2008), while 
such ‘great leap forward’ type of growth is perceived as a threat to the 
mechanism’s equity distribution (Bakker et al, 2009) and environmental 
integrity (Haya, 2007). In addition, some believe China’s rise has 
essentially exposed the primary challenge of the present institutional 
arrangements and credibility of the newly established international 
flexible mechanisms (Hepburn 2007; Wara & Victor, 2008). 
1.1.2. Justifications of the research: empirical and 
theoretical puzzles  
Behind divergent opinions of the implications of China’s dominance in 
the CDM market are some theoretical and empirical puzzles that need to 
be addressed. The detailed discussion of these gaps is presented in 
Chapter 3, here I only lay out the main issues as the justification of this 
research.  
The history of CDM and China’s experience imposes a fundamental 
puzzle that needs to be clarified, namely what were the main causes of 
China’s dominance of the CDM market, its unbalanced allocation of 
project types, and its questionable project quality. Before the CDM 
started to mushroom in China, some early studies provides theoretical 
assumptions of how factors such as abatement potential, institutional 
arrangements, economic development and investment environment would 
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affect the prosperity of CDM in a given host country (Jung 2006; 
Michaelowa 2003). As we look back today at CDM’s development track 
in the last decade, it is clear that some of these early theoretical 
assumptions have been proved to be incompatible with the actual market 
reality. For example, the field study of this research indicates that host 
countries’ abatement potentials and attractiveness for foreign investment 
is not the main cause of China’s large CDM market share (See chapter 5 
for detailed analysis), and some large emergent economies, with equally 
abundant market potential and low FDI risk level, such as India or 
Mexico, have developed significantly less projects than China. Hence the 
causes of such differences should be re-examined.  
In addition, for a country that is distinctive for its authoritarian traditions 
and carrying out marketizing reforms only in the past three decades, few 
on-site empirical studies have been carried out to link China’s specific 
political and economic dimensions to the explanations of how CDM 
governance has been implemented on the ground. Schroeder’s research is 
one of the few pioneering studies on the dynamics of the CDM market in 
China, but the research focus is concentrated on the government or 
government affiliated entities, with the conclusion that in the CDM 
market state actors are still at the centre of the stage (Schroeder, 2009) 
and some hybrid actors (quasi-governmental local CDM offices) are 
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becoming the major steering parties of the market growth (Schroeder, 
2011).  
Therefore, the vast number of private companies that are either newly 
created or recently mobilized for the carbon offset market, and the roles 
and influence of these organizations in the governance of CDM have yet 
to be systematically investigated in China. I argue that the study of 
business actors in China’s CDM market could provide critical insights 
about why China outpaced other developing countries to become the 
largest host of CDM, why renewable CDM dominates in China, and why 
the integrity and quality of some of these projects is questionable. In 
general, better understanding of business power and influence in the 
CDM domain would provide empirical evidence of how CDM is 
developed at the implementation level. The empirical evidence may shed 
some light on those rather contradictory perspectives on China’s CDM 
story in the recent years; either as a huge success or an enormous fraud.  
As for the criticisms around China’s CDM projects, there is still a 
significant lack of evidence of both the magnitude of the problem and 
how it happened. Gilley (2012) pointed out that China’s response to 
climate change has been a characteristic case of authoritarian 
environmentalism with a distinctive non-participatory nature during the 
policy making process. In such a case the production of governance 
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outputs in terms of policy, measures, regulations and institutions can be 
highly efficient, yet the environmental outcomes are often disappointing 
due to countervailing interests among stakeholders, particularly at local 
level (Gilley, 2012). Besides, studies of China’s renewable policies also 
indicate that uncoordinated inter-ministerial arrangements in China are 
the major obstacle to achieving the grand policy goal of the top (Lema 
and Ruby, 2007). These previous studies illustrate another important 
puzzle for understanding the performance of CDM in China, some of the 
problems may not be the direct consequence of state policies due to the 
fragmented interests at the operational or local level, hence empirical 
efforts to identify alternative explanations for the causes that have led to 
the dubious quality of CDM activities is a very crucial task.  
The research also addresses several theoretical puzzles that have affected 
CDM since its inception. At the outset is the question of why a market 
mechanism blossoms in one of the more authoritarian countries in the 
world. As explained before, the fundamental theoretical assumption of 
carbon offset market is that these flexible instruments make the effort of 
reducing environmental crises more cost-effective than those of command 
and control type policy options. However, today’s geographic distribution 
of CDM ironically illustrates that, after a decade of development, this 
innovative global offset instrument thrives in a country with a distinctive 
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nature of environmental authoritarianism (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012). 
Countries like China would theoretically face more difficulties when 
trying to harness a market instrument within their ‘command and control’ 
political system, compared to those more democratic host countries like 
India or Mexico, but in reality China turns out to be the most popular 
destination for CDM activities. Therefore, interrogations of how the 
flexible instruments are integrated into China’s political reality could 
provide theoretical insights on governing market instruments in non-
liberal economies like China.  
Another related issue concerns the notion that ‘state power’ is retreating 
in the governance of public affairs (Strange, 1996) and non-state actors 
have started to fill the governance vacuum left by the state officers 
(Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). In the environmental arena, the inception 
of market instruments is believed to be a typical example of this trend of 
government-to-governance transformation and CDM is often regarded as 
a new form of networked governance jointly sustained by public and 
private entities at all administrative levels (Streck, 2004). The analysis 
and fieldwork in this research reveals the leverage of business actors in 
the carbon market in terms of allying with or confronting state actors in 
order to sustain or shape governance structures in the CDM domain. Such 
analytical efforts will hopefully provide informed insights of how non-
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state actors are taking up the governance vacuum left by the state actors 
after new governance tools are enforced on the ground.  
1.2. Research Questions 
The research questions are designed to address the empirical and 
theoretical puzzles elaborated in the preceding paragraphs (see Figure 4). 
Firstly, these questions differ from a state-centric approach and shift the 
analytical focus to the business actor instead. The overarching question of 
this research asks how business organizations and their strategic 
preferences are reflected in the governance of CDM in China and its 
implications for China’s clean development. This research question will 
be addressed by three subsets of questions explained below (see Figure 
4). 
1.2.1. Key question 1: who governs CDM in China?  
Currently a plurality of private and public actors is engaged in the day-to-
day governance of CDM, even if they are not formal participants in the 
decision making process (See Figure 5). As the only market mechanism 
prescribed under the KP to promote cooperation between Annex-1 
(mainly OECD members) and Non-annex 1 (developing) countries, the 
successful implementation of every project needs participation from 
international organizations (EB), multinational corporations (MNCs), 
financial institutions, national and local governments from both Annex 1 
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and Non-annex 1 countries, domestic public or private companies, 
independent consultants, and professional validators. Although it is rather 
obvious that for such a complicated system to function, the interaction 
and collaborations among these actor groups is crucial (Streck, 2004), the 
actors’ level of involvement and their purpose can be largely different to 
each other when joining the project implementation phase (see Chapter 5 
for a detailed analysis).  
The first key question hence intends to clarify the boundary of these 
actors, their roles and strategic priorities in the CDM market in China. It 
identifies the most active players at the operational level and interrogates 
the primary motivations and mandate for their involvement. It is noted 
that this is essentially a challenging task due to the complicated 
configuration of public and private spheres in China. Schroeder (2012) 
revealed that quasi government institutions were set up in China to take 
advantage of their ambiguous status for the profit making opportunities in 
the CDM market. I argue in this research that quasi-public business 
entities such as state owned companies (SOEs) or other corporations with 
close political connections, apply similar strategies to tap their political 
resources and advance their own political or policy preferences in the 
newly emerged CDM market. Therefore it would be simplistic to view 
these companies as mere profit-making organizations as from time to 
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time their priorities can be non-economic.  
1.2.2. Key question 2: Resource, lobbying strategy and 
outcome 
This subset of questions deals with the sources of business power in 
China’s CDM market, as well as how the power was used by business 
actors in building up coalitions or accommodating conflicts either with 
state actors or other actors in the market. The marketization of China's 
economy in the past thirty years has cultivated a fast growing business 
class who has an urgent need for supporting regulatory frameworks and 
favorable policies, which has resulted in extensive lobbying activities by 
companies within various industries, such as steel, electronics and 
software (Kennedy, 2005). The Chinese companies have various 
capabilities to influence the polity just like most Western companies do 
with their policy makers. However, Kennedy (2005) pointed out that the 
ways Chinese companies’ influence the central-party state are notably 
different from Western corporations due to China’s unique one-party 
political system. In addition, various sectors seem to have different 
approaches so that no single pressing model, such as pluralism, 
clientelism or corporatism, suffices to describe the complex business–
government relations in China.  
This research largely echoes those of Kennedy’s findings but goes further 
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from two perspectives. Firstly, the analytical focus is given to a newly 
emerged cross-sectoral market with strong political orientation. The 
carbon market accommodates elements from various traditional economic 
sectors including finance, energy, consulting, heavy industries (such as 
steel and cement, transportation and buildings), etc. It is thus interesting 
to see how actors from various sectoral and ownership backgrounds 
compete with others over the dominant influencing strategy for CDM 
regulators. It somehow illustrates which form of power resource is likely 
to be more effective over others and why. Secondly, the research also 
brings the local political-economic dynamics into the analysis, which 
provides insight to the power variance between local, central and 
international business in terms of networking or countervailing local state 
actors. In general, the analysis of Chinese business actors’ pressing 
strategy and networking techniques in the CDM market can also serve as 
a complementary effort to the previous studies of business power in 
developed economies in global environmental or climate governance 
(Falkner 2008, Levy and Newell, 2005, Meckling 2011). 
The last element of this subset of research questions concerns the policy 
outcomes. Previous studies show that direct lobbying activity hardly 
exists in China’s CDM market (Schroeder, 2009), indicating that the 
relational dimension of power, in which business actors achieve their 
24 
 
goals by organized pressuring activities (Falkner, 2008), is not an 
observable phenomenon in China. Power interactions are therefore not 
always observable as they are not exercised in open competitions for 
influence over policy making and process. However, as Kennedy (2005) 
pointed out informal lobbying, often in the form of discussions behind the 
closed doors, individual pressing of the state officers or manipulating the 
media, is a dominant phenomenon in China. Hence I argue that 
understanding of different techniques and strategies of Chinese business 
to leverage their positions in the CDM arena is important since these 
informal activities may generate an aggregate effect on setting and 
changing policy parameters. In order to reveal these informal activities, I 
selected interviewees not only from current business managers or market 
regulators, but also those with previous CDM expertise who had left the 
carbon business.  
Therefore, the outcomes of the policies are approached in this research by 
unraveling how privileged business actors build political coalitions and 
policy frameworks in accordance with their own preferences. For 
example, the analysis in Chapter 5 reveals that the dominant transaction 
pattern of CER trading in China is due to the joint efforts of major 
business actors in the market. Such a transaction pattern is a significant 
contributor to China’s CDM miracle and is tacitly tolerated and agreed by 
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the policy makers, even though it is essentially a serious deviation of the 
KP’s original intention. Examples of this kind of policy outcome also 
reveal that elite business groups are able to subdue the debate of other 
acceptable transaction patterns and keep them off the policy agenda. In 
addition, they are also capable of making the public take this outcome for 
granted as the only option for implementing the CDM projects in China.  
1.2.3. Key question 3: what are the implications?  
The third subset of questions deals with the implications of business 
power and policy outcomes for the overall performance and quality of the 
CDM as a flexible mechanism. The international carbon offset market is 
distinctive from traditional markets. On the one hand, it is essentially a 
market with a clear global public mission to combat climate change by 
exploiting most cost-effective abatement options around the globe. Hence 
the integrity of the mechanism is utterly important since any fake or 
miscalculated credits would literally inflate the emission cap of Annex 1 
parties and increase the global GHG emissions (Schneider, 2009). In this 
regard, a market flooded with dubious carbon credits would threaten the 
fundamental justification of the offset market. That is exactly the reason 
why CDM Executive Board at the UN imposed very stringent verification 
and validation rules for CER issuance since the offset mechanisms took 
off.  
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On the other hand, carbon offsetting is basically a market instrument 
where business actors are lured into the arena for profit making 
opportunities only, either in the present stage or in the foreseeable future. 
If most of the business actors see their efforts or investment in CDM 
would not pay off, due to high transaction costs or an uncertain future, 
they would quit and the market would collapse, as we see what has 
happened in the CDM market today. Hence there is a notable trade-off 
between quality and efficiency, and most of the critical argument and 
debate around the CDM today is essentially about how and where to 
strike a balance between the two extremes.  
The last subset of research question asks how the interactions of business 
actors affect this trade off. The massive number of Chinese projects may 
suggest that China’s political economy in the carbon market is pushing 
the whole governance system towards efficiency end instead of the 
quality end. Yet such an assumption would only be grounded by strong 
empirical evidence of what is the real nature of those dubious credits and 
what is process of producing and approving these credits at the national 
and local level.  
Another benchmark to evaluate the performance of CDM is its 
sustainability contribution, which also received tremendous academic and 
public criticisms since the inception of the mechanism (Böhm and Dabhi 
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2010; Olsen, 2007). The fundamental problem is that CDM itself does not 
generate any tangible products or services to society apart from the 
credits being used as offsets. Hence if projects produce negative social, 
environmental and economic impacts on the host countries they should be 
avoided. The paradox lies in the fact that any CDM activity has to be 
attached to an industrial activity, such as power generation or cement 
production, which would inevitably produce both valuable products or 
services, and social and environmental impacts to the host localities. The 
evaluations of CDM’s sustainable development (SD) contribution are 
essentially assessing the social and environmental impacts of these 
industrial activities. That is where national and local political economy 
enters. Previous studies revealed that the Chinese government’s SD check 
is carried out in a rather laissez faire manner with only a broad 
description of priority CDM sectors (Newell, 2009). The questions of this 
research are then asking why it is the case and to what extent do power 
interactions between business and government shape the evaluation 
process of SD contribution of CDM projects, and which ultimately 
impact on who benefits from the project activities.  
At the time of writing this thesis, the CDM market with the CER price hit 
record low level of below 1 Euro. Noting there are many uncertainties, 
hesitations and discouraging prospects, I argue that the empirical 
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evidence of how CDM is governed by business actors also sheds some 
light on the future evolution, improvement or restructuring of global 
carbon offset mechanisms in the post-2012 era. Yet the results of this 
research concern not just the CDM as they are also critically relevant to 
future successive or replacement instruments in global climate 
governance. For example, the lessons learned in Chinese CDM projects 
can help to improve the governance design of forest carbon offset 
mechanisms such as REDD (Lederer, 2011) or carbon capture and storage 
projects (CCS) in developing countries (de Coninck, 2008).  
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
In order to develop further the research questions and eventually present 
the empirical results, the rest of the thesis is structured in 7 chapters. The 
literature review is carried out in Chapter 2, which focuses broadly on 
two set of previous studies. At the outset is literature concerning the main 
themes around CDM and its governance, particularly its ethical roots, 
manifests inefficiencies, and possibilities for improvement or reform. The 
second part of the literature review looks at the political economy of 
China, particularly in the area of environmental governance. The review 
aims to provide a link between a highly contested international 
mechanism and China’s unique political context. It also offers strong 
justification for a business centered analytical orientation due to the gaps 
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or limitations revealed in previous research. In Chapter 3, an analytical 
framework is designed to apply neo-pluralism perspectives and concepts 
as the main theoretical tools to investigate the role and influence of 
business actors in China’s CDM market. Based on the research questions 
and analytical framework, the research methodologies, data collection 
and analytical techniques are discussed in Chapter 4. 
The empirical part of the thesis starts with Chapter 5, which mainly 
examines the role of business actors at the national level governance of 
carbon offset activities. The intrinsic but subtle relationship between state 
regulations and market activities at the various stages of CDM market are 
the focus of the analysis. Chapter 6 shifts the analytical focus to the local 
or municipal level where the projects are actually set up. The relationship 
between local dynamics and trans-municipal business such as national 
state owned business champions are at the centre of the discussion since 
such power relations and their impacts are relatively neglected in 
previous studies in the CDM context. As the last empirical chapter, 
Chapter 7 looks at the inter-business conflicts that are constraining 
business companies. It reveals how various forms of leverage and 
strategies among business actors collide and how this process changes 
their overall impacts on the CDM governance at both local and national 
levels. Chapter 8 presents a summary of the key findings, their policy, 
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theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and the directions for 
future research. 
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Figure 1.1 Number of CDM projects by months 
 
    Projects with CERs issued         Registration requested but no issuance       Still at validation      Rejected validation by DOEs 
 
(Source: UNEP Risoe 2013) 
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Figure 1. 4: Research Question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
How CDM is governed by business actors in China and its implications for the 
country’s clean development? 
Key Question 1: Who governs China’s 
CDM market? 
Key Question 2: How powerful are business actors 
in the governance of RE-CDMs in China?  
Key Question 3: What are the implications of 
business power for the quality of CDM projects? 
Who are the most active 
business actors in the market? 
What is their strategic goal 
and priority in the CDM 
market? 
What are their specific roles in 
the terms of governance? 
What are the sources and 
representations of business 
power at the central and 
local level? 
What are the major lobby 
strategies for various 
business actors? 
How are conflicting interests 
dealt with? By networking, 
negotiation or mere 
How the environmental 
integrity of CDM projects is 
upheld in China?  
What are the special features 
of China’s policies over CDM 
and their relationships with 
business influence?  
What about carbon offsetting 
programs for post-2012 era? 
How sustainability 
contribution of CDM is 
evaluated, and by who?  
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2. Literature review  
This chapter provides a summary of related literature regarding to the 
main themes of this research. At the outset, I look at China’s political 
economy in general since the reform era. It is only an outline review with 
the focus on public-market relationships, because a comprehensive 
version of the evolution of China’s domestic politics and policy process 
would take a book in itself. This part of the review is based on the 
assumption that any market or market system in transitional states is 
politically, historically, socially and culturally embedded (Breslin, 2007). 
Therefore in order to understand how any given market is governed, such 
as the CDM market, one has to investigate these contextual and structural 
factors that are constructed to serve specific purposes such as generating 
and trading carbon credits in the market place. 
The second category of the literature is more specifically related to 
China’s policy process on environment and climate change arenas in 
particular. The review of this literature intends to reveal the resemblance 
or differences of China’s environmental or climate politics to its broader 
political practice and tradition. It also helps to illustrate in what specific 
policy context the CDM market is embedded. The third part of the 
literature review considers the studies that are directly related to the CDM 
and its governance, with a focus on its ethical roots, manifest 
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inefficiencies, and possibilities for improvement or reform. The aim is to 
investigate the background knowledge and current debate around CDM 
governance. As explained in Chapter one, the ultimate goal of this 
research is to provide some empirical insights on whether this flexible 
mechanism is environmentally and economically effective and what are 
the causes for its dubious performance in China.  
In general, the literature review will present two traditionally parallel 
tracks of research that may help to lay the foundation for this study. On 
the one side is the analysis of Chinese (environmental) polity and its 
notoriously complicated relationship between the Chinese regulators and 
the business community since the economic reforms began. On the other 
side, however, are the studies of CDM or carbon offset as part of 
international schemes or global efforts to combat climate change. My 
assumption is that CDM has dual identity as both an international 
mechanism with a trans-national climate objective, and a significant part 
of the domestic reality that is subject to the national interests, either 
political or economic. Therefore, both strands of literature are important 
to gain insights on how CDM markets actually evolved along with 
China’s fast changing economy and politics since the last decade. The 
aim of the literature review is to establish a link between the international 
academic critics of CDM and the reality of China’s political economy, 
governance tradition and policy process particularly in the environmental 
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domain. It is believed that once such links are established, it would be 
easier to find out whether academic critics and policy suggestions around 
CDM are actually making sense and why.    
2.1. Studies of China’s state-market relationships in the reform 
era 
The economic reforms that began in 1978 generated profound impacts on 
the relationships between the ruling communist party (CCP), states and 
markets. During the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market oriented hybrid economy, the autonomy of market actors has 
expanded tremendously (Kennedy, 2005). However, it is generally agreed 
among scholars of Chinese political economy that the relationship 
between the state and economy is blurred, and strong elements of state 
control and intervention remain in place (Breslin, 2007, Wank, 1998). 
There is a number of the studies that illustrate the retaining control of 
state institutions and their influence over policy making and 
implementation via bureaucratic activities such as license management 
and project approval to fine-tune the economic development in their 
favorable directions (Duckett, 1998). In addition, researchers have also 
revealed other factors that add to the complex picture. For example, on 
the one hand, much of the non-state sector in China originates from the 
party elite, either direct relatives or close friends of senior party-state 
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officers (Dickson, 2003). On the other hand, private business leaders are 
found trying to secure CCP membership or affiliate their business 
activities to a state-controlled organization, known as the ‘red hat’ 
strategy, in order to gain a political advantage over their competitors 
(Chen, 2007). These complicated features lead to claims that in reality it 
is all but impossible and pointless to distinguish between public and 
private spheres in China (Wank, 1998), as much of what is theoretically 
considered ‘non-state’ and ‘state’ is so closely connected and 
interweaved.  
Therefore, the idea is well accepted among scholars of contemporary 
China that the country’s state-market boundary is particularly hazy, and 
the power of the business community and their level of involvement in 
the policy process remains a highly contested argument because there is 
strong evidence that the non-state actors are spawned by the party-state 
sector (Breslin, 2007; Wank, 1998). In the following paragraphs, I divide 
the studies of Chinese contemporary political economy into three sub-
categories. Firstly, I focus on the studies regarding central-local 
relationships as major political change during the reform era. I argue that 
contemporary central-local relationship is the key to understand various 
connections and controlling mechanisms over business elites at different 
political purviews. Secondly, I look at the studies that focus on economic 
factors that affect business actors’ political strategy such as their 
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ownership, company size, market share and technology capability. In the 
third part, I emphasize studies that intend to identify the distinctive 
patterns or features of state-market annexes in China. In other words, by 
breaking down both ‘state’ and ‘market’ as monolithic groups to find out 
their symbiotic interactions, I intend to highlight how these theoretically 
rival actor groups became connected and allied.  
2.1.1. Central-local relationship: a fragmented 
authoritarianism  
There is a considerable large literature on the relationship between central 
and local authorities in China, and most of these studies agree that along 
with the shift from a centrally planned economy to a more market 
oriented economy, the authoritarianism in Beijing is waning and local 
governments’ autonomy is gaining prominence (Breslin, 2007; Chung, 
1995; Oi, 1995). Among these studies Breslin’s (2007) argument is most 
straight forward, that local authorities at different levels in China are 
powerful enough to decide whether to adhere to central regulation or not, 
hence if China is truly shifting from a centrally controlled economy to a 
market regulated one, it is only a partial capitalist system that is 
voluntarily participated in by the local states. 
However, since it is also obvious that different localities would have 
different levels of authority (Goodman, 1997) many studies set out to 
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answer the question of what makes some localities more or less powerful, 
compared to others (Cheung et al, 1997; Hendrichke and Feng, 1999). No 
consensus has been reached but factors like cultural identities, local 
leadership, and roles in the national economy are attributed as relevant to 
the different degree of autonomy at local levels. Although the process of 
decentralization is not the focus of this research, these earlier studies 
illustrate the necessity to look at what happens at the sub-state level of the 
carbon market by taking into consideration the internal processes and 
dynamics within the localities.  
As for the relationship between the local states and the market, two 
important insights are found in previous studies. One is that given the 
growing autonomy, governments are found to deploy innovative and 
proactive policies to generate income and encourage development 
(Bernstein and Lu, 2003). In this regard, most of the reforms in China are 
essentially carried out in the bottom-up fashion. One typical example is 
the flagship reform program in rural areas, the household contract 
responsibility system, which was formally adopted in the agriculture 
sector in 1981 and later extended to other economic sectors. Yet, this 
system was actually invented by a group of poor farmers in Anhui 
province in 1978, who signed the contracts with village leaders in secret 
and they were willing to risk being labeled and even prosecuted as anti-
revolutionary capitalists or landlords. They were lucky because the then 
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province leader in Anhui, Wan Li, was a reformist in the party, who 
eventually recommended this innovative mechanism to Deng Xiaoping 
and got it formally adopted and promoted. Throughout the history of 
China’s economic reform such bottom up innovations can be found in 
many key sectors of the economy and are well documented by both 
Chinese and Western researchers (Chen el al, 1992; Rawski, 1995).  
The other important insight is the notion of the so called local state 
corporatism or rampant patronage relationship at various localities (Oi, 
1995; Wank, 1998). On the one hand, the local state maintains firm 
control over local business activities by controlling their financial 
resources such as tax revenue, fees, license, and investment plan (Breslin, 
2008; Kennedy, 2005), as well as political resources such as the local 
judicial system (Xie, 1999). Harassment, interference, and consequently 
corruption are rampant as business elites usually have to seek protection 
from individual political officers to stay in business. On the other hand, 
however, local states act as a protector or promoter of local business in 
competing with other localities or securing favorable treatment from 
higher officialdom. Oi (1995) pointed out that local political leaders are 
in effect acting like CEOs of the business who zealously promote 
business activities as a major drive of economic development. This 
situation became obvious after the taxation reform in 1994, when fiscal 
revenue from local business income tax became arguably the only major 
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revenue source for most of the local governments (Tsui and Wang, 2004). 
In addition, for a relentless pro-development nation, thriving business 
sector and high GDP growth is the single most important benchmark to 
evaluate the performance of the local leaders (Li and Zhou, 2005). Hence 
for the sake of money and careers, local leaders often do not hesitate to 
provide all kinds of support to keep their enterprises in good shape. In the 
same vein, local leaders are found to deter outside competitors fiercely 
and protectionism has become the major features of Chinese sub-state 
political economy (Huang, 2002; Young, 2000). The result is a less 
integrated national economy with limited internal trade as most local 
companies prefer to trade with overseas partners rather than their 
neighbors (Sasuga, 2004).  
The relentless support from the local state officers for their patronage of 
business is believed by some researchers to be the engine of China’s 
miraculous economic growth (Oi, 1999). But it has obvious drawbacks 
too, one of them is a lack of coordination at the macro-level since local 
leaders can choose to ignore the national goals and interests if they are in 
conflict with their own (Tsai, 2004). Protectionism at the local level also 
encourages widespread duplication of successful ventures in neighboring 
localities and consequently leads to overcapacity and weakening 
competitiveness in the given sector (Yu, 2004). Consequently, some 
Chinese researchers refer to this ‘local control and protect’ model as the 
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old feudal or dukedom economy (Shen and Dai, 1990; Xie, 1999). 
These insights on China’s local political economy provide an important 
analytical reference to this research. For example, although the patron-
client ties appear to be hierarchical, beneath it are the needs of exchange 
of resources that are held by the opposite party. It helps to understand the 
reaction of local states to the call from the central government to promote 
CDM activities. There are a handful of studies that tackled the local 
politics in the CDM market and illustrated the local appetite to develop 
hybrid institutions with market actors (Qi et al, 2008; Schroeder, 2009). 
But these studies have not yet captured the tradition and culture of 
China’s transitional local politics and integrate these factors into their 
analysis. Therefore they have not yet answered the key questions such as 
why hybrid institutions are more welcomed than other institutional 
arrangements in China’s carbon market, or why certain project types such 
as RE-CDMs are more popular, or why local states are not very keen to 
uphold environmental or sustainability principles of CDM projects even 
though these projects are to be built on their doorsteps.   
Another gap that that can be noted among the existing CDM literature is 
that most of the studies fail to capture the important fact that the growth 
of local autonomy is by no means a linear process. On the contrary, 
according to MIT Professor Yasheng Huang (1996, 2008), local 
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autonomy experienced ups and downs throughout the years of struggle 
with both central government and the often trans-locality market actors. 
Huang (2008) also pointed out that there were many times during the 
reform when central government tried to re-capture or retain some parts 
of local authority. Meanwhile, local business actors may grow so fast that 
they are no longer satisfied with their ‘offspring’ statues. In this research, 
all these dynamics have been carefully examined via the analysis of the 
local development of CDM markets. Hopefully such analysis would 
contribute to the existing understanding of China’s local political 
economy.  
2.1.2. From dependents to allies 
Then how about the power of business in China? Are companies just 
treated as a subordinated class to the state sector? At least on the surface, 
the patronage relationship observed in the Chinese state-business 
relationship seems to suggest that the ongoing market reforms have not 
yet significantly increased the power of business actors in terms of their 
capabilities to affect national policy (Wank, 1998). Zweig (1999, p67) 
argues that business in China is no more than ‘barnacles on a ship’ and 
their life substance, such as credits, market opportunities or favorable 
regulatory environment, depend heavily on the officialdom that they were 
spun off. Other studies echo with such arguments by going further to 
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explore the role of the ruling CCP in the transitional economy. Breslin 
(2007) insists that the party resists any substantial challenge to its 
dominant position in Chinese polity. Zhang (2003) believes that the 
newly emerged social groups or agencies, including business actors, are 
largely the new representatives of state interests, and the level of their 
independence or autonomy is given and controlled by the party-state. In 
other words, it is a result of intentional incorporation from above 
(Howell, 1998; Solinger, 1992) and hence there is no real independence 
of anyone from the private sector, since the state has the capability to 
reverse the trend when they see fit (Breslin, 2007).   
Another group of studies echoes this view by studying business 
associations in China. Foster (2001, 2002) asserted in his empirical study 
of local industry associations in China that these institutions are merely 
extensions of bureaucratic systems and state authority. Wank (1998) and 
Bruun (1996) argue that trans-sectoral associations that are directly 
appointed and sponsored by the state are often found squeezing or 
shutting down spontaneous grass-root industry associations, often at the 
local level. In general, these studies explain why business associations 
fail to undertake their roles as a platform for organized business lobbying 
as they normally do in developed countries, and probably more 
importantly, why most business actors prefer to rely on direct and 
personalized networks or relationships with the state officers (or the 
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‘guanxi’ relationships) in the Chinese business society (Gold et al, 2002). 
This strong relationship is so endemic and symbiotic that some believe 
the economic reforms in the last thirty years are not driving the society 
towards pluralism (Meisner, 1996) but on the contrary, it creates a single 
blended class of ‘entrepreneur bureaucrats’ in China.  
Alternative opinions, however, argue that it would be simplistic to treat 
business community as the mere dependents of the party-state. An 
important work on business power in China is Kennedy’s study on 
business lobbying activities in three different economic sectors, namely 
steel, electronic goods and the software industry (Kennedy, 2005). His 
main finding is that business actors in different markets deploy a wide 
range of strategies and techniques to influence the policy making process. 
Factors such as ownership, company size or market share plays an 
important role in the success rate of their influence in the polity 
(Kennedy, 2005). Another important insight is that big companies no 
longer wish to be the passive receivers of policies that are closely related 
to their business interests, to them ‘public policy is business’ (Kennedy, 
2005 pp.176).  
The contrasting arguments of business power in the contemporary China 
prove one thing, that it would be at least simplistic to assume that the 
state-market relationship in China has a fixed pattern across various 
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economic sectors. Any attempt to describe China’s current state-private 
relationship with a fixed pattern or model would be futile. In some 
markets or some localities, businesses do operate like ‘barnacles on the 
ship’, but in other sectors business actors are gaining prominence in 
policy making process, such that their identity has been largely changed 
from mere dependents to meaningful allies or partners with the state. It 
would be interesting to investigate the position of business actors in the 
CDM markets in between this spectrum.   
2.1.3. Distinctive features of the Chinese state-market 
relationship 
If there is no fixed pattern that can be applied to describe the 
contemporary state-market relationship in China, how can we analyze the 
influence of business actors in any given sector? Previous studies provide 
several excellent clues on how to navigate through complex relationship 
map and grasp some the distinctive features of the political and economic 
dynamics.  
2.1.3.1. Transparency and direct interactions 
One important feature of the Chinese market is a lack of transparency, 
which means every market has insiders who can use social capital or 
guanxi to secure important knowledge and information as a key source of 
power (Breslin, 2007). Although some critics argue that it is not the 
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authorities’ intention to retain an opaque system, it is rather obvious that 
the lack of transparency has been constantly exploited by officers, 
particularly at the introduction phase of new market or projects. Breslin 
(2007) points out that new regulation that overlaps with the existing 
regulations is often the main source of confusion and bureaucratic battles, 
though they are not intentional consequences. In this regard too much 
regulation is even worse than too little regulation.  
Transparency issues are linked with state-market analysis because, as 
many believe, the heavy reliance on personal connections with the 
officers is the main cause of the lack of transparency and even corruption 
in the public policy domain (Su and Littlefield, 2001). However, it is also 
believed that the reliance on personal contacts and direct interactions 
between business leaders and state officers is not a new product of 
economic reform but a legacy of Maoist planned economy, since at that 
time both parties had to negotiate over the details of the production plan 
almost on a daily basis (Kennedy, 2005). This tradition of direct contacts 
with the officers remained strong during the reform era as an efficient 
way of communication over case specific issues. However, despite its 
vulnerability to rent seeking and corruption, my argument is that it is 
crucial to understand the accumulative effect of these interactions on 
policy making, change and implementation processes, same thing which 
is carried out in this research. 
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2.1.3.2. Capturing the transformation and dynamics  
The previous studies also illustrate two important insights. The first is 
that no relationship is static and the basis of state or private power is 
always transforming (Hong, 2004). Within the Chinese economy, private 
companies, state-controlled companies and foreign businesses have all 
gone through tremendous changes in the last decade or so. Within the 
public sector, new institutions and regulations emerge almost on an daily 
basis. Yasheng Huang’s excellent studies (Huang, 1996, 2002, 2008) on 
some major transformations in the key economic sectors such as finance 
and infrastructure during the reforms provide a strong case of the 
necessity and value to present longitudinal analysis in a given sector, 
rather than only snapshots of the reality.   
Related to the first insight, is recognition of the non-linear nature of the 
dynamics in China’s political economy. The literature reviewed in the 
above sections presents no convincing evidence that there is a smooth 
trend from a ‘command-and-control’ system to a more ‘market oriented’ 
one, hence contradictory conclusions arise regarding the nature of the 
Chinese political economy. As Breslin (2007) argues if we really want to 
believe that along with the state elites there are new economic elites, and 
they have become an effective alliance to mutually reinforces each 
other’s power and fortunes in contemporary China, we have to question 
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not only what businesses have as their power basis, but also what the state 
actually lacks. But more importantly, I argue that we need to know the 
exact resource exchange mechanism between the state and market actors, 
which may vary significantly from one sector to another, as well as from 
one locality to another.  
2.2. Environmental governance and politics in China  
The purpose of reviewing studies on China’s environmental politics is 
twofold. I wish to know the extent to which the environmental domain 
resembles the overall context of China’s political economy. In addition, I 
want to know in what way they differ. Since political dynamics in the 
climate change area are largely apart from other environmental issues 
such as pollution control or loss of bio-diversity, special attention has 
been given to those studies focused on China’s climate policy in recent 
years. It is obviously unrealistic to document a full intellectual history of 
China’s environmental politics therefore the thematic focus is again 
directed to the role of state actors and civil society in the environmental 
realm. I also pay close attention to the research on China’s international 
involvement in and cooperation on environmental issues, which appears 
to me the greatest difference between environmental problems and other 
domestic issues.  
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2.2.1. State and civil society in environmental problems 
Wu (2009) pointed out in her review of environmental politics studies in 
China that few studies had been done before China’s economic reforms 
regarding China’s environmental management because the access to 
mainland China was difficult. Fieldwork, personal interviews and even 
survey research methods came into use only after the mid-1980s. 
Therefore, most of the studies that intend to reveal China’s pre-reform 
environmental statues are based on secondary data and narrated in a 
retrospective manner. Among these pilot studies, Judith Shapiro’s work 
presents the devastating impact of Chinese politics on China's 
environment during the Mao years. Under Mao, the traditional Chinese 
ideal of 'harmony between heaven and humans' was abrogated in favor of 
insistence belief of 'People Will Conquer Nature'. Shapiro’s strong 
argument is that the abuse of people and the abuse of nature are often 
linked (Shapiro, 2001). Peter Ho (2003) however, by using the first-grain 
campaign as example, argues that the negative effect of Mao’s policy 
may be exaggerated and the environmental degradation is the result of 
comprehensive social factors rather than the sole victim of irrational 
policies.  
No matter what caused the environmental degradation in China’s 
revolutionary period, it is generally agreed that the situation continued to 
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worsen after the economic reform started. Elizabeth Economy’s famous 
book, The River Runs Black, provides both rich narratives and 
comprehensive theories of the political causes of the environmental 
degradation in China (Economy, 2004). Other scholars such as Lester 
Ross also started to focus on the role of the state, whose work aims to 
provide comprehensive understandings of China’s governance structure, 
regulatory setting, key agencies, policy process, and law enforcement in 
environmental areas (Ross 1987, 1992, and 1998). Ross and other critics’ 
findings, to sum up, are that environmental governance resembles the 
overall Chinese governance system in terms of its ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ (Jahiel, 1998; Lieberthal, 1997; Mertha, 2009), as 
analyzed in preceding paragraphs. However, the level of fragmentation is 
particularly high because most of the environmental issues are trans-
sectoral and therefore trans-institutional in terms of its regulation and 
governance (Wu, 2009).  
This high degree of fragmentation is believed to be the main reason for 
poor coordination, low capacity, and slack rule enforcement in the 
environmental areas (Harkness, 1998; Lema and Ruby, 2007). Wu (2009) 
also argues that the environmental regulators, as the newly emergent 
institution, have raised bureaucratic friction with the existing regulators. 
This argument echoes with Breslin’s findings that new rules and 
regulations are often the source of incoherence and conflicts (Breslin, 
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2007). Another general finding is that environmental issues are often 
subdued with local leaders’ strong pro-development commitment in the 
past 30 years (Economy, 2006; Jahiel, 1997), which also leads to a 
weaker position of environmental protection units in the officialdom.  
Another trend of studies departed from the state-centric approach to look 
at emerging environmental NGOs and social movements. Wu (2009) 
pointed out that the environmental sector is the forerunner and most fully 
developed area in terms of the rapid emergence of NGOs and suchlike 
associations. A large amount of studies have thus been carried out to 
understand their origins, roles, and even future prospects in China (Ho, 
2001; Schwartz, 2004; Yang, 2005). Although few would dispute that the 
NGO community is growing fast in China, many critics are dubious of 
their autonomy and effectiveness as watchdogs of environmental 
problems. Peter Ho (2001), for example, is suspicious that NGOs in 
China would bring out fundamental transformations and argues that all 
these organizations can do is to adapt but rather oppose to the Chinese 
political reality (Ho and Edmonds, 2007).  
On the other hand, there are more optimistic opinions. Researchers 
believe that using un-confrontational strategies is not only wise but also 
effective in terms of persuading local authorities to change attitudes and 
take action (Mol and Carter, 2006; Saich, 2000; Yang, 2005). The 
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disagreement echoes with the debate about the rise of business power in 
the previous sections. In this regard, studies of environmental NGOs and 
social activism provide another window to reflect the non-state actors’ 
role in nvironmental governance.  
2.2.2. International cooperation and environmental 
diplomacy  
One of the distinctive features of China’s environmental politics is the 
close links between domestic environmental problems and international 
cooperation and diplomacy. Liu and Diamond (2005) believe that given 
China’s size of population, territory and natural resources its domestic 
environmental issues can be a severe challenge to the world. In addition, 
along with the China’s economic miracle is its increasing influence in the 
global affairs, particularly with the developing world under the name of 
the G77. Therefore, academic focus has been given to both China’s 
cooperation with foreign entities to address its own environmental 
problems, and its involvement, attitude and role in international 
environmental regimes (Carter and Mol, 2006; Chan and Lee, 2008).  
As for international cooperation, researchers find that due to the lack of 
experience and technology in dealing with environmental issues, the 
Chinese government has been quite open for innovative governance 
devices and policies (Harris, 2002; Zhang and Wen, 2008). Many joint 
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projects and institutions were established (Wu, 2003) and international 
norms are introduced in regulating issues like biotechnology (Keeley, 
2006). There are many studies that document the international efforts to 
reform China’s environmental sector (Hyun and Schreurs, 2007; Morten, 
2005)  
As for China’s participation in international environmental regimes, it is 
noted that entering these treaties has pushed China to induce domestic 
policy and regulations to meet international standards (Falkner, 2006; 
Newell, 2003). Yu (2008) also pointed out that due to the fact that the 
environmental protection ministry is a relatively weak institution in the 
domestic political system, environmental officers often use China’s 
participation in international treaties as the justification to push for new 
domestic regulations or bureaucratic coordination in related areas.  
2.2.3. Climate politics in China: from outside-in 
Previous studies of Chinese climate change policies and politics reveal 
that there are many identical features between climate governance and 
environmental governance in China. Firstly, fragmentation is also 
inevitable in climate change domain as GHG mitigation or adaptation 
policies would include almost all the key economic sectors in the country. 
Heggelund (2007) points out that bureaucratic coordination and conflict 
is an important issue in China since many key ministry level institutions, 
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such as NDRC, China Meteorological Administration (CMA), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 
all want a role in the decision making process. Behind these formal 
government entities there are think tanks, consultancies, and academics 
who are also injecting their efforts into the policy process on a daily 
basis.  
The second similarity is that just like other environmental issues, climate 
politics have both domestic and international dynamics. Many researchers 
argue that it is not the warming planet itself but related domestic issues, 
such as energy consumption, energy security, or the social stability that 
led to the change of attitudes among government officers throughout the 
years (Economy, 1996). Co-authored by 16 top climate scientist, Piao el 
al (2010) pointed out, in their paper published in Nature, that the impact 
of recent climate change on China’s water resources and agriculture is 
rather limited but ‘one cannot rule out the possibility of strong negative 
climate change impacts on food production, even though the most 
optimistic scenario provides a net increase.’ (Piao et al, 2010; pp. 50)  
However, comparing the uncertainties and threats of climate change on 
China, Wiener (2008) argues that the biggest obstacle to persuade China 
to embark on comprehensive climate change policies is still the worry of 
its negative effects on national economic development. Therefore, 
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illustrating the net benefits of serious GHG mitigation effort, such as 
reducing damage of climate related natural disasters, improving public 
health, and pressing technology innovation and upgrade are crucial 
elements to understand in order to induce meaningful policy change in 
China (Wiener, 2008).  
Given that the climate change issues have only been elevated to the 
political agenda since the mid-2000s, most of the climate related policies 
are just issued in the last few years and many more are still under 
discussion and at preparation stage. There are at the moment, very few 
studies that provide comprehensive analysis of these policies and their 
outcomes. On the contrary, the academic focus is primarily on China’s 
role in the international climate regime. Specifically, many studies have 
been carried out to interrogate if China should commit to a quantitative 
cap on its emissions. Zhang (2000) envisions that some efforts and 
commitments could be expected from China only when its per capita 
income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries. It is very 
unlikely that China would impose a commitment that would severely 
jeopardize economic development. A decade later, Zhang (2011) again 
claims that China needs to take on an absolute emission cap around 2030 
via several intermediary phases to reduce carbon intensity, try a ‘no-lose’ 
target, and binding carbon intensity target as international commitment.  
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Just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Summit, China pledged to cut its 
carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 to its 2005 level, which sparked off 
intense debate of whether such target are ambitious or merely ‘business 
as usual’ (Qiu, 2009). Stern and Jolzo (2010) believe that China needs 
substantial mitigation efforts to meet its stated target. But Zhang (2011) 
believes the target is neither ambitious nor ‘business as usual’, to him the 
most important thing is to ensure the targets are met in a credible way. 
Wang et al (2011) compares the different responses and contrasting 
policies from two local provinces, Anhui and Fujian, to the national 
carbon intensity target. Their study reveals that integrating the national 
target into local energy, development and sustainability policies can be a 
daunting task for the local government.  
The previous studies indicate an important message. No matter what has 
been pledged by the Chinese government at the international conferences, 
it will be sooner or later translated into the local level, and hence China’s 
climate policy outcomes are highly subject to the Chinese local political 
economy as explained in the previous sections of this review. At least at 
the surface, China’s climate politics followed a trickling down of 
international-national-local process and it is an on-going process with a 
lot of uncertainties and struggles (Heggelund, 2007; Newell, 2008). 
Therefore, any attempt to analyze the performance of climate policies in 
China should adopt a bottom up approach to fully capture this process of 
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‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.  
2.3. Studies of CDM: growing out of the criticism 
The inception of CDM sparked off extensive discussion among academic, 
policy, business and public communities. The mechanism is arguably the 
most critically acclaimed and debated policy instrument under the KP 
during the last few years and consequently there is a substantial body of 
work around almost every aspect of CDM. Yet the popularity of CDM 
and the flourishing of research is by no means a surprise, since the 
mechanism itself presents a number of theoretical, technical and 
empirical paradoxes or puzzles that attract attention of scholars’ from 
various disciplinary backgrounds. The presentation and debates of these 
paradoxes and puzzles, as well as their relevance to this research will be 
documented in this section.  
This section begins with a brief review of the controversial nature of 
carbon offsetting, since the ethical justification of the idea of ‘putting a 
price on nature’ remains questionable to many critics (Daily et al, 2000). 
CDM in particular, as the newly internationalized market instrument to 
tackle climate change, has been interrogated for its moral grounds of 
purchasing low-cost offset credits (from the poor countries) to 
compensate for a high-consumption lifestyle in the West (Bohm and 
Dabhi, 2010; Smith, 2007). It is not my intention to join the debate of 
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ethical justification of the CDM since it is simply beyond the scope of 
this study. Yet I wish to lay out these fundamental arguments about 
carbon offsetting to raise an important question, which is why a highly 
contentious mechanism or idea can be accepted and promoted without 
any (open) challenge from the Chinese academic, policy making, 
business circles, and the general public.  
The second part of the review focuses on the various problems of CDM 
presented in the previous research. Issues like capacity building or 
institutional arrangements, additionality or environmental integrity, 
sustainability contribution to the host countries, and technology transfer 
embroiled in the projects, are at the center of this review. There is a 
wealth of single case studies that focus on a given country or economic 
sector, but together they present a general trend towards questioning 
some fundamental elements of the CDM’s performance both in terms of 
its integrity and its effectiveness for global GHG emission mitigation 
efforts. Given the large body of literature in these areas I focus mainly on 
the case studies related to China and the renewable energy sector, which 
is directly relevant to this research. I also look at those studies that intend 
to provide solutions to address these inefficiencies of the CDM, in the 
hope that the review can help to understand the possible outcome if these 
theoretical suggestions would be applied to China.   
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2.3.1. Carbon offset: a divided ethical ground 
It is now generally accepted that most of the environmental problems that 
we face today are induced by the externalities of the market activities, or 
a market failure. The British economist Arthur Pigou (1932) is the first 
scholar to advocate government intervention to fix this problem by 
introducing a corrective tax (Pigovian tax) on the producers of negative 
externalities. Pigou’s idea remained as the mainstream solution until an 
American economist R. Coase published his revolutionary paper ‘the 
Problems of Social Cost’ in 1960, which is written largely to challenge 
Pigou’s tradition of government intervention on economic externalities. 
In his paper Coase (1994) argues that given the clearly defined property 
rights and minimized transaction cost, the externalities can be 
‘internalized’ by negotiations and bargains among the pollution producers 
themselves without any government intervention. Inspired by Coase, 
economists like Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972) formally proposed 
an emission trading system as a new policy tool to control pollution. 
Since then, the debate of whether, or in what condition, a corrective tax 
scheme would be outperformed by a cap and trade mechanism has almost 
been the eternal challenge for environmental economics and policy 
studies until today (Keohane, 2009). 
Yet in reality, emission trading has later become the preferred method for 
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environmental governance in some of the most advanced economies such 
as the US and Europe, from the regulation of acid rain to sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions, and then the world's largest emissions market, the 
European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for carbon 
dioxide (CO2). Emission trading, once called ‘grand policy experiment’ 
by Stavins (1997), shows no sign of slowing down its pace by stepping 
into just another source of pollution and realm of governance. The 
explanations of the salience of emission trading, however, are often more 
political than economic. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) reveals that 
business actors would prefer quantity-based market instruments (cap and 
trade) to a price-based carbon tax, because the former policy creates a 
new entry barrier for the newcomers, who have to buy the pollution 
permits from the market.  
Schneider and Volkert (1999) follow this public choice approach to 
further argue that since it is very difficult for the beneficiaries of 
environmental tax to organize a collective expression of their interests 
and voices, their political influence is considerably low. Policy makers 
would prefer a quantity based instrument if the policy making process is 
highly subjective to the leverage of interests groups. In addition, many 
scholars believe that the ideological shift to neo-liberalism since the 
1980s in the major Western countries, paved the way for a full-fledged 
embrace of permit trading instruments in accordance with the idea of 
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‘nature-as-commodity’ and efficiency oriented policy making mentality 
(Byrne and Yun 1999; Levy and Newell, 2005; Newell and Paterson, 
2010) 
2.3.1.1. Carbon offset as a fundamentally un-ethical approach  
Set aside the struggle for policy championship between a carbon tax and 
offset instrument from the welfare economics perspectives, the skeptical 
voices of carbon offset’s moral ground never dissipate in the academic 
and public communities. The debate of ethics is regarded by many as 
dauntingly absent in the orthodox economics of environmental policy 
(Spash, 2010). However, it should be noted that there are various logics 
and arguments that lead to a moral objection to using market approach in 
dealing with environmental problems. Lovell (2008) pointed out that 
pricing nature is believed to degrade the existing non-monetary value of 
the environment and turns the intrinsic value of the environment into an 
instrumental value. In such cases, moral values such as duty to others and 
care for the planet, are seen to be subsumed and disregarded, because the 
companies are allowed to pollute in ‘business as usual’ ways by buying 
carbon credits from other resources (Bohm and Dabhi, 2010). The idiom 
of ‘the polluter pays’ has been changed into, with the creation of market 
instrument such as a carbon market, the polluter pays someone else to 
pollute less (Newell, 2011).  
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Another argument of moral objection is that market instruments have a 
negative psychological impact as they are at least diverting, if not 
completely counteracting, the efforts to make painful structural economic 
and industrial changes that are urgently needed to prevent irreversible 
climate change (Spash, 2010). Spash (2010) also argues that the 
expansion of carbon offset is particularly worrying in terms of fairness 
and equity, when taking into the consideration the ‘historical 
responsibility’ of the polluters (mainly industrial countries), when the 
average duration of some GHGs in the atmosphere is between 200 and 
300 years. Some critics argue, rather in a sarcastic manner, that if the 
polluters sincerely ‘want other people to clean it up for them’, their 
historical emissions in the past 200 years should also be capped and 
traded equally with their present and future emission (Lohmann 2008; 
Smith 2007).  
Lovell (2010) pointed out that the above critics essentially deny the role 
of the carbon market since commodifying carbon is viewed as 
fundamentally immoral and unjust. According to this neo-colonist 
perspective, carbon offset is morally unacceptable as it entices developing 
countries to clean up the waste produced by the developed countries in 
the North, therefore these instruments should be removed completely 
from the policy agenda (Lohmann 2008; Smith 2007).  
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2.3.1.2. Mild critics on ethical issues  
Alternatively, other critics believe that basic concept of carbon offset is 
acceptable, only the design, architecture of specific market mechanisms 
have serious flaws so that these instruments cannot possibly achieve the 
environmental and political goal that was initially promised (Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008). So there is a set of more practical debates about the 
effectiveness of markets in mitigating climate change. 
At the outset is the worry of speculation (Button, 2008). Although 
speculation exists, theoretically, for almost all the commodities in the 
market, speculation on the carbon units is believed to be particularly 
worrying for two reasons. Firstly, carbon credits are easy targets for 
speculation due to its ‘invisible’ nature of its generation process 
(Mansfield and Boyd, 2007). CDM is therefore another example of a 
creative accounting project and consequently derivatives transactions 
based on carbon units will not only be transacted by regulated entities 
with the aim of minimizing compliance costs and price risk, but also by 
financial intermediaries looking for quick profit from the new market 
(Button, 2008). The field study of this research also illustrates that most 
of the carbon credit buyers in China are intermediaries rather than the end 
users of CERs. This phenomenon echoes with worries that the boom in 
trading of carbon credits is no more than another round of ‘sub-prime’ 
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bubble that will implode sooner or later (Lohmann, 2008; Mol, 2012; 
Spash, 2010).  
Narain (2010) argues that carbon business must not fall into the trap of 
cheap or corrupt emission reduction deals with only market value, aiming 
only to make a quick buck. Yet the question is how? Taking CDM as an 
example, the ideals of this instrument include assisting Annex-1 countries 
in complying with their emission reduction commitment (with genuine 
carbon credits), achieving sustainable development in the South, and 
helping holding together the fragile coalition of international climate 
cooperation. Liverman and Boyd (2008) argue that only when all these 
high-end purposes have been achieved that the adoption of quantity-based 
market instruments to reduce the political barriers of GHG emission 
reduction, though a sub-optimal policy option, can be acceptable and 
should be even welcomed as a meaningful part of efforts to combat 
climate change. A huge body of literature illustrates that after a decade of 
experiment with CDM, the result is far from satisfactory, as explained in 
the following paragraphs.  
2.3.2. Problems of the CDM: manifestations and 
remedies.  
The ethical questions about CDM encourage a vast body of literatures on 
the investigation of CDM projects’ on the ground performance in host 
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countries. Most of the studies are based on extensive field studies in a 
given country or economic sector, in order to evaluate the qualities of one 
or a few aspects of the proposed CDM projects. Generally speaking, the 
problems emerging from these studies include the dubious additionality 
or environmental integrity of some project types, very limited (if any at 
all) sustainability contribution to the local areas, and lack of technology 
transfer involved within the project implementation.  
2.3.2.1. Environmental integrity of the CDM 
Environmental integrity is the most central concern for any offset 
program, because if the amount of emission reduction credits is over 
calculated or simply forged, it would indeed increase the overall 
emissions once these credits are used to offset emissions made elsewhere, 
in the case of CDM these are namely the developed countries 
(Michaelowa, 2005; Paulsson, 2009). In such cases the overall 
justification of the mechanism would collapse. In the realm of CDM, the 
most intensively debated integrity issue is undoubtedly the notion of 
additionality, namely a situation that some projects would occur even in 
the absence of CDM support. 
Schneider (2009) argues that additionality measurement is the most 
important and difficult prerequisite to maintaining the environmental 
integrity of the CDM. The flawed quantification of CERs or a leakage 
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will only put part of the carbon credits in question, but if the project itself 
is not additional from the beginning, all the CERs produced are then fake 
credits. It is a ‘total-loss’ in terms of the environmental integrity and 
hence should be prevented through all means. But it is by no means an 
easy task, since there is an inborn paradox, according to Michael Grubb 
(1999), as the most ‘cost-effective’ projects may be the least ‘additional’ 
and strict project additionality would give perverse policy incentives.  
However, many scholars are optimistic and propose ways to define and 
check additionality of projects (Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003; Shrestha 
and Timilsina 2002; Sugiyama and Michaelowa, 2001). Notably, most of 
these ideas are later integrated into the additionality checking procedures 
at the UN EB, which include barrier analysis, common practice analysis 
and financial return analysis as the major toolsets to determine the 
eligibility of CDM projects. Yet, it should be noted that the problem of 
additionality is not a mere technical issue. The fundamental problem is 
that the question of whether a project would also be implemented without 
the CDM is hypothetical: it can never be proved with absolute certainty 
(Schneider, 2009). In reality, only investors know exactly the profit 
margin of their projects. After a careful examination of more than 93 
CDM projects’ project design documents (PDDs), Schneider (2009) 
identifies a number of serious weaknesses in the way in which 
additionality is assessed in the CDM practice, which is the cause for a 
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large number of suspicious projects rushing into the pipeline.  
There are number of supportive case studies for Schneider’s critics of 
additionality assessment. For example, the term ‘icing on the cake’ has 
been used in many studies (Ellis and Kamel, 2007; McCully, 2008) to 
describe the rather embarrassing situation that CER revenue is not the 
reason for undertaking the CDM project in the first place. This means that 
the underlying project may need to be economically attractive enough 
even in the absence of the CDM in order to attract sufficient investment 
capital (Haya, 2007; McCully, 2008). Michaelowa and Purohit (2007) 
also identify some clearly non-additional projects in the Indian market. 
Chinese CDM projects received particular criticism in terms of their 
integrity, Wara and Victor (2008) showed that most of the renewable 
energy projects in China are seeking CDM credits. Assuming that no or 
only very few new gas, wind or hydropower plants would be added to the 
grid without the CDM incentive, which is in reality a highly implausible 
scenario given the supportive policies that China has adopted during the 
period. Victor (2008) estimates that between one-third and two-thirds of 
the CDM projects are not additional. With the same logic, Haya (2007) 
concludes that the majority of the hydro-power CDM projects in China 
are not additional, because otherwise the new installed capacity would 
have dropped in 2007 by 65% compared to the 2006 level in the absence 
of CDM – a situation that is hard to believe. 
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The criticism of Chinese CDM projects’ integrity reached its peak after 
the EB rejected 10 Chinese wind farm projects in December 2009, which 
shocked the market as wind energy had been considered as the safest 
choice for CDM development (He and Morse, 2010). Both the Chinese 
government and investors publicly attacked the EB’s decision (see 
Chapter 5 for a detailed review). The controversy presents a vivid 
example of the technical challenge, as previous studies suggest, 
particularly taking the local incentive policies into the consideration of 
additionality assessment. In their detailed report concerning the origin 
and implications of this controversy to the additionality assessment, He 
and Morse (2010) argued, that the existing assessment tool turns a deaf 
ear to the real picture of China’s wind energy development, where the 
investors in the energy sector are not at all market-oriented or profit 
driven, making the existing “internal rate of return” (IRR)-based 
additionality test a systematic failure.  
From the above debate of CDM’s actual additionality it should be noted 
that to prove a project is non-additional is an equally difficult job because 
it is also hypothetical to assume that a project would be ‘definitely’ 
carried out without CDM support. Therefore what most of the above 
mentioned studies present are simply educated guesses rather than solid 
empirical evidence, a gap that this research intends to fill. In addition, it 
should be noted that additionality is not the only integrity issue of CDM. 
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Other problems such as improper baseline design and leakage effects 
would also lead to erroneous calculation of CER and hence affect the 
mechanism’s environmental integrity. Nevertheless, I would like to argue 
that leakage and baseline problems are largely technical issues, which can 
be addressed through more carefully designed methodologies or clearly 
defined project boundaries. Additionality problems are instead deeply 
rooted in the asymmetric information between the market players and 
regulators so it is essentially a political issue, in which the power 
struggles between the market players and regulators (national or 
international) determine the overall integrity of the mechanism (see 
Chapter 5 for details).   
2.3.2.2. Sustainability contributions of the CDM  
There are broadly two key issues around the literature of CDM’s 
contribution to sustainable development in the host countries. Firstly is 
the academic engagement to analyze and improve the measurement 
criteria or quantification benchmarks of sustainable development benefits 
for specific CDM project types. The second trend of academic effort is to 
understand the political difficulties at various levels to enforce a set of 
transparent and universal standard governance procedures for checking 
CDM’s sustainable development. Therefore, the lack of SD contribution 
to the CDM is viewed both a technical and political issue. The research 
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focus of this study is why SD is neglected in China, therefore the second 
trend of literature received particularly attention for this review.  
The inclusion of SD requirement for CDM originates from the ethical 
worry mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Specifically, the designers 
of the CDM were afraid that some projects, even with potential climate 
benefits, may not produce positive environmental and social benefits for 
the host localities (Sutter and Parreno, 2007). However, when it comes to 
practical and concrete assessment of sustainability impact of the CDM 
activities there is no single, authoritative and universally accepted 
method, regardless of the project types and locations (Olsen, 2007). In 
addition, since the incentives for both Annex-1 and Non-Annex 1 parties 
to pursue efficient GHG emissions are much stronger than their desire for 
sustainability (Sutter and Parreno, 2007), the importance of SD benefits 
are most likely to be neglected, if not completely ignored (Ellis et al. 
2007; Pearson 2007). 
It should be noted that this ‘trade-off’ argument has already been 
evidenced by the later development of the market as end-of-the-pipes 
project types such as HFC-23 (a project type with very little SD benefits) 
has dominated the market. But small projects with higher SD benefits are 
not favored by the market due to their low productivity of CERs and high 
transaction costs (Muller, 2007). Another piece of evidence is that 
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countries with ‘lassie-faire requirements’ for SD contributions, such as 
China, have proved to be much more ‘productive’, both in terms of 
number of proposed projects and potential volume of carbon credits, than 
those host nations with relatively more stringent checking rules for SD 
benefits (Newell, 2009).  
Yet sustainability in the CDM context is not just a technical issue. Politics 
plays an important role here. During the climate negotiations, 
governments of developing countries have insisted that SD is so 
contextualized to the characteristics of each country’s specific 
development strategy so it is a ‘sovereign issue’ that should not be 
interfered by any international standards or norms. Consequently, the 
Marrakech Accords in 2001 concedes that developing countries can set 
their own standards and procedures to check the SD benefits of CDM 
activities in their territory. This regulation de facto rejects any possibility 
of imposing a universal guideline or introducing independent parties for 
SD checks in the official governance structures of CDM. David Victor 
(2006) points out that developing countries have rightly feared that the 
developed world’s concern about the environment would overshadow 
their interest in development. CDM and international carbon offsetting is 
just another manifestation of this fear, as many critics believe that, behind 
the almost unanimous rejection from the developing nations of an 
international standard of SD checking for the CDM activities, is the fear 
72 
 
that such standards would essentially impose an interference scheme to 
the developing world and constraint their rights of development (or to 
pollute) (Cosby el al, 2005).  
Hence, although many developing countries welcome CDM as an 
additional channel of finance from the developed countries, they normally 
do not want to be interfered with in relation to how the received funds are 
to be allocated and used within their political purview, because most of 
the countries have their own strategic priorities that may vary 
significantly (See the special issue of The Journal of Environment 
Development, December 2009, vol. 18 for a detailed review of different 
carbon strategies in newly industrializing countries). 
In the case of China, many studies are trying to reveal the political 
intention of the Chinese government to engage in CDM (Qi et al, 2008, 
Schroeder, 2009). Most of these studies arrive at similar conclusions that 
the Chinese government is using this newly created mechanism to 
advance its own SD strategy. For example, it is observed that the political 
emphasis has been put on the technology transfer rather than the financial 
benefits, which is believed to be crucial to cultivate a competent domestic 
green industry (Wang, 2010). For the same reason, many studies reveal 
the tremendous effort by Chinese government to promote favorable 
project types such as renewable project activities through a biased CER 
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taxation mechanism with the combination of other policy instruments 
such as tax exemption or subsidiaries (Lewis, 2010; Resnier et al, 2007; 
Schroeder, 2009). In general, China’s position is clear that as long as the 
proposed CDM is in line with the national development priorities then the 
projects must have positive SD impact (Schroeder, 2009), so basically it 
does not need to enforce a comprehensive guideline or check list for each 
project’s SD benefits within its domestic governance procedures. 
Unfortunately, there remains one important question that the above 
mentioned studies are yet to answer: has the goal of the Chinese 
government been met yet? In the first section of this literature review I 
have explained the central-local dynamics and state-market relationships 
as the two important sets of relationships that may shape the policy goal 
and implementation process on the ground in China. However, these 
relationships and their impact on China’s CDM governance have not yet 
been carefully examined. I argue that without understanding these local 
dynamics any conclusion regarding the causal links between China’s 
CDM performance and its national policies can be highly contestable.  
Mariam Schroeder’s book on China’s local climate governance is the first 
of its kind to interrogate the hybrid institutions at local level (Schroeder, 
2011). Despite the excellent account of local incentives and processes to 
establish and maintain local hybrid CDM offices to reap the benefits of 
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CDM, it has not yet intended to interrogate the impact of these local 
institutional arrangements to the national policy goals. Nevertheless, she 
raises the question at the end of the book that if all parties involved in the 
CDM cycle care only about the economic benefits, who and how can we 
expect to check the environmental quality of this mechanism? This is one 
of the questions that this research intends to answer.  
2.3.2.3. Technology transfer associated with CDM 
The KP and Marrakech Accord do not have an explicit technology 
transfer (TT) mandate for CDM, yet TT is regarded as an important 
source of benefits of international offset mechanisms by financing 
projects using technologies currently not available in the host countries 
(Haites, 2006). Due to the expanding size of the market, an increasing TT 
could serve the dual purposes of both reducing the emissions of 
developing countries and changing their course of development 
(Schneider et al, 2008).  
Haites el al (2006) analyse the technology transfer claims made by 
project participants in their PDDs and finds that the TT is a loosely 
defined term in the CDM context, but it mainly refers to the transfer of 
equipment and knowledge. Their conclusion is that almost one third of 
the projects claim some level of TT. However, TT contribution varied 
widely due to project size, project type and host countries’ policy. 
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Another early study on TT in CDM was conducted by De Coninck et al 
(2007). Their article examined TT in the 63 CDM projects that were 
registered up until 1 January 2006 and found that nearly 50% of the 
projects were involved in equipment TT. They also noticed that the 
knowledge or software transfer can be substantial but uncertainties are 
rather high.  
Dechezleprêtre el al (2009) compares TT in four major CDM destination 
countries: Brazil, China, India and Mexico. Their analysis reveals that TT 
can vary from 12% (India) to 68% (Mexico). The research conducted by 
Seres el al (2009) is based on 3, 296 proposed projects to EB and finds 36% 
of the projects are involved in TT. Echoing previous studies they find that 
TT is more common for large projects or projects with foreign investment 
partners. One significant observation in this research is that as the number 
of projects increases, TT occurs beyond the individual projects. This is 
observed for several project types in China and Brazil. For example, for 
Chinese N2O and Wind projects it shows a declining trend of TT over 
time as more projects are developed, which cultivated a fast growing 
technological capability at home. A dedicated research on wind energy, 
carried out by Haščič and Johnstone (2011), also indicates that 
involvement with the CDM may increase domestic absorptive capacity 
for the new technology in the host country.  
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In Schneider et al’s (2008) comprehensive study of CDM’s TT 
contribution, it is argued that three major issues should be investigated: 
TT barriers, current technological distribution and TT quality. Based on 
qualitative interviews, their conclusion is rather promising because the 
creation of CDM increases the commercial viability of low-carbon and 
decreases the information and capital barriers for TT. But they also 
pointed out that CDM does not automatically improve the institutional 
framework for TT so local government needs to complement the CDM by 
fostering host-country-specific improvements in investment conditions 
for key technologies and not to rely solely on CDM. 
Wang (2010) conducts a detailed study on how the TT performance of 
Chinese CDM projects with the conclusion that the incompatibility of 
procedures with Chinese domestic procedures, technology diffusion (TD) 
effects, and the role of carbon traders and CDM consultants all contribute 
to the different degrees and forms of TT. However, the proportion of 
CDM revenue to the projects’ overall income plays a vital role for the 
Chinese project owners to deploy foreign (often more expensive) 
technology options. Doukas et al (2009) provides an exploratory analysis 
of five renewable energy options, namely Hydro, Wind, Solar, 
Geothermal and Ocean energy, in terms of their status in the developed 
world and their potential for deployment in the developing world under 
the umbrella of a programmatic CDM. 
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In general, the literature on CDM’s TT benefits to the host countries 
provides a rather complicated picture as the magnitude of TT varies 
geographically and sectorally at different stages of market development. 
Capital intensive or large projects that involve equipment trade are the 
major contributor of TT in CDM compared to small sized projects. 
Popular project types may encourage technology diffusion and 
consequently decrease TT, when more projects from the same region are 
rushing into the project pipeline. The trade-off between the ‘market 
expansion’ and ‘level of TT’ is examined in detail in the analytical 
chapters, and I argue that understanding the perspectives of business 
actors can provide complementary insights to the present knowledge of 
TT in CDM, since most of these analyses are largely ‘state-centered’, 
which often focus on the government institutions’ effort in promoting TT 
2.3.3. The future of CDM 
In section two I review the current critics of the performance of CDM. 
The focus of the review has been given to the empirical knowledge and 
findings around issues of CDM’s sustainability benefits, environmental 
integrity and TT contribution to the host countries. The mounting 
evidence that is gathered in these studies indicates that CDM is not 
performing as it was once promised. The early assumption of easily 
achieved win-win solutions for everybody is at least dubious after a 
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decade of practices. It should be noted that besides these fundamental 
problems there are procedural issues concerning the EB’s current 
governance structure and high transaction costs, which also affect the 
performance of the CDM (Hepburn, 2010). In addition, the geographic 
and sectoral distribution of CDM is unbalanced with Asian giants 
receiving over 90% of the total CER revenues (Bakker et al, 2009), and 
the transport and building sectors, both key for achieving ambitious 
climate targets, almost absent from the project portfolio (Zegras, 2007; 
Schneider, 2009). 
This rather worrying picture has sparked off two trends of studies that 
focus on the substantial reforms and incremental ‘fine tuning’ 
respectively (Paulsson, 2009). In order to ‘enhance’ the performance of 
CDM, many recommendations of substantial reforms emerged through a 
series of studies conducted both by academics and senior officials of 
current CDM governance structures, which will be reviewed in this 
section. It should be noted that most of these reform proposals aim to 
address only part of the CDM problems that are presented in the 
empirical studies, and almost all of the reform proposals are prescribed in 
a top-down manner, with focus on the improvement of governance 
procedures and rules mainly at the international level. Hence on the 
surface these studies may not appear to be closely relevant to this 
research, which focuses mainly on the national context. But I argue that 
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these proposals not only present the intellectual development regarding 
the improvement of the first international offset market, but more 
importantly, they illustrate how difficult these top down designs are to 
implement on the ground, since most of these reform proposals have not 
yet successfully solved the problems they intend to. Some proposals, such 
as sectoral CDM or a discounting system of CERs, have never been 
tested due to their lack of practicality. 
2.3.3.1. S-CDM and P-CDM 
A sectoral approach of CDM (S-CDM) is probably the most discussed 
option to address some of the shortcomings of the CDM. The argument 
for an S-CDM approach is based on the belief that CDM’s design, as a 
project-based mechanism, is fundamentally incapable of achieving both 
meaningful scale of cost-effective GHG emission reduction in the rich 
countries and essential structural changes desired by host countries 
(Figueres, 2006; Sterk and Wittneben, 2006). The S-CDM was firstly 
introduced by Samaniago and Figueres (2002), who suggested a 
government-driven mechanism that could enable Non-Annex I Parties to 
develop national or local policy initiatives that discernably lower GHG 
emissions in a particular sector. The CERs then can be calculated and 
paid directly to the host government that will eventually trickle down 
(hopefully) to the industry and households affected by the measures.  
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However, Cosbey et al (2005) believe this approach is essentially ‘policy-
based’ and cannot be labeled as S-CDM as it is no longer a ‘market’ 
mechanism. They believe that S-CDM can still be initiated by the private 
actors who are able to bundle similar projects within a country or local 
region along the lines of a sector. To Bosi and Ellis (2005), whether S-
CDM should be launched by public or private entities is not a big issue if 
the baseline could be set up in appropriate ways. They propose the 
introduction of sectoral baselines where any emission mitigation below 
the baseline would be credited, which could be implemented at the 
government level or might be devolved to the private entities in the 
respective sector. Schmidt el al (2008) follow their lead and advance a 
‘no-lose’ GHG emission intensity baseline for some key economic 
sectors in major developing countries.  
In general, S-CDM is believed to be a useful option to overcome some 
governance hurdles. Yet its limitations are also obvious. For example, the 
problem of lacking sustainability benefits would not be resolved by 
simply shifting project-base to sectoral base, and the unbalanced 
geographic representation of CDM will even be exacerbated as only a 
handful of countries are capable of devising and hosting complex projects 
such as S-CDM (Sterk and Wittneben, 2006).  
One of the prescriptions to the CDM’s inefficiency in delivering 
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sustainability to the host countries is the programmatic CDM (P-CDM), 
According to Boyd et al (2009), P-CDM simply means bundling of many 
similar projects in order to bypass transaction costs of smaller projects. 
Programmatic CDM is registered with the EB as a PoA (Program of 
Activities). It is a voluntary coordinated action by a public or private 
entity consisting of unlimited number of CDM project activities, either 
large or small scale. All projects under PoA must have an implementing 
entity authorized by host country DNA. The sustainable development 
aspect of CDM should, at least theoretically, be better addressed as P-
CDM aims towards this more integrated approach to creating local 
benefits.  
The supporters of this approach argue that P-CDM projects are activities 
involving large numbers of dispersed emissions that cumulatively add up 
to substantial reductions, hence allowing these small projects that had 
been historically hard to implement via the CDM due to the difficulty of 
precisely monitoring and verifying emissions reductions (Wara and 
Victor, 2008). Figueres (2005) argues that the lessons learned from the 
programmatic CDM activities in the current CDM pipeline support the 
intuitive understanding that this type of CDM activity can broaden the 
scope of the CDM in areas with significant social and economic benefits 
that are currently under-represented in the CDM. In short, P-CDM can 
offer both quality and quantity in one go (Cosbey el al, 2005) and ‘there 
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is no reason not to continue to expand the possibilities of Programmatic 
CDM’ (Hepburn, 2009).  
Yet the challenges and barriers of a programmatic approach are also 
obvious. Hayashi and Michaelowa (2007) argue that programmatic CDM 
may require relatively complex and sophisticated emission reduction 
calculation methods, as well as a high demand of project developers’ 
capability in order to avoid problems at a time of verification. In addition, 
additionality assessment is also demanding to capture the free riders in 
the program of activities (Hayashi and Michaelowa, 2007). Crosby et al 
(2005) also point out the major challenges of P-CDM in terms of project 
boundary and leakage potential, additionality and free rider problems, and 
difficulties of introducing multiple baselines or methodologies.  
Therefore, from the regulator, validator and market participants’ 
perspective, the paradigm shift from single projects to aggregate activities 
that are implemented over time and space has proven to be challenging 
due to the substantial liabilities it creates (Figueres and Streck, 2009; 
Michaelowa et al, 2008). Consequently, P-CDM continues to fall short of 
triggering the needed level of GHG emission reductions with quality 
programs of activities as once they were expected to. By the time of 
writing, only 19 P-CDMs have been registered with the EB (UNFCCC, 
2012).  
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2.3.3.2. Discounting CERs 
Chung (2007) initiated the argument for a CER discounting scheme in 
order to change CDM from a mere offset instrument to a mechanism that 
generates a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. His 
proposal is that only a certain proportion of CERs from CDM projects 
could be sold on the carbon markets, and then CDM would no longer be 
simply a compliance mechanism for Annex I, but would also function as 
a global emission reduction mechanism from non-Annex I. With such a 
discounting scheme, developing countries can contribute to the global 
GHG emission reduction without having to bind in quantitative reduction 
targets.  
Such a proposal is endorsed by other researchers (Schatz, 2008; 
Schneider, 2009), who argue that discounting of CERs, not only to 
achieve net reductions for the atmosphere, but to increase the efficiency 
of the system by removing windfall profits made by project developers. 
Schneider (2009) discusses the major qualitative variables of applying 
discounting CERs, including discounting by sectors, countries (supply or 
demand side), and appropriate discount rate, with the conclusion that a 
CDM with atmospheric benefits could also benefit the host countries and 
enhance environmental integrity. The only obstacle, however, is the 
agreement of discounting schemes between negotiation parties.  
84 
 
Bakker et al (2011) follow the lead and conduct a comprehensive analysis 
of how discounting schemes between countries and project types could be 
implemented in practice, their impact on the carbon market, and 
implications for different actors. They notice a trade-off between the 
easiest discounting options for negotiations and their rather small benefits 
for enhancement. Castro and Michaelowa (2010) assess the impact of 
discounting on the distribution of CDM projects in host countries, with a 
special focus on Least Developed Countries (LDCs). They find that 
discounting has an impact on the competitiveness of individual CDM host 
countries as it affects their abatement cost curves. Hence it could become 
an instrument to force advanced developing countries to leave the CDM 
and engage in other farther-reaching climate-related commitments. 
However, a discounting system would not help LDCs to realize their 
CDM potential due to the financial, technical and institutional barriers to 
CDM development in these countries. 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have reviewed three different schools of research, namely 
studies on Chinese political economy, environmental (specifically 
climate) governance, and the CDM related literature. My intention in 
linking these three previously separated areas is to echo Peter Newell’s 
argument that most of the issues regarding CDM governance are closely 
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interrelated and deeply embedded in a broader political and economic 
context (Newell, 2009). Given the reality that such contexts may vary 
significantly in different sectors and localities, there is a crucial lack of 
empirical evidence of the observable governance pattern and specific 
state-market relationship in China’s CDM market. So far there is very 
small number of studies that provide strong field evidence of what is 
really going on at the project site level in China. 
Most of the empirical CDM studies are either based on PDDs and other 
available documents on the internet, or interviews with Chinese 
politicians particularly at the national level. Hence they regrettably do not 
yet establish a theoretical link between these ‘local realities and 
perceptions’ and their relevance to the governance or institutional 
arrangements of CDM at the local, national and international levels. An 
important gap emerges between the manifestations of local problems at 
the bottom and the call for reforms of the international regime at the top. 
Something in between is missing, namely the national political context, 
institutional structures, norms, conflicting interests and power dynamics, 
etc. Without properly understanding these dynamics, I argue, any attempt 
to assess or evaluate the proposals for future international carbon offset 
mechanisms would be bound to be a daunting but perhaps futile effort.  
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3. Business Power in CDM markets: an 
analytical framework 
In this chapter, I establish a dynamic and flexible approach to 
conceptualizing the role of business power in the governance of the CDM 
market in China. This framework is built mainly upon the neo-pluralistic 
beliefs of business power as an influential but not determining force for 
political agenda setting, policy processes, and observable outcomes in a 
given governance domain (Falkner, 2008; Meckling, 2011). I will start 
the chapter by explaining the neo-pluralistic basis of this framework and 
identify the appropriateness of its application in the analytical context of 
China’s CDM market. I argue that the hazy configuration of China’s 
public and private domains, the creation of a ‘National Team’ of public 
owned business champions in the energy and financial industry, and the 
growing significance of climate change as a political issue, are the major 
contextual factors that require a more open and flexible theoretical 
approach.  
The second section lays out the detailed structure of this analytical 
framework, which combines both structural and agential factors that help 
to legitimize, reinforce and change the role of business in governing the 
carbon market. In general the framework not only addresses the issue of 
how the coalition and networks in the carbon market are established by 
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business actors, but investigates their motivations to do so. In addition, 
the framework also intends to reveal the dynamism of the networks and 
coalition in the market and its implications, in order to make sense of the 
complexity of climate politics and governance in China. It examines the 
resources of business power in the carbon trading sector, as well as 
business actors’ capability to utilize these resources to make their voices 
heard, identities established and interests legitimized in the governance 
process. It claims to hold significant explanatory power for analyzing the 
interrelationship between strategy formation, policy influence, coalition 
building and potential inter-conflicts of business actors in the carbon 
market. Analytical focus is also given to the actors, institutions, and the 
daily process of governance that happens on the ground in the form of 
day-to-day business practices and constant communications with other 
social actor groups such as media, governments, and business partners or 
competitors.  
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of 
applying this analytical framework to reveal the highly complex nature of 
how the carbon market is governed in China. I argue that the purpose of 
this research is not merely to present the complex reality but to make 
sense of it. Therefore, the theoretical frameworks intend not to only 
answer the questions such as what is the role of businesses and how they 
get what they want in the carbon market, but rather to interrogate the deep 
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rooted and diversified driving forces, either political or economic, that 
ultimately define and shape the power configuration and governance 
repercussions in the market.  
3.1. A neo-pluralistic approach: why and how? 
One of the dominant debates in the study of global environmental 
governance has been the ever-increasing involvement of non-state actors 
in governing national and global environmental problems. Previous 
research has noted that governments are no longer the only crucial actors 
in the arena of environmental regulation and policy setting (Young, 1997; 
Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), as business and civil society are becoming 
ever more powerful. However, it is noted that the role of agencies of non-
state actors in steering environmental governance, the blurry concept of 
the state, and its complicated relations with a wide range of non-state 
actors remain largely unspecified (Okereke et al, 2009). Hence the claim 
that non-state actors, including a large number of NGOs, business 
corporations and associations, can be regarded as legitimized ‘governors’ 
and states are losing power to them, or the concept of a ‘retreating state’ 
(Strange 1996) or ‘power shift’, cannot be taken for granted (Barry and 
Eckersley, 2005; Sending and Neumann, 2006).  
In addition, although it is rather obvious that business has in the last few 
decades become one of the most influential actor groups in global 
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environmental politics (Falkner, 2008; Jagers and Stripple, 2003; Levy 
and Newell, 2005), the investigation of business power in environmental 
politics is often an overwhelming challenge, particularly when the 
analytical focus shifts from developed nations to those fast industrializing 
nations, such as China. In these countries the role of the state and the 
configuration of public-private spheres often vary significantly to those 
‘liberal state plus free market’ Western nations. As some scholars once 
claimed, even prior to the official launch of a globalized carbon trading 
scheme such as the CDM, that one of the major obstacles for 
internationalized offset mechanism is that some offset activities would be 
established in the countries where markets and law operate poorly, and 
non-compliance and fraud would eventually dominate the market (e.g. 
Victor, 2004). Now a decade has passed since the inception of globalized 
carbon market and the launch of the first CDM project, it is timely to 
check the validity of such claims. In the following section the advantages 
of adopting new-pluralistic frameworks to tackle this issue are presented. 
3.1.1. Business power: sources and manifestations  
If the assumption holds true that at least some developing countries’ 
governance infrastructures are not able to uphold the integrity of the 
global carbon market, then the crucial question would be: whether the 
global and local business community, as arguably a powerful non-state 
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actor group, is challenging the governance status quo and helping to 
improve the governance quality in these so called non-liberal countries, 
or they just did the opposite? In order to clarify this issue I argue that 
disaggregating business community as a holistic actor group is necessary 
in order to examine the power variance between those global companies 
and domestic ones in the CDM host countries and identify different 
sources of influence and leverage strategies when speaking to the national 
political system. Only in this way we can understand their aggregated 
influence to shape the overall performance of the CDM market. 
Previous research on the driving forces of China’s booming CDM market 
presents rather contradictory explanations: some believe it is due to a 
command and control mode of governance that is mainly led by the state 
(Schroeder, 2009; Shin, 2010) while others believe it is an expected 
consequence of using market mechanisms to govern environmental and 
climate crises (Pearson, 2006; Lohmann, 2008). It should be noted that 
this kind of overt conflicting explanation is not rare among discussions 
about other achievements or setbacks of a transitional state from a 
planned economy to a more market oriented one: some believe the 
marketization reforms have gone too far, while others believe just the 
opposite. In this regard, questioning China’s rather ‘bizarre’ CDM 
explosion and its implications for the overall quality of the carbon 
market’s governance need to be reconciled in open and flexible theories, 
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which can simultaneously take seriously the agency of business, its 
relationship with the state, and the complex nature of power structures. In 
the complex arena of climate governance in a transitional and fast 
changing society, the neo-Pluralism approach can offer a promising 
means to address this challenge for several reasons. 
At the outset, a neo-pluralistic approach provides a rather complex and 
less bounded account of public-private configuration. On the one hand, 
the state is conceived as a site of struggle for interest group influence and 
policies are the reflections of the underlying balance of power between 
different interest groups. It echoes with structuralists’ view that states 
retain their authority in some core functions such as national security 
(Strange, 1988) and remain (powerful) gatekeepers in policy areas that 
are more open to the influence of non-state actors (Drenzer, 2007). On the 
other hand, business is regarded by neo-pluralists as a privileged interest 
group based on their economic contribution to the national welfare, and 
consequently possess and (though not always) exercise structural powers 
that may limit the state autonomy (Falkner, 2008; Meckling, 2011). On 
the surface, this concept of business power echoes with the neo-
Gramscian thought on the power of firms in global environmental politics 
(Newell and Paterson 1998, Levy and Egan 2003, Levy and Newell, 
2005), which serve as a main ‘reference point’ for neo-pluralistic 
perspective as both represent business-centered approaches.  
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The major difference of these two schools of thought, however, lies in the 
various understandings of the weight of business actors’ structural forms 
of power in influencing the environmental politics. The neo-Gramscian 
tradition emphases the material power of business and argues that 
business actors from the core sectors of the economy would most likely 
prevail due to their strategic importance to a market system (Cox, 1997), 
while the neo-Pluralists insist that the dominant position of business 
actors are far from certain due to the agential capabilities of individual 
business institutions, even their leaders, as well as the conflicts or 
contestations with other social actors and among business actors 
themselves (Falkner, 2008). That is exactly why business around the 
world still needs to press or lobby state actors for a favorable policy, and 
network with other social actor groups or influence the public ideas via 
media. In this regard, in a neo-pluralist view, the interaction between state 
and business actors is not treated as a ‘win-lose’ scenario, with power 
shifting in a ‘zero-sum’ fashion (Weiss, 1999).  
The other major difference between the neo-pluralist and neo-Gramscian 
approaches is the former tradition’s dedication to understand the context 
of issue specific areas. The pattern of the engagement of business actors 
in the policy area and their influences is shaped by the nature of the 
policy issue. Previous studies on Chinese lobbying activities reinforce 
this contextualization viewpoint and affirm that there are multiple 
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lobbying strategies within various economic industries (Kennedy, 2005), 
therefore understanding the context of Chinese CDM market is a crucial 
and requisite element to interrogate how it is governed. The role of the 
market and state actors, as we may observe in China’s CDM market, is 
often overlapping both at the policy and the implementation level. In a 
country with over 80% of its public listed companies essentially state 
controlled (The Economist, 2012), distinguishing pure private actors from 
state actors is almost destined to be a fruitless effort. In the case of CDM, 
although the nature of CDM projects are commercial projects, the 
governance of CDM cannot be fully separated from the broader political 
and industrial context in which it is embedded. For example, CDM’s most 
closely related markets, arguably energy and finance, are all heavily state 
controlled, and consequently subject to a series of policy changes, 
privatization and nationalization, and change in top regulators in the past 
few decades. All these activities have produced profound impact on how 
carbon markets are developed and regulated in China. Hence, in order to 
explore how renewable energy CDM is governed, one has to understand 
the overarching governance structure, policy process and policy change 
of the country’s energy and financial sector.  
In the same vein, both public and private actors involved in CDM 
governance are often playing determining roles in broader governance 
domains. DNAs are at the same time regulatory agencies for environment 
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and energy sectors (in different branches), and CDM project owners can 
be the champion of state-owned fossil fuel energy utilities, DOEs can be 
either major international accounting firms or quasi state-owned national 
quality certification centers, and local CDM offices can be quasi-private 
low-carbon consultancy companies (see Schroeder 2012, for a detailed 
account of these hybrid actors in China’s carbon market). Therefore, 
analytical distinctions between these actors as rival groups under the 
CDM context will underplay the multi-level social networks and political 
coalitions that speak to a wider political framework. 
In this regard, the neo-pluralistic view of public-private relationships can 
be described as a political effort of both state and business actors to 
coalesce an alliance of interest groups and thus its governance essentially 
arises out of the power interactions among them. The neo-Pluralist 
approach treats business actors as alliance builders instead of rival parties 
to the state or other non-state actors in advancing their economic 
preference and political strategy. Hence, the national and international 
regulations on CDM do not create governors from the top, rather it is the 
newly emergent alliance among the existing social interest groups that 
creates, sustains and shapes the practices, implementation process, norms 
and structure of CDM governance at the national level, which is then 
played out, scrutinized and sometimes challenged internationally. The 
answer of who governs who (or what) is not a matter of choice among 
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rival actors (state vs. market, or global vs. local, etc.), but rather an 
understanding of dynamic and complex political-economic system (Levy 
and Newell, 2005). The political outcomes are neither determined by 
coercion from the states, nor the material power of the economic 
production.  
It should be noted that the neo-Pluralistic argument of a networked elite 
in governance is echoed by some neo-Gramscian theorists who believe 
that the newly emergent networks and alliances are essentially the 
reconfiguration of capitals in the society (Levy and Newell, 2005). The 
slight difference between the two perspectives lies in the understanding of 
the level of the dominant role that business actors play in promoting and 
sustaining the coalition. Neo-Gramscian approach emphases the structural 
power of business or capitals in general to create a hegemonic coalition, 
while neo-pluralists believe the role of business is crucial but far less 
decisive to the policy and governance outcome. I argue that the latter 
perspective is believed to be more applicable to the reality in China, since 
the country has just been transformed from an orthodox planned economy 
thirty years ago when the capitals were essentially buried and state power 
stayed at its peak over all other non-state sectors including the business 
community (if any at all). Business power is therefore growing out of 
state power and plays a far less decisive role compared to most Western 
countries.   
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In short, the growing popularity of CDM activities in China has created 
new elite groups within a rather blurred configuration of public and 
private domains (Shin, 2010). These actors, as the political agents, are 
active both at various domestic sectors and at the international level, 
shifting the nature of relations among business, state and civil society. 
The carbon market, from the neo-pluralistic perspective, is developed and 
governed as (the pro-trading) coalitions and networks are constructed, 
developed and changed in real-time conditions among a plurality of 
actors (Cerny, 2003). 
3.1.2. Multi-dimensional view of business power 
The above paragraphs present the justification for adopting a neo-pluralist 
approach to investigate business power in China’s carbon market, with 
particular reference to another business-centered yet more structural 
oriented neo-Gramscian theoretical approach. In short, neo-pluralism 
treats business actors as alliance builders instead of rival parties to the 
state or other non-state actors in advancing their economic preference and 
political strategy. Business actors do enjoy certain degree of privileged 
leverage in the policy arena yet their dominance statues cannot be taken 
for granted, due to the countervailing forces either outside or within the 
business community. Such an understanding leads to the query of various 
resources of business power, how these power resources are utilized by 
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business actors to influence the policy, and with what implications.   
Power has long been considered to be an ‘essentially contested’ concept 
(Lukes, 2005). From a pragmatic perspective, it works in various forms 
and has various expressions that cannot be captured by a single 
formulation (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). The neo-pluralist understanding 
of power should therefore advance a comprehensive view of power and 
its various forms should be analyzed in their relevant context (Falkner, 
2008).  
This research will mainly borrow Lukes’ (2005) conceptual analysis of 
power and advance a multi-dimensional approach to understand business 
actors’ influence in China’s CDM market. Lukes’ argument of three 
dimensional power is based on previous theories of power. Dahl’s 
understanding of power as a party’s prevailing over actual and observable 
conflict of interests or preferences (Dahl, 1958) is regarded by Lukes as 
‘the first dimension of power’. Such understanding of power usually 
involves a research focus mainly on the behaviors of the parties in the 
decision makings over an issue area. Dahl’s later critics, Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970), argue that power also exist in non-decision making 
processes when a given actor has the capability to keep the unpreferred 
issue off the political agenda. This is the second dimension of power 
according to Lukes, which is still inadequate for several reasons. Firstly, 
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it focuses on the agential factors of the party to influence others but 
somehow ignores that behaviors, group behaviors in particular, are 
socially constructed and culturally patterned. Secondly, it is still a 
conflict-centered approach but overt conflict may be absent during power 
interactions such as manipulation, authority, or mind control. Lastly and 
closely related to the second inadequacy, Lukes argues that it has not yet 
revealed the possibility of reaching consensus with a process of shaping 
perception and preferences from a given party to the others, where power 
interactions may somehow be embedded.   
Lukes proposes a third dimension to view power that shifts the analytical 
focus from overt conflicts to latent ones among the parties. Such turning 
will inevitably involve observations of actions such as persuasion and 
inducement into the analytical boundary (Lukes, 2005) and therefore can 
only be resolved in empirical studies that acknowledge both the agential 
and structural resources of power in a given issue area. Lukes’ three 
dimensional view of power is highly pertinent for this research for several 
reasons. Firstly, it is noted that business actors are powerful not because 
they get what they want by lobbying state actors, but by setting the 
parameters of policy (Falkner, 2008). Power interactions are therefore not 
always observable as they are not always exercised in open competition 
for influence over policy making and process. However, power is either 
embedded in the political-economic structure that privileges business 
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actors to build up political coalitions and policy frameworks in 
accordance with their own preference (Levy and Newell, 2005), or deeply 
rooted in intentionally constructed discourse, or translated into the policy 
process through day-to-day interactions between business and state actors 
in the name of formal or informal lobbying. Such an understanding of 
multiple facets of power enables us to reveal how business actors are able 
to use different techniques and strategies to leverage their positions in the 
CDM arena, even in a seemingly state-centered governance system where 
relational power of business community, or direct pressing for the 
preferred policy, is often limited.  
In this research, a pragmatic approach to categorize power is adopted 
based on the understanding of the multiple dimensional view of power. 
Three forms of business power, namely material, institutional and 
discursive power, are to be examined in this research. Although such a 
categorization of power is parallel with neo-Gramscian approaches, I 
argue that it provides insightful understanding of the various resources of 
power that business actors possess, particularly within the context of 
China’s CDM market, as illustrated in the following paragraph. 
3.1.2.1. Material Power 
Business is said to possess material power because of its central role in 
the national economy and it serves as the main source of economic 
100 
 
growth, employment and technology innovation (Falkner, 2008). It 
should be noted that in CDM projects, the CERs often constitute a small 
part of the revenues and the material power of business actors in the 
CDM market therefore derives not only from the sales of CERs but also 
the control of production and technologies of the given sector in which 
CDM projects are developed. For example, the material power in 
renewable CDMs is expressed not only through the renewable CERs but 
also through the production of renewable energy equipment and 
electricity as main output of the projects. Hence the politics of renewable 
CDMs have to be understood in relation to China’s (renewable) energy 
policy and politics.  
The development of renewable energy plays a central role in China’s 
present energy and economic strategy as China has identified it as a key 
growth component of the country's economy. The official targets of 362 
GW of renewable energy capacity by 2020, established as part of the 
2007 ‘Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy 
in China’, has appeared to be too conservative and a total of 500 GW 
renewable power capacity can be expected by 2020 (NDRC, 2010). The 
figure indicates that the material contribution of the renewable energy 
sector to the country’s economic growth will be enormous. In addition, as 
most of the renewable resources are concentrated in the relatively under-
developed inland provinces in Northwest and Southwest China, local 
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governments also exhibited their relentless support for developing 
renewable projects such as wind farms and solar power stations. It is not 
surprising that CDM is viewed as the major element in achieving such an 
ambitious goal and consequently renewable CDMs have been treated as 
the most significant category in China’s CDM portfolio (NDRC, 2011).  
Technology and technological innovation is another crucial aspect of 
material power of business actors in CDM governance, since technology 
transfer (TT) was designed in CDM to play a key role for Non-Annex I 
countries in achieving GHG reductions (See Chapter 2 for a detailed 
review of TT in CDM). Policy makers may want to encourage 
technological innovation by using regulatory instruments. For example, 
the wind energy related technology attracts particular policy attention in 
China in an effort to diversify its energy mix and enhance energy security. 
Such attention provides a rather conflicting approach to attracting foreign 
technology and foster domestic ones simultaneously (Schroeder, 2009), 
which has tremendous impact on the power configurations among 
business companies. In general, the design of the regulation depends on 
the knowledge base which is often largely controlled by business actors. 
This technological power enables business to shape the regulatory agenda 
and discourse (Falkner, 2008).  
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3.1.2.2. Institutional Power 
Institutional Power derives from the access to bureaucratic structures and 
decision making processes within the state institutions at various levels 
that have responsibility for governing CDM activities in China. It 
generates insights about the forms of influence that non-state actors can 
exercise formally and informally (Newell, 2009). Due to the significant 
material contribution to the economy, it is hardly surprising that some 
CDM elite organizations, such as leading CDM consultancies or DOEs, 
are heavily involved in formal decision making in China. This is 
particularly obvious when most of the renewable CDM activities, such as 
wind energy CDMs, are dominated by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
who often have privileged links with state institutions. However, the term 
‘state-owned’ is not equal to ‘state-controlled’ and it is inappropriate to 
perceive SOEs as mere tools for the state to implement renewable 
policies (Cunningham, 2007). In reality, large Chinese SOEs often 
selectively tap state resources as they see fit (Kennedy, 2005).  
As a result, renewable energy policy, including CDM regulations, have 
become a battleground of negotiation among powerful actors, which fuels 
constant institutional evolution with regulatory agencies rebuilt (often in 
the name of capacity building) or disbanded (often in the name of reform) 
in the last decade, and some integrated supra-institutions remain either 
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ineffective or dead-on-arrival (for a comprehensive review of policy 
coordination in the Chinese wind market, see Lema and Ruby, 2007). 
Non-state actors’ privileged access and their capability to influence the 
institutional mechanisms and policy process suggest a strong alignment 
of purposes with regards to CDM governance. Though various non-state 
actors may have their own preferences in advancing special policies or 
measures, the consensus of desirability of renewable CDMs, as the 
general interests of this coalition, remains almost uncontested. 
3.1.2.3. Discursive Power 
The neo-pluralistic perspective believes that business power is not 
enforced by coercion but rooted in consensus and acquiescence 
(Meckling, 2011). Therefore the ideological power has an important role 
to play to establish moral and intellectual legitimacy for governance. This 
form of power is originated in sociological constructivism, which focuses 
on the role of inter-subjective ideas and understandings of social life 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Some of the constructivism theorists go 
further to argue that political action is primarily driven by ideational 
rather than material factors (Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1992 and 1998), which 
shapes both interests and identities just like what Lukes describes as the 
third dimension of power. However, I do not suggest that discursive or 
ideational power is somehow more crucial to other forms of power, which 
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is at least not the case in China’s CDM market. Yet business actors do 
communicate with each other and struggle over ideas, identity and value 
on a daily basis, in order to shape the social understanding of carbon 
offset projects.  
The discursive power hence derives from and expresses itself in the 
ability to construct dominant framings of issues (Newell, 2009) and set 
the tone for public opinion (Okereke et al, 2009). In addition, it is used by 
business actors to deflect the skepticism of using CDM to address climate 
change and its implications for clean and sustainable development in 
China. The dominant discourse of renewable CDMs is that these 
activities provide win-win-win solutions for economic development, 
environmental protection and social benefits in China. Wind energy 
projects in particular, are regarded as the most suitable project type for 
CDM. Such statements have been sustained through government 
speeches and documents, marketing materials of companies and media 
coverage.  
The exercise of this form of power is particularly obvious when 
contestation of the dominant discourse emerged. For example, the 
rejection of approval for many wind CDMs by the EB sparked off 
enormous criticism from Chinese CDM officers and business 
organizations through Chinese media and press conferences. Another 
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latest example is one in which the Chinese vice minister who denounced, 
at the National People’s Congress, that most of the Chinese wind farms 
are ‘show business’ which deliver neither economic nor environmental 
benefits (Jinghua Times, 2010). Such a claim received tremendous 
counter arguments from business circles, which use the popularity of 
wind CDMs in China to justify the appropriateness in developing these 
activities. This is a rather exceptional case, since senior officers in Beijing 
are rarely challenged overtly by non-state actors in the centralized China, 
which may illustrate the powerful discourse in this sector. 
3.1.3. China’s CDM governance: making sense of the 
complexity 
In the above section I identify the theoretical roots of this research based 
on the neo-pluralistic approaches to understand the power of business in 
the Chinese carbon market. Three major sources of power have been 
identified which provide a lens through which we can examine the 
strategies and techniques of business actors to influence the overall 
governance of CDM. Yet a question emerges as how these resources are 
applied and exercised by the business actors to shape the governance 
structure of the carbon market. This is more than an empirical enquiry. It 
is essentially a methodological challenge, as the causal link between the 
business actors’ daily action and an aggregated governance effect can be 
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hard to establish. Therefore, the crucial task of a neo-pluralistic analytical 
framework is to relate the agential factors of the business actors to the 
structural context of the issue area.  
In this research, business networks and business conflicts are believed to 
be the major two segments of the analytical framework, since building 
alliances and confrontations are the two major strategies that guide 
business organizations’ daily operations. Business power is therefore 
manifest in how business actors are making friends and fighting foes for 
their own interests and benefits. But since the purpose of this research is 
not to present only a snapshot of how the CDM market is governed in 
China in a given time, but a longitudinal analysis of the impact of 
business power on the governance structure and quality of the 
international offset mechanism I thus have to consider the changing 
dynamics of the situation during the years as cooperation and 
confrontation may come and go in a market-state system. Hence, 
interrogating these changing dynamics would be a third pillar to sustain 
the analytical framework of this research. Finally, the constantly changing 
nature of cooperation and confrontation centered on business power could 
produce profound impact on the structure and quality of the governance 
structure, which will serve as the fourth pillar of this analytical 
framework, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: The analytical framework for business power in China’s 
CDM market  
 
3.2. Introducing the framework 
Analytically speaking, CDM has a two-tiered governance framework 
which consists of a regulatory framework and an operational framework. 
The formal regulatory structure constitutes official institutions both at 
international level and national level, such as EB and DNAs. It also 
provides the basic rules and procedures such as applicable methodologies 
and project approving processes, etc. This regulatory framework operates 
in a classical top-down manner (Streck, 2004) with the UN EB as the 
ultimate decision making authority. Regarding the implementation 
framework at the project level, however, it can be described as a 
‘complex’ of networks, where business actors are undoubtedly at the 
centre of various contractual or non-contractual relationships with other 
actors such as business partners, CER validators and national 
government.  
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This operational framework is believed to be considerably less 
hierarchical (Beneck et al, 2007) and some scholars argue that it operates 
in a typical ‘network governance’ fashion (Streck, 2004). Therefore, in 
order to clarify the role and influence of business actors at the operational 
level of CDM governance, the preliminary conceptual task is to identify 
the basic features of these networks, as well as investigate motivations for 
business actors to create or sustain them. In short, the nature and purpose 
of these coalitions or networks among private and public actors in the 
project cycle should be clarified.  
However, understanding the operational networks inside the CDM arena 
would not be sufficient, because these networks are constantly 
communicating with broader social frameworks or contexts that are 
outside the CDM project cycle. For example, domestic economic 
industries (e.g. energy or finance) and their regulators, local state officers, 
or international organizations, are only a few of the types of actors and 
organizations that CDM project participants have to deal with on a daily 
basis. The constellation of these ‘external’ forces would also affect 
business actors’ motivation, role and leverage in the carbon market. 
Therefore, these external interactions and motivational factors need to be 
carefully examined as they may reinforce or diverge from business actors’ 
interests, which may or may not be in accordance with the CDM’s 
intention.  
109 
 
The second element of the analytical framework investigates the 
conflicts, contradictions and incoherence of business actors’ behavior in 
the CDM arena. Such enquires are rooted in the neo-pluralistic theoretical 
approaches that intend to reveal the limits and constraints of the role of 
business and their influence. Contestations exist not only between the 
parties who have contradictory ethical views of carbon offset projects, but 
also between the private actors who are competing for a larger market 
share, CER profits, and favorable standards or norms. Besides, there is an 
observable tension between the market actors and their regulators at 
national and international level. Once the projects begin, local politics 
creep in and begin to challenge and confront the business interests. 
Finally, there are bureaucratic frictions between the relevant state 
institutions and some business actors that are inevitably deeply involved 
in the disputes in order to either secure a favorable policy or to legitimize 
their business operation. Hence, the framework intends to categorize the 
conflicts in the carbon market as public-private, public-public or private-
private in order to understand the nature of the confrontation. 
The confrontations in the carbon market suggest that the governance 
arrangement at the CDM’s operational level is considerably fluid and 
unstable. The power interactions among the actors may lead to new 
norms, standards, and patterns of cooperation as time goes by (Beneck et 
al, 2007). Hence, the third element of the analytical framework looks at 
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the changing dynamics of the networks or interrelationships in the various 
stages of carbon market. At the international level, from being Kyoto’s 
‘unexpected child’ to arguably its most meaningful and tangible 
component in the first commitment phase, the change of CDM’s role and 
influence in global climate governance is dramatic.  
Similar changes also happen at national and local level. In the case of 
China, it is notable in this research that the macro political and economic 
environment changed dramatically both at national and local level. Along 
with these structural changes, CDM’s ‘micro’ market condition has also 
undergone a dramatic change since 2005, when the first Chinese project 
was registered with the EB. The CDM market, though initiated with 
strong political orientation, has been developed into a very mature and 
standardized business (Beneck et al, 2007, Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). 
Many lessons were learnt both by the public and private actors which 
changed their motivations, perceptions, interests and ultimately the way 
they communicate with other actors. Some actors have withdrawn from 
China’s CDM market completely, while new actors have jumped onto the 
stage with new governance inputs. The growing prominence of state-
owned enterprises in the CDM market in China is a crucial example of 
these changes. In this regard, the analytical framework reveals the 
magnitude of these changes at the project implementation stage in order 
to make sense the dynamic and fluid nature of CDM governance in 
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China.  
The final sphere of the analytical framework aims to clarify the multiple 
implications of how CDM is governed at the project level. The impact of 
business-centered networks, coalitions and conflicts to the overall 
performance of CDM are explored. In this regard, the dual goals of CDM, 
as providing both cost-efficient mitigation options and sustainability 
benefits, are used as major benchmarks for the assessment. Analytical 
focus has also been given to understand the impacts of operational 
networks or coalitions to the regulatory framework and formal policy 
process of CDM at both national and international level.  
In general, the analytical framework presented in the chapter combines 
structural and agential factors of how business actors emerge as on-the-
ground governors of CDM. I argue that the uniqueness of China’s 
political economy and complex nature of regulated carbon transactions 
require an analytical framework with considerable explanatory power in 
revealing the nature of cooperation, conflicts, changing dynamics and 
implications of a private-public governance structure centered with 
business power and influence at CDM’s operational level. Therefore, the 
ultimate goal of this framework is not merely to present the power 
resources of business actors in China’s carbon market. Rather, it intends 
to investigate how power operates at the project level, among the private 
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and public actors, and what are the limits and constraints of this power 
operation in terms of shaping the governance arrangement and the 
performance of the CDM. In the following paragraphs the four basic 
building blocks of this analytical framework, known as business 
networks, conflicts, changing dynamics and implications, will be 
elaborated in detail.  
3.2.1. Business cooperation and networks in a 
transitional economy 
Mol and Carter (2006) point out that since China embarked on marketised 
reforms in early 1980s, the environmental governance system has been 
transformed from a command-and-control approach to a more diversified 
direction, which includes the involvement of non-state actors and market 
mechanisms into the governance arrangement. To Mol and Carter, the 
broad shift to a more liberal model of environmental governance is set in 
China and the only question is the extent and speed of such transition 
(Mol and Carter, 2006). In this regard, the introduction of an 
internationally defined market mechanism such as CDM into a previously 
centrally planned economy can serve as a meaningful assessment of how 
business actors are elevated as the new source of environmental 
governance. In order to understand business actors’ motivations and 
strategies to ally with the traditionally powerful state actors and other 
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newly emergent private actors, two types of networks are differentiated 
and elaborated in the following section. 
At the heart of various forms of cooperation are the hybrid networks 
between public and business actors. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) argue 
that non-Annex-1 governments in the initiation phase of CDM are 
essentially the active promoter of a multitude of partnerships with private 
actors. This is mainly because they often lack the resources and 
capabilities to implement the international rules in their political purview. 
In addition, the rules of CDM in the Marrakesh Accord in 2001 are no 
more than a set of umbrella principles and guidelines. Many regulations, 
methodologies and procedures were only gradually crafted out of a 
budding market. Hence during this stage, most of the CDM actors are 
simultaneously the subject of the regulation and proactive advisors on 
policy change when they see fit (Beneck et al, 2007), leaving huge 
potential for public-private cooperation.  
3.2.1.1. Public-private cooperation in CDM market 
The public-private cooperation in the CDM market can be described as 
the classical form of ‘Private Public Partnership’ (Beneck et al, 2007). In 
general, business actors seek state allies because the latter can provide the 
legitimacy and accountability that are crucial to encourage the 
engagement of stakeholders of CDM projects. State actors, however, lack 
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financial resources or project expertise to translate international 
commitment into a global treaty into local actions (Streck, 2004). As a 
result, alliances are built when both parties share a common desire to 
support CDM project implementation on the ground. The capacity 
building programs at the early stage of market development in China are 
typical examples of such private-public cooperation, when central or local 
governments often act as official organizers of these programs while 
private companies are the real sponsors. The common aim of these 
programs, however, is to discover and realize CDM potential in the local 
area. Another example is the EB accredited DOEs who are essentially 
private companies but have been delegated authority from the UN to 
evaluate the environmental performance of CDM at project level.  
3.2.1.2. A transnational, cross-sectoral and multi-level game 
One of the prominent features of these public-private partnerships is that 
they are transnational, cross-sectoral and operate in a multi-level scale. 
Streck (2004) and Beneck et al (2007) the use UN’s Prototype Carbon 
Fund as the example to illustrate how international organizations are 
actively involved in this innovative model of public-private cooperation. 
According to Andonova el al (2009, pp. 56), ‘transnational governance 
occurs when networks operation in the transnational sphere 
authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals.’ Since the creation 
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of CDM has a climate goal (cost-effective options for GHG emission 
reduction), steering the market growth of CDM has by nature a strong 
intention of providing a public good. In this regard, most of the capacity 
building efforts in China can be categorized as a form of transnational 
governance when joined by many Annex 1 parties. In the same vein, the 
operational authority of DOEs in the validation, approval and verification 
process is largely believed to increase the accountability of the 
mechanism (Backstrand, 2008), since most of these validators are 
essentially large multinational corporations normally with high reputation 
in their specialized fields.  
The public-private networks in CDM are destined to be cross-sectoral 
because eligibility of CDM activities is open to market actors. As long as 
an appropriate methodology is proposed and approved by EB, the project 
type is then allowed in the CDM family. The field study reveals that at the 
earlier stage, developing and designing the methodology, was often a 
highly challenging but lucrative work that sparked off many ad-hoc 
cooperations between private companies, academic institutions and 
government agencies. The output of such cooperation is those newly 
developed methodologies that can be used as updated standards and 
norms of carbon accounting for the future projects. The effort for joint 
methodology design can be considered as another form of temporary 
governance arrangement even if these networks are often spontaneously 
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established, and the networkers are profit driven.  
The governance of CDM presents a multi-level feature in China when 
local governments, though not directly involved in formal decision 
making process, are actively engaged in the promotion of CDM projects 
in their administrative purview. Schroeder details how hybrid institutions 
were established at different localities in the name of CDM centers, 
which is just another example of local public-private cooperation in 
governing of CDM activities at sub-national level (Schroeder, 2011). 
According to Schroeder, the hybrid nature of local governing institutions 
indeed encourages more market-oriented local policies in favor of 
promoting CDM projects after local government put a stake in the CDM 
business and when they are closely allied with business interests 
(Schroder, 2011). The local states have become a crucial stakeholder of 
CDM activities.  
In general, the function of hybrid networks in the carbon market is often 
to promote capacity building or setting the implementation rule of CDM 
projects. The motivation of business actors in promoting or sustaining 
these networks is rather self-interested. Businesses seek legitimacy from 
their state allies for the profits of CDM business since such allies often 
help them to secure a decent market share or effectively deter potential 
competitors. That is the main drive for the accounting companies to apply 
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for a DOE certificate, or the project developer to join a capacity building 
program. However, the outputs of these networks are also often public 
goods, such as new rules, norms and procedures, which gradually build 
up the foundations of operational governance in the carbon market. 
3.2.2. Conflicts and confrontations in the CDM market 
In general, conflicts and cooperation are two sides of the same coin in 
neo-pluralist politics (Meckling, 2011). The major features of carbon 
networks in China’s CDM market can also be observed when looking at 
business centered confrontations, as they are also transnational, cross-
sectoral and play in a multi-level fashion. In this research, both public-
private conflicts and private-private conflicts over CDM regulations and 
are examined to understand the constraints of business power in the 
market.  
The first set of conflicts is to be observed between the business centered 
operational level of CDM and their regulators in the formal of 
hierarchical governance processes at international level. The complaints 
of the business actors about the lengthy and bureaucratic process of 
approving CDM have been well documented (Figueres and Streck, 2009; 
Michaelowa 2005; Schroeder, 2009). Although the conflicts between the 
regulated and regulator are often inevitable in any given market, the 
challenges from the private sector is believed to be helpful to enhance the 
118 
 
accountability, transparency and predictability of the formal decision 
making process around CDM, at least at the international level.  
However, some complaints from the market actors can be hard to justify. 
For example, it is noted that a common claim of the business actors in 
China is that the data and information required for the EB are too 
standardized. Some of these data are simply unavailable. The project 
developers therefore request more flexibility in the carbon accounting and 
baseline determination process. ‘Adapting to the real situation’ is the 
often heard request from the business community. Such requests, though 
sound reasonable from time to time, but may lead to a deterioration of the 
whole integrity of the system if satisfied. Because the reality of CDM 
shows that EB is de facto the only party that upholds the quality of the 
carbon credits generated from CDM projects. Other parties, including 
both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 governments, CER buyers and project 
developers, all have strong interests in loose baselines and convenient 
CER production. Hence the conflict between the operational level and 
regulatory body represents the opposite positions between pro-market and 
pro-integrity policy approaches. In such conflict situations the role of 
project validators, or Designated Operational Entities (DOE), has become 
utterly critical, because their business strategies can induce a direct 
impact on the result of the contestation mentioned above.  
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Another set of confrontations emerge when CDM governance has to be 
integrated into a broader domestic regulatory framework in the host 
countries. CDM is a highly fragmented market which is embedded in 
many existing economic sectors. Most CDM activities are essentially 
industrial activities with well-established regulatory arrangements either 
at national or local level. The introduction of carbon business in the host 
countries will inevitably collide with those existing rules and regulations, 
where contradictory, incoherent or overlapping policies can be found 
once these projects are augmented with a CDM label. On the surface, 
these inter-ministerial conflicts belong to the public domain that should 
be coordinated by the state actors alone. Yet in reality, state officers often 
lack political incentives to settle the newly emerged institutional 
conflicts, which leave the ground open for the business lobby. Business 
actors who have close connection with officialdom are often seen actively 
visiting government offices to give out their opinion and advice in 
settling some bureaucratic frictions at the project implementation level. In 
China’s carbon market, some large carbon companies have established 
dedicated teams to communicate with the state officers in order to, 
according to one interviewee of this research, advance their political 
strategy and search for favorable policies or policy makers in the 
regulatory maze around CDM activities.  
However, some regulators can be too powerful to be influenced. Taking 
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the financial and energy sectors as an example, these two industries are 
both heavily regulated in China and they are closely related to CDM 
projects. Most CDM projects are energy projects that are often capital 
intensive investment and need financial support at the beginning of 
construction. However, it is noted that CDM activities have little effect on 
the existing regulatory frameworks. Although calls for changes or 
efficient policy integration have been escalating among CDM projects, 
developers and CDM officers, the CDM rules are at present carried out in 
parallel with energy or finance regulations. The regulatory contradictions 
or incoherence are left untouched at the institutional level and only dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis, which may constrain the carbon coalition 
centered with business interests.  
The last form of conflict is among the private actors, since divisions of 
business community may cause conflict that constrains the overall 
leverage of business (Cox 1997). Once CDM had been developed into a 
functional market, more private actors began to be aware of the 
emergence of CDM as a new business opportunity. Companies like 
carbon fund, consultancies, and project investors are lured into the market 
to tap the potential of CER profits. The inter-business conflicts arise as a 
consequence of intensified competition.  
In this research, the analytical focus is given to the conflicts between 
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international and domestic companies, and between companies from 
various economic sectors (See Chapter 6). CDM is believed to be a policy 
innovation mainly crafted out by Annex-1 governments. Hence Annex-1 
companies often have stronger expertise and capabilities compared to the 
domestic companies. The latter are often believed to be mere rule-
followers in the market. However, domestic companies’ advantages lie in 
their familiarity with local business culture, political institutions and 
social norms. The division has not only changed the CER transaction 
pattern as a result of power interactions between the buyer and supplier, 
but has also led to opposing attitudes and leverage strategies towards 
domestic policies and regulators.  
As for the cross-sectoral conflicts, although there is almost unanimous 
support for carbon offset and CDM among business actors, the interests 
and motivations of actors from various economic sectors are rather 
different. For example, it is noted during this research that banking 
sectors are not very keen to be involved in financing CDM transaction. In 
addition, the distribution of CDM projects is rather unbalanced. 
Renewable energy projects have taken up the lions share while other 
important GHG emission related sectors are largely underrepresented in 
the portfolio. There are some project types that are technically difficult to 
be packaged into CDM. Lastly, there are constant disputes between DOEs 
and project developers over validation or verification processes and 
122 
 
conclusions.  
Although most of the confrontations among private companies are project 
based and aimed only at the producing private goods, they combine to 
produce powerful on-the-ground norms or informal standards for 
developing CDM projects in China. For example, the reluctance of the 
banking sector to finance CDM activities has led to a transaction model 
that has largely deviated from the original design of CDM as multilateral 
investment projects. The confrontations between DOEs and project 
developers over a given project may lead to the change of on-the-ground 
validation or verification procedures. At last, companies from under 
represented sectors may question the performance and justification of the 
CDM and challenge the favorable discourse on market instruments or the 
benefits of offset. In general, the inter-business conflicts may lead to 
change of carbon coalition and networks mentioned in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
3.2.3. Evolution of the CDM market  
Both networks and conflicts presented in the preceding paragraphs lead to 
the reconfiguration of power dynamics and shape the evolutionary 
dimensions of the CDM market. Hence the market development is 
viewed in the research as an organic process rather than a linear progress 
of market size or scale. In order to capture the changing dynamics of the 
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market, three elements of evolution need to be carefully examined. 
Firstly, the constituency of actors in the market may vary at different 
stages. Companies may choose to enter or to quit a market according to 
their corporate strategy, but here the analytical focus has been given to 
the observable change of attitude or behavior pattern of a given group of 
private companies in their CDM related operations. For example, the 
entrance of large state-owned enterprises in the carbon business when 
CDM is gaining ground in China has been analyzed in detail in Chapter 6. 
I argue that the motives and interests of the new entrants are very 
important indicators of whether and to what extent CDM has deviated 
from its original purpose.   
Secondly, in addition to the actor dynamics there are the substitutes and 
transformations of institutions in terms of their functions and operational 
norms. Some public-private networks vanished from the market 
completely and some changed their purpose in a maturing market. 
Beneck el al (2007) foresees that the public-private-partnership model of 
market steering in the initial stage of CDM development will inevitably 
give way to the transaction focused inter-business interactions once the 
market starts to function. This research finds ample empirical evidence 
for such arguments. For example, most bilateral capacity building 
programs at the initial stage are no longer necessary to continue once 
CDM business has become a fully legitimized market. Some programs, 
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such as the EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, have been formally 
finalized and other bilateral programs have changed its CDM focus to a 
broader climate purpose other than the CDM market. Hybrid institutions 
that have been established at local level to promote CDM activities, 
namely the local CDM offices, also need institutional change since CDM 
has become such a well-known idea in some localities that a promotional 
agency is no longer required. Some of these offices hence adopted a more 
marketised orientation and have established commercial wings in order to 
compete with other private project developers and tap CER benefits 
(Schroeder, 2012).  
Beside the notable trend of marketization among these cooperative 
networks or hybrid institutions is the observable tendency of localization 
of the mechanism as a whole. CDM is essentially created in accordance 
with Annex-1 parties’ limited experience in carbon offsetting. The rules, 
procedures and norms are crafted at international level without careful 
consideration of local reality. This gap has been gradually filled as large 
amount of projects implemented on the local level. For example, many 
DOEs started to recruit local auditors and validators not only because 
they are notoriously short of staff, but also due to their realization that 
local knowledge plays a crucial role for competent validators.  
In addition, the emergence of a large number of local project developers 
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or consultancy companies also helps to bridge the communication gap 
between Annex-1 buyers and local project owners. The local voices 
started to be heard at the international level and changes have been made 
in the formal governance system. For example, project developers and 
local project owners are now allowed to attend the EB meetings to 
explain their situation, or to express their complaints and concerns about 
existing CDM rules or the EB’s decisions on certain projects. CDM is 
becoming a truly international game, even if its initiation was based on 
western experience.  
The involvement of local inputs and integration of local interests into the 
CDM system leads to another form of challenge to the status quo. At the 
initial stage of market development, CDM was promoted as the typical 
example of ‘win-win’ solutions between the developed and developing 
countries and their companies. Government officers, academics and 
market participants endorsed this imported discourse repeatedly at 
various occasions. However, it should be noted that such framing of 
discourse is created at international level when the mechanism was firstly 
designed. The purpose is to dissipate strong suspicion and criticisms of 
the idea of offset mainly in the Annex-1 countries. However, CDM as a 
win-win solution was soon gaining prominence in China. It faces little 
challenge, when China’s marketization reforms have been carried out so 
successfully in the past two decades. CDM was unanimously supported 
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mainly because of its brand as ‘market’ instrument.  
However, many contesting voices emerged once local interests were 
integrated into the mechanism. The most obvious criticism is that the 
CDM revenue is often too small, too difficult to achieve, and arrives too 
late for the real project construction, so it has little effect on investment 
decisions. Many project owners expressed their disappointment in CDM 
and some of their complaints began to be picked up by mainstream 
media. Their complaint echoes with the Chinese government’s ambition 
to establish a domestic cap and trade system. Officers consequently 
started to downplay the significance of CDM in China’s strategy to curb 
carbon emissions and promote clean development. In addition, it is 
generally believed that China’s time of being a carbon credits supplier is 
numbered. As the world’s largest GHG emitter, the country will 
eventually take up a binding emission reduction target sooner rather than 
later. In such a case, the once dissipated concern, which argues that 
international offset programs like CDM would exhaust China’s most cost-
effective mitigation options and therefore increase its costs to meet its 
future emission cap, has crept back into the public discourse and is 
swiftly regaining ground.  
In general, there are observable changes in market actors, institutions and 
the dominant discourse as the CDM market matures and becomes 
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functional. These changing dynamics are an important element to 
understand the complicated nature of the internal power interface in the 
CDM market and their consequences. It also presents the evidence of how 
the carbon market is hugely influenced by external political and economic 
factors in a broader social context. In this regard, the evolution of the 
market is shaped by combined internal and external forces and factors, 
which also have profound implications in terms of the governance of 
international carbon markets in developing countries. 
3.2.4. Evaluate the implications of business power in 
CDM governance 
The changes in China’s CDM market, explained in the preceding 
paragraphs, produce a combined impact on the performance outcome or 
overall quality of CDM as the first international carbon offset 
mechanism. Strange (1996) pointed out that power is often impersonally 
and unintentionally exercised by market actors in profit making activities 
such as searching for new deals, negotiating prices, and lobbying officers. 
Hence it is more ‘power over’ than ‘power from’ that matters (Strange, 
1996), because just like state power does not belong only to one ministry 
or political party, business power does not belong to any given company 
or industry. The main argument of this research is that business power 
and leverage has crept into the governance domain at the CDM market’s 
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operational level and produced significant effects on the quality of CDM 
activities in China. Therefore the analytical framework should not only 
reveal the power resources of business actors and their confrontations and 
cooperation strategies in a historical context, but to examine the impacts 
and effects that have been produced in terms of the performance quality 
of the carbon market. 
Identifying the governance contribution of business power, other than 
their regulators or policy makers, to the overall orientation of the market 
can be a daunting task. Most of the markets do not have a clearly defined 
political agenda or purpose other than the profit-maximization principle. 
Markets often have no common ultimate goals to be achieved rather than 
making money. Thus it would be difficult to identify market actors’ roles 
in shaping the overall orientation of the market. The exceptional cases 
can be those heavily regulated markets with clearly public objectives, 
such as financial markets that provide financial stability, or energy 
markets that are pertinent for energy security. Although these markets are 
characterized with high frequency of market actors’ advocacy and lobby 
activities as a result of public-market conflicts, the confrontations and 
business leverage are namely confined only at the domestic level, which 
is often highly subjective to the domestic political agenda and economic 
situation.  
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The international carbon offset market is somehow a different market. 
Firstly, it is a market with clearly defined political (environmental) 
purpose. The dual aims of CDM are to lower the cost of meeting emission 
reduction targets in the West and to promote ‘more’ sustainable ways of 
living or production in the East. These requirements for public values of 
CDM are served as important benchmark to evaluate business’ impact on 
the performance of the mechanism. In addition, although the mechanism 
intends to incorporate local benefits and development priorities, as a part 
of global climate regime, CDM’s ultimate goal is helping to achieve 
considerable climate benefits. Therefore the power of business will now 
have direct international rather than domestic impacts on a globally 
public objective: curbing global GHG emission and deterring global 
warming.  
Yet the grand objective of CDM may or may not be in accordance with 
the country specific political or economic priority. Therefore, 
understanding business actors’ positions in the spectrum between the 
hardcore environmental value and mere money making opportunism, and 
toward which direction they are, either intentionally or spontaneously, 
pushing the carbon market, can be a crucial analysis of the outcomes after 
delegating the authority to the market forces in fighting climate change.  
In such a case, environmental integrity is the most important criteria to 
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evaluate the impact of business influence in the CDM market. In what 
way and to what extent business actors are influencing the integrity of the 
carbon credits generated from offset activities? What are their techniques 
and strategies in dealing with the DOE’s validation and verification 
system or the EB’s regulatory and decision making process? What are the 
norms and rules that have been established and enforced that eventually 
weaken or strengthen the credibility of the whole system? These enquiries 
are particularly pertinent since the integrity of Chinese projects has long 
been a critical focus due to an apparent contradiction of strong political 
support for clean development from Beijing and weak financial viability 
of most renewable projects on the ground. The analysis of the roles of 
business groups in steering the integrity of the mechanism would help to 
provide an explanation to this complex situation from a different angle.  
Another set of outcomes that can be observed concern the local benefits. 
CDM promised to deliver additional finance and technology from the 
Annex-1 parties which may contribute to local economic, environmental 
and social development. Therefore the enquiries are twofold. Firstly, 
whether business power has an impact on the financial and technology 
transfer involved in the project implementation process? And secondly, 
the question is whether business actors can produce an impact on how 
these financial and technology inflows are distributed and used to 
enhance local sustainability? Power interactions among business actors 
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and DNA regarding the sustainability requirements are also crucial 
manifestations of business influences. The nature of their alliance with 
the central and local officers will provide insightful evidence of how 
sustainability criteria and decision making process are crafted and carried 
out at various levels.  
The central task of analyzing the implications of business power is to 
make sense of business actors’ efforts in striking the balance between 
profit making and all other social requirements associated with CDMs. It 
investigates their current strategic position and operational priorities in 
between the spectrum of environmental integrity and profit. By revealing 
how they established networks and confront conflicting interests 
throughout various development stages of the market, I hereby go further 
to investigate in what direction of the profit-environment spectrum that 
business actors are indeed pressing. I examine the constant efforts of 
business actors in alliance building and confrontation, and ask if there are 
any countervailing and constraining forces to these efforts. After all, 
neither a carbon market with no profit at all, nor a carbon market with 
nothing but the profit is a desirable outcome, as it is obvious that going to 
either extreme would eventually lead to a total collapse of the 
mechanism.   
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4. Methodology 
The previous chapter provides theoretical and analytical frameworks for 
understanding the development of RE-CDM activities in China and 
offered rationales for an in-depth empirical study of the political economy 
of the CDM governance, with analytical focus on business actors and 
their leverage. This chapter focuses on the methodological issues of this 
study in order to explain and justify the research questions and research 
design. I first elaborate and defend a case study strategy that has served as 
the guideline for this research. In doing so, the case selection process, the 
epistemological roots, and its advantages and limitations are discussed 
within the context of RE-CDM in China. Then I discuss specific 
techniques for collecting and generating data and how they complement 
each other for the data analysis, with which the main results are to be 
displayed in the following chapters. In the third part I focus on ethical 
issues that have received particular attention throughout the fieldwork 
and analytical stages. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some 
limitations of this research design and implications for future studies. 
4.1. Case Study Strategy: Case selection, epistemological roots, 
and its advantages (limitations):  
Research strategies should be question-driven rather than method-driven 
(Wendt 1992). The research focus and questions presented in Chapter 1 
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aim to provide insights and understandings of the complexity of CDM 
governance in China, due to the rather unique position of business actors 
in a fast changing political and economic system. The study also 
challenges or strengthens previous empirical arguments and theories 
about regulated carbon markets by revealing and analyzing power 
structures, dynamic relationships, and strategic changes in China’s CDM 
market. Hence, questions like who governs CDM in China and how, or 
with what implications for sustainability, can only be answered though a 
carefully designed qualitative case study. In addition, the research also 
suggests possible links between cross-scale political, economic, 
ideological, and other forms of power relations among various actors and 
the implications for climatic and developmental benefits of CDM 
projects. The research is hence essentially asking questions of process 
and context and it is believed that qualitative research approaches 
centered on a case study strategy will serve the research purpose well.  
In this research, the definition of case study is borrowed from Yin who 
argues that a case study is essentially a form of empirical inquiry with the 
focus on a contemporary phenomenon, complex social phenomena in 
particular, within its real-life context in which the boundaries between 
phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994). This is a 
rather flexible definition which leaves researchers with considerable 
autonomy in defining the subject as the case and frame, its boundary and 
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scope. In Chapter 2, I provide a detailed analysis of various case studies 
about CDM and governance of carbon markets around the world, 
including Boyd el al (2009), Corbera and Brown (2010), Bumpus and 
Cole (2010), and Newell et al (2011). My research will follow these 
studies and propose a clearly defined case of China’s renewable CDM 
market. The case study strategy is also helpful to develop or critique 
governance theories with more contextualized description, consistent 
interpretation, reliable inferences and vigilant conclusion.  
4.1.1. RE-CDMs in China as a least-likely, interpretive 
single case 
It is noted that the selection of case and observations lies at the heart of 
qualitative case study research (Mitchell and Bernauer, 2004). Although 
CDM is often regarded as an innovative and rather complicated 
governance tool that is applied across the national borders and many 
existing economic sectors and since its inception, this research is 
designed to be a single case which focuses only on one particular sector 
(renewable energy) in one geographical area (mainland China). The strict 
boundary of this case study is set mainly to narrow down meaningful 
observations and data in a manageable manner and in a realistic time 
frame for this PhD project.  
In this research, I focus on renewable energy CDM projects, and wind 
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energy projects in particular, that have been developed in mainland China 
between 2004 and 2011. Analytical focus is given only to the actors that 
are directly involved in CDM related business activities and policy 
process. However, I also engaged with certain peripheral actors within 
CDM circle, such as NGOs and academics who have considerable 
relevance in China’s present CDM reality.  
There are clear rationales for such case selection. In China’s CDM 
portfolio, renewable energy CDMs (RE-CDMs) are playing a significant 
role, comprising about 41% of generated CERs, among them wind energy 
CDM accounts for 10% (NDRC, 2013). However, the selection of RE-
CDMs in China as a case is not only due to its dominant share, but rather 
some theoretical and empirical assumptions about its dominance as 
presented in the previous chapter. Firstly, critics argue that a great-leap-
forward of renewable projects in China has nothing to do with CDM 
(Wara and Victor, 2008; Lewis, 2010). For China, development of 
renewable energy is an inevitable move toward diversification of China’s 
coal-centered energy production mix. This is an unprecedented challenge 
to China’s present political agenda which links with other political 
concerns such as energy security or even social welfare (Han el al. 2009, 
Schroeder 2009). Besides, the dominance of hydro, wind or solar power 
CDM projects is not surprising because these technologies comprise the 
majority of relatively mature and marketable renewable technologies 
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(Haya, 2007; Lewis, 2010).  
Second, the development of renewable energy sector, wind energy in 
particular, comprises intense power dynamics among actors with various 
backgrounds (Lema and Ruby, 2007; Liu and Kokko, 2010). CDM as the 
new intervention scheme adds to the already complicated situation where 
policy processes and institutional transformations have been constantly 
shaped by the inter-business, public-private and global-local interactions. 
Conflicts between wind farm builders and grid companies, and between 
foreign and home investment and technologies, have the potential to 
reconfigure the present political coalition in the CDM market. Yet unlike 
other CDM activities, such as HFCs or large Hydro power, the economic 
and sustainability benefits of wind farm CDMs have been unanimously 
acknowledged. RE-CDM has been regarded as a living proof of a 
successful ‘business case’ in promoting sustainable energy system in 
China (Lema and Ruby 2007). The lack of obvious opposition in 
developing wind farm projects provides an insightful case of political 
coalition and unrivalled support for wind CDMs deserves explanation. 
Thirdly, and closely related to the above argument, the CDM boom in 
China raises theoretical issues from governance perspectives. The 
creation of CDM was once regarded as a vivid example of new forms of 
networking or multi-level governance, where public and private actors 
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have to align closely to guarantee the success of this green-field 
governance project (Streck, 2004). Yet, it is observed by many that China 
attributes its CDM explosion largely to a traditional top-down governance 
where a strong and powerful regulating authority plays a crucial role in 
promoting and expanding activities effectively (Michaelowa, 2007; 
Ganapati and Liu, 2009). Is CDM an illustration of ‘governance without 
government’ in climate policy arena, or merely the old wine (command 
and control) in a new bottle? Is it merely another round of top-down 
coalition building or a triumph of the private actors over their state 
counterparts? These rather conflicting explanations need to be reconciled 
with solid empirical evidence. A close examination of how RE-CDM 
projects are negotiated and implemented on the ground, underpinned by 
intensive power interactions, will hopefully solve these theoretical 
puzzles. 
China is traditionally viewed as a highly centralized government with 
command and control or authoritarian governance as the dominant pattern 
in regulating most of its domestic environmental affairs, including 
climate change (Beeson, 2007). The non-state actors’ incentives to 
establish political connections and coalition ultimately arise from the 
state control of key governance resources (Li et al, 2008). In this regard, 
the RE-CDM in China is served as a ‘least-likely’ single case to test the 
role of non-state actors in global climate governance. If CDM, being the 
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newly introduced market based mechanism, has successfully empowered 
non-state actors in advancing its own interests, this would provide strong 
confirmation for the inference of ‘state-retreat’ in governing global 
climate, which can be more likely valid in other parts of the world where 
state power is relatively weaker than in China. Hence it would open 
possibilities for future comparative studies of similar events in other 
developing countries, as well as other critical climate governance events 
in China at various historical moments. 
4.1.2. Case study: pros and cons  
This research is based on a pragmatic ontological view, which simply 
means that the choice of research methods depends purely on what the 
researcher is trying to find out (Silverman, 1999). The methodological 
strategy adopted is mainly a result of the research questions to be 
analyzed and the available data that can be possibly accessed, rather than 
any epistemological beliefs or position. Therefore, it is not my intention 
to gauge the epistemological roots of this research in order to 
discriminate against one methodological family as a way to promote 
another. The qualitative case study, as argued in preceding paragraphs, is 
believed to be the most appropriate approach to generate relevant 
observations, design interview questions, and construct key coding 
through which a vast number of documentation is to be scrutinized.  
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The comparative advantage of the case study is evident in addressing 
qualitative variables, individual actors, decision-making processes, 
historical and social contexts, and path dependence (George and Bennett 
2005). The detailed and comprehensive contacts with instances and 
context of the event will stimulate fresh concepts or hypotheses (Odell, 
2001). In addition, single case studies may also focus on previously 
analyzed events to uncover alternative views that force a rethinking of the 
received interpretations or generalizations (McKeown, 1999).  
Governance as a process has long been a neglected issue among 
governance studies in general (Adger and Jordan, 2009). Case studies are 
also out-performing its alternatives for documenting policy processes 
(Odell, 2001). There are many previous studies concerning governance of 
carbon markets focused on governance institutions, structures and 
(formal) decision-making procedures (Figueres and Streck, 2008), with 
little revelation of the political and economic variation among host 
countries and actors. In addition, as structures and institutions do merge 
and change at multi-scales since the inception of CDM, case studies may 
provide the knowledge of how these changes happened within a 
geographical, sectoral and time frame. A thorough case study in one host 
country will preserve and reveal more information and provide a fuller 
report with richer evidence and reasoning about process and context.  
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It is noted that case methods also entail several inherent disadvantages. 
Generally speaking, qualitative research methodology involves a trade-off 
between theoretical parsimony and rich explanation (George and Bennett 
2005), which simply means that using a few case studies could be 
atypical or universally valid (Odell, 2001). This problem is particularly 
obvious when using a ‘no variance’ single case as for the research (King 
et al, 1994). However, in this case study of RE-CDM in China, the in-
case comparison is designed to strengthen the inferences. Observations 
are located both before and after project completion to understand the 
different power structures and their consequences. Focus is given equally 
to the projects before and after the verification stage, since both are 
important for analyzing SD benefits, as prior to the submission of the 
PDD the actors’ interaction is rather open-ended. The basis for this 
division is the PDD as the milestone document for CDM projects. 
Comparison is also carried out between the similar RE-CDM projects 
promoted by identical actors at different locations, as well as a group of 
actors in the same project region. For example, during the interviews, 
focus is given to the description of a project developer concerning their 
different experiences in developing RE-CDM projects across the nation. 
Similarly, observations are carried out on how various actors are involved 
(either competing or collaborating) in one RE-CDM project. Such design 
aims not merely to increase the number of observations but to trace the 
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sequential processes within its particular historical context, in order to 
provide a reliable contingent generalization.  
RE-CDM in China as the case for this study is partially because, as 
explained previously, it is an innovative and even surprising tool as a 
result of international climate negotiations. CDM, probably for the first 
time in the climate negotiation history, opened the regulatory room for 
North-South, and private-public collaboration at the same time. Whether 
it is really a win-win situation is another issue, but it may indeed have set 
the history of global effort in combating climate change down a different 
track from what would have occurred without it. In this regard, a case 
study concerning this crucial break point of international climate 
governance is essentially an interpretive case study in which the 
researcher has to explain the event by applying one or a few existing 
theories to this new terrain.   
Chapter 3 elaborates the theoretical framework crafted to guide the data 
analysis in a systematic way. However, it is also clear that the RE-CDM 
as a critical event may be consistent with more than one interpretation. 
Therefore the general risk is a biased selection of inferences to support a 
favored theory by subordinating evidence inconsistent with the chosen 
theory (Odell, 2001). This research is constructed as a neo-pluralistic 
approach to understand the power dynamics led by business actors around 
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RE-CDM’s arena. It rigorously reflects on alternative theories, such as 
neo-Gramscian approaches in global environmental governance, with the 
hope to make the interpretation more robust.  
4.2. Rresearch technics and data generation procedures 
In this research, wind energy CDM activities are selected as a case to 
identify the possible links between the emergence of business power in 
the CDM market, the CDM’s climate and development benefits, and the 
implications for the governance of carbon offset activities. The selected 
RE-CDM project(s) present variables and evidence that can be observed 
via various sources such as direct observation, archival documents and 
interview transcripts (George and Bennett 2005). The combination of 
these techniques are crucial in this research since it provides strong links 
between what people say (interviews), what they do (observations), and 
under what policy or institutional condition (written documents) 
4.2.1. Ethnographic observations 
The ethnographic observations are mainly carried out during two field 
trips to Gansu Provinces in Novermber, 2010 and January, 2011. I spent 
15 days with local officers and business leaders to investigate local 
renewable resources and visit the potential wind and solar project sites in 
the area. In addition, the author was often invited to participate in some 
informal business discussions around CDM or renewable projects during 
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the field study in Beijing. Research notes, totally around 10 thousand 
words, are taken after these observation sessions and later stored up in the 
researchers’ personal computer.  
In the ‘brave new world’ of CDM, everybody is the learner, including the 
researcher himself. It means you need to learn about a world you 
understand by encountering it firsthand and making some sense out of it 
(Agar, 1986). When looking at the stunning growth of CDM market since 
2004, questions as follows emerge: 
 What is going on here?’  
 Who is involved and what do they do?  
 For what? 
 How and how often they act?  
 With what consequences?  
As it is obvious that these questions can be easily translated into 
academic or theoretical terminologies and frameworks such as agencies, 
context and process, which this study aims to address, the method of 
‘encountering the world firsthand’ emerged as an appropriate and 
powerful technique in generating valuable data. The fieldwork for this 
research was carried out between November, 2010 and October, 2011, 
when the researcher was actively engaged with the people who take 
certain aspects of CDM related activities as their full-time jobs, such as 
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consulting, financing, certificating and validating, CER purchasing, etc. 
However, the observation focus has been given to the organizational level 
rather than individuals, meaning that the representativeness of these 
individuals’ actions to the organization they belong is constantly checked 
by the researcher during the process of observation. Most of the 
observations were carried out in offices or working contexts rather than in 
private contexts, though in China’s business reality, the two can hardly be 
strictly separated when some informal ways of business communication, 
such as business dinners (one important source of observation 
opportunities), have an important role to play when doing business.  
During the field study, observation of the negotiations emerged as a 
useful technique since negotiation is the most common way of 
interactions among state and market actors in the market activities in 
producing compromise and consensus. The theoretical perspective of this 
research drives the observations focusing on which norms and rules 
prevail over others, who is proactive and who is inactive, in practicing 
these norms and what preferences and motivations can be spotted during 
the bargaining process. The general objective for such observation is to 
identify the possibility of changes in norms or rules and to see how such 
change may possibly affect the actor’s role and capability in governance.  
CDM is a surprising (and arguably premature) child of the KP, which 
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leaves tremendous negotiating room open to the actors involved in its 
policy process and project implementation. Negotiation is thus essentially 
a major part of the ‘learning by doing’ process which characterizes the 
history of CDM development. There are two types of negotiations around 
RE-CDM governance that received particular attention during the 
fieldwork of this study. First are the so called capacity building efforts 
that are often carried out in the name of seminars and workshops, during 
which private actors often lead the session and dialogue that often involve 
certain policy issues from time to time. It is a rather formal process of 
exchanging ideas, which appears to be hardly relevant for any specific 
project. It is also a good forum to study the representation and 
participation issues when examining questions like ‘who is selected to 
speak and on whose behalf’.  
The second type of negotiation happens among the private actors 
(upstream and downstream of the core CDM activities, business and 
financial actors, to name but a few) in negotiations of the specific 
elements of CDM projects on the ground. This form of activity happens 
literally on a daily basis, during which issues such as regulation, policy 
compliance or political influence, were often picked up to enable or 
disable one particular negotiator from time to time. It is usually a good 
opportunity to identify some on-the-ground norms and rules among the 
parties. In general, the above two types of negotiations can be regarded as 
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two typical patterns of formal communication between public and private 
actors in China’s political and economic context: direct lobby (for or 
against a policy in general) or indirect influence on a case by case basis.  
As explained before, the paramount purpose of observation is to figure 
out ‘what they do’, not ‘what they think (they are doing)’. It is noticed 
that some actors’ behaviors in these two types of communication contexts 
are strikingly different, and the contrasts are reveal some important 
information on power dynamics, interests and other elements that 
underpin the process of governance. Beside negotiations, observations are 
also conducted at some informal occasions such as diner parties or public 
exhibitions, which happened in a less frequent manner but serve as 
valuable complements to the formal negotiation types of activities.  
4.2.2. Document analysis  
Documents are also used to serve as a supportive role for this research. In 
this research, 62 pieces of formal document plus hundreds of informal 
documents (mainly news clips, leaflets or website materials) were 
collected via different channels and stored in the database with the total 
word count of roughly 110,000 (See Appendix 2.)  The documents 
analyzed include business correspondence and project files, policy or 
legal documents and relevant media coverage. The information and ideas 
conveyed through these documents and shared by actors provide strong 
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supportive evidence for the norms and rules that have been observed from 
the observation. Most of these documents provide ‘official’, ‘normative’ 
and ‘common-sense’ versions of social phenomena (Silverman, 1999) and 
therefore serve as background materials. Documents may also illustrate 
the contradiction between the norms on paper and the norms on the 
ground, and how such contradictions may potentially lead to a new 
balance in the reality of CDM governance at the implementation level. In 
other words, by analyzing the documents we discover the ‘hidden’ 
implications for the governance arrangement by revealing the gap 
between ‘what is written’ and ‘what is actually happening’.  
Any piece of document can be regarded as a consequence or evidence of 
ongoing interactions between social actors that are somehow related to it. 
Therefore, many interesting questions can be asked about the documents, 
as illustrated below: 
 How are texts written? 
 How are they read? 
 Who wrote them? 
 Who read them? 
 For what purpose? 
 On what occasions? 
 With what outcomes? 
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 What is recorded? 
 What is omitted? 
 What is taken for granted? 
 What does the writer seem to take for granted about the readers? 
 What do readers need to know in order to make sense of them?                       
Source: Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 142-3 
The aim of addressing these questions is not just to review the format and 
content of the texts, but to reveal the causes of its publication as well as 
the decision making process associated with its completion (Silverman, 
1999). For example, China’s Measures for the Operation and 
Management of CDM Project in China (NDRC, 2005) was an important 
policy document, which reveals, at least partially, how interests of various 
government ministries are organized to generate this policy, what is on 
the agenda and what is not, how the business actors are expected to 
behave as a response to the policy, etc. The revised version of this policy, 
published in 2010, however, revealed some crucial changes in these 
variables and provides valuable insights in understanding the dynamics of 
political and economic context around CDM arena from a historical 
perspective.  
In the meantime, business documents such as a company annual reports, 
company websites, or auditing reports of public listed companies are a 
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potential goldmine for the investigation of interactions of the targeted 
company with other actors such as financiers, investors, competitors, 
regulators and the public stakeholders. These documents also inform the 
researcher about the companies’ official standpoint towards CDM, to 
what extent they are involved in CDM activities and what role CDM is 
playing for its business strategy. In addition, it also tells a story of how 
and for what the decisions are made within the organization, and can 
reveal some interesting statistics and proceedings that are crucial in 
understanding CDM activities at an organizational level.  
Besides official documents such as policy papers or company profiles, a 
large number of unofficial documents are also examined. These include 
email correspondence, memos, internal reports, media coverage, etc. The 
ethical issues and access resources of these documents will be explained 
in detail in the following paragraphs. The content of these documents is 
often project focused, which provides fertile sources to investigate 
project-based, on-going power dynamics among the actors when 
negotiating or doing a particular project. In addition, these documents 
often present a vivid picture of how policy is landed on the ground and 
dealt with by the non-state actors through their day-to-day practices via 
emails or meetings. Analysis of documents within the qualitative domain 
is all about detecting how social reality shapes what is said or written in 
the documents (Grbich, 2007). The unofficial documents can be treated as 
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the records of these social actions that take place on a daily basis, through 
which the norms, rules and patterns of behavior can be detected.  
In general, this research examines the documents produced at multiple 
governance levels, ranging from the policy (national) level, the 
organizational level, and then down to the specific (project files) level.  
Like much document focused research, it starts with an investigation of 
linguistic coherence or contradictions in presentation, understanding and 
interpretations of the texts. Then the researcher seeks the explanation and 
implication of these contradictions by asking questions such as: how it 
emerged and by whom? Whether and in what way it is reconciled? The 
ultimate purpose for doing so is to understand through what process the 
normative realities are depicted and transformed by actors’ intended or 
unintended actions, rather than examine the validity or ‘true or false’ the  
statements. The documents do not speak for themselves and it would be 
naïve to take its content for granted as transparent representations of the 
reality of the world of CDM. Yet, as Atkinson and Coffey (1997) argue 
texts are important social facts that should be approached for what they 
are used to accomplish, yet should not be treated as firm evidence as there 
is a clear division between what is recorded on the paper and what 
happens in reality. Therefore, documentary sources shall not be treated as 
surrogates for other sources of data.  
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4.2.3. Interviews 
The decision to use interviews as the main data generation technique is 
based on the reflection of the research needs. Qualitative research 
interviews intend to reveal ‘subject perceptions’ of the research themes 
(Kvale, 1996). In the research, the private actors’ perceptions on CDM 
development, its critics and its contribution, and their relationships with 
other social actors, are important elements to understand the political 
economy of carbon markets and their governance process. Interviews 
may disclose some hidden ‘facts’ of the speaker’s identity and power 
statues in the CDM circle, and reveal how different actor groups are 
trying to make their voices heard, identity established, and interests 
legitimized in the governance process. Interviewees’ narratives may 
contradict what they do or what they should do, which provides fertile 
ground for in-depth investigation. More importantly, it helps to clarify 
interviewees’ understanding of their own CDM related actions, or ‘what 
they think they are doing’, and hence bridges the gap between ‘what they 
do’ (from observation) and ‘what is written’ (from documentation 
analysis). Interviewees’ detailed accounts may produce convincing 
explanations of the observable differences between written texts and on-
the-ground activities, so that questions like ‘why and how these 
deviations happened’ can be answered.  
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During the field work, altogether 40 formal interviews were conducted 
between November, 2010 and October 2011 (see Appendix 1. for the 
interviewee list). The interviews often last from 40 minutes to over 3 
hours, with most of them are recorded. It should be noted that the CDM 
structure is particularly complex in terms of the sheer number of various 
actors groups involved in the project cycle. Therefore the focus of 
interviews is given to those actors groups that are directly relevant to its 
governance structure. Among them are the officers both at national or 
municipal level, business managers of wind CDM project developers, 
bankers and financiers who underwrite project risks, on site engineers 
who tackle project implementation and maintenance barriers, project 
validators and consultant companies, and NGOs who depend on their 
involvement in the project. Due to the complicated nature of CDM 
governance, interviews with line-ministerial officers, local academics, 
journalists and community stakeholders are also included on an ad-hoc 
basis.  
The language used for interviews was normally Chinese as the first 
language of the both parties. However a few interviews were done in 
English because the informants are expatriate carbon managers in China 
who are not confident to use Chinese as interview language. Choosing 
expatriates in China originated from the intention to keep the informants 
as diversified as possible to get balanced views. In the same vein, I also 
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interviewed former CDM experts who already left CDM business, for 
various reasons. Their account of CDM project development in China 
provides significant information and insights.  
According to Kvale (1996), it is crucial to make sure the relevance of the 
research topic or themes to the interviewees’ life and experience. This 
research mainly use open-ended and semi-structured interviews because it 
is unrealistic to attempting ‘standardized interviews’ with undifferentiated 
questions and procedures when engaging a wide range of actors in the 
interviews. Although all the interviewees are somehow involved in CDM 
activities on daily basis, their different jobs and expertise split them rather 
significantly in terms of being capable to answer certain questions. For 
example, when talking about the implementation risks of the CDM 
project, a buyer may be interested in the probability of CER delivery; 
whereas the banker may worry about the security of the loan repayment, 
and the policy maker may be mainly concerned with the negative impact 
of a failed project to the successful registration rate with the EB in his 
political purview. Therefore, interview questions were carefully crafted to 
suit participants’ various backgrounds and experience, even though the 
purpose of the questions or focus of the issues to be investigated 
remained coherent throughout the interview study. For example, although 
different questions concerning ‘environmental integrity’ were designed 
for DOE people and project owners, the purpose was essentially the 
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same: understanding peoples’ perception of ‘business as usual’ way of 
doing CDM project and its implications for ‘additionality’ issue.  
In order to keep the subject on track, the researcher made the theme and 
purpose of this research clear at the beginning of each interview. The 
process of the interviews was manipulated more like a ‘naturally 
occurring’ conversation where the interviewee was encouraged to be open 
and conversational. From time to time, I required the informants to 
comment on some existing CDM related criticisms or arguments with 
their own experiences in order to get deeper insights. For the same 
reason, I also picked up some key words, phrases or ideas that I think are 
related to the research themes and questioned the informants for further 
explanation or clarification. For example, one of the informants kept 
using the word ‘cheating’ during the interview. I picked up this word and 
asked him to elaborate what he really meant by cheating. He then 
presented a fantastic story of his disillusionment of CDM after seeing this 
mechanism deviating significantly from his original ideas.  
Ambiguity is another issue when informants might sometimes be vague 
and inconsistent in their expression (Kvale, 1996). Although this may due 
to the faulty communication or even informants’ particular personality 
traits, it is more often a manifestation of how interviewees make sense of 
the genuine contradictions in the real world (Kvale, 1996). Yet, treating 
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such kinds of self-conflicting statements is always tricky, because if the 
researchers keeps on asking the questions over the contradiction elements 
of the statements, the informants may realize these inconsistencies and 
‘fine-tune’ the previous statements or perceptions, which is not always 
welcomed by the researcher. In such cases, I usually encouraged the 
participants to use other stories to explain a situation that appears to be 
self-contradictory or unclear to me (though not necessarily to the 
informant), rather than raise the contradiction directly and ‘force’ 
informants to have a second thought about it.  
Being open minded and sensitive to the potential of change or need to 
modify interview questions or procedures is also needed. The need for 
change may be due to various reasons. For example, during this field 
study there was an increasing worry about CDM’s future, which led to 
significant changes in peoples’ perspectives. New policies issued during 
the same period may also lead to the similar issues. People will respond 
to these external variables and develop new ideas or insights that need to 
be reexamined if possible. In this research, I tried to revisit some 
informants when they changed their roles in the business circle (i.e. form 
DOE to consultancy, or vice versa) in the hope that the change of duties 
might have led to a change of perspective. This assumption was proved 
largely valid and most of the revisits became important conversations of 
this field study. In addition, the interview procedures were also modified 
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to best suit interviewees’ convenience. For example, in the later phase of 
interviews, I often suggested interviews to be taken in unofficial settings 
such as in a quite café or tea house, because I noticed most of the 
informants feel it more relaxed and open in these places, rather than 
sitting with a tie and suit in the office.  
All of the interviews were recorded with prior consent of the 
interviewees. The use of digital recorder is essential because it allows the 
researcher to document the non-verbal details of the conversations, such 
as pauses, overlaps and the like, which may reveal some interesting 
information. Besides, note taking during the conversation has two distinct 
negative effects. Firstly, it distracts the researcher who may be busy 
writing down the notes but ignoring some important words, phrases and 
even expressions that should be picked up for further questions. Secondly, 
interviewees may not feel very comfortable with someone sitting in front 
of him or her, and trying to taking down every single word he is saying, 
hence the flow of the conversation can be severely interrupted. Although 
some informants may feel uncomfortable at the beginning with the 
recorder, after a few minutes they normally become used to it and 
continue talking in a more relaxed manner.  
So far I have described document analysis, observation and open-ended 
interviews as the three ways of gathering data in this research. Then what 
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about credibility? As I explained previously, these techniques are used 
mainly to understand ‘what the actors should be doing’, ‘what they are 
actually doing’ and ‘what they think they are doing’. In order to make the 
inferences reliable, triangulation is necessary to carry out ‘cross 
examination’ between these three sets of data. Triangulation is a method 
whereby different methods are used in order to remove bias in single 
method-oriented research and thus achieve the validity and reliability of 
the research findings. Denzin (1970) as an early advocator of this method 
argues that a field strategy should simultaneously combine multiple 
sources of data collection as a method of triangulation process in order to 
overcome the partiality of data and present a complete picture. Later 
supporters of triangulation also hold the assumption that different 
methods should lead to the same findings and if it is not the case, certain 
measurement must be ‘flawed’ (Moran-Ellis et al, 2006).  
The limitation of this argument is clear when various research methods 
can also lead to erroneous research results (Fielding and Fielding, 1986), 
while different results may not necessarily be due to a flawed 
measurement, but rather a factual difference between social reality, 
people’s perceptions and a normative statement. Hence in this research, 
both convergence and divergence are actively sought after since the 
former may suggest a coalition in presence, while the later reveals 
conflicts and contradictions. It is believed that both can provide 
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interesting evidence for a comprehensive understanding of the research 
issue, as long as they are grounded in disciplined theoretical perspectives.  
4.3. Research Ethics 
The ethical clearance of this research was issued by School of 
International Development at University of East Anglia prior to the field 
work in November, 2010. However, there were several ethical issues to 
be taken into serious consideration throughout the various stages of data 
collection phases. Among them the most important issue was the 
confidentiality problem of those informants that are involved in the 
observation and interviews. There is a “disclosure risk” in this research in 
which people reveal things of a sensitive nature (e.g. on power relations 
with other social actors, or non-compliance of national or international 
CDM regulations.) Thus, the informed consent and confidentiality is 
important. Consent was gained in advance for every informant in this 
research and the researcher only recorded the interviews with the prior 
consent of the participants. The informants were also required to sign the 
consent form, which is in English. Since all the informants have no 
difficulties to understand written English as they have to deal with 
English written CDM project documents on daily basis, translating the 
consent form into Chinese was deemed unnecessary.  
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All the informants preferred to remain anonymous so that securing their 
anonymity and privacy was the researcher’s top concern (see Appendix 1 
for the complete list of interviewees). All the names of participants were 
coded anonymously in the transcription and recording. Pseudonyms are 
used for any direct quoting are included in writing up the thesis or other 
publications. The recordings have been kept safely with password 
protection on the researcher’s personal computers to guarantee that only 
the researcher himself can access to the data. Besides, some of the records 
were edited afterwards to cut off the names of the relevant parties or 
organizations. The researcher made sure that all the quotes used in the 
thesis aimed to identify some general features of research issues but not 
relate to any specific problem of individual projects or organization. The 
researcher discussed with the participants how to use the content of 
interviews, and picked out sensitive phrases that are not comfortable with 
the informants to be quoted, before asking for the permission to take 
direct quotes from the interview transcript. 
Most of the documents analyzed in this research are available to the 
public, which can be accessed and acquired from the website, seminars 
and public libraries or archives. However, some project related 
documents, such as negotiation memos or business reports, were provided 
by the informants, who had to make sure that these documents were not 
confidential and could be exposed to the researcher for research purpose 
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sonly. It is noted that there are quite a large number of projects and 
organizations involved in the RE-CDM activities in the research area, so 
that the revelation of the information that concerns these activities will 
not lead to the leakage of the participants’ and their organizations’ 
identity.  
Accessing and snowballing are other issues that are carefully considered. 
I have over ten years of experience as a credit risk analyst on 
infrastructure and energy projects in China and worked with major 
Chinese financial institutions and energy utilities. Some parts of this 
research are linked with people from organizations I once worked with 
closely. Yet most of the latter participants were introduced by the people 
who did interviews as their friends, former colleagues and business 
partners, and so on. In such case I always reminded the informant that if 
he wishes to introduce other people as potential interviewees, he must not 
reveal his identity as an existing informant since the identities of the 
informants should be back-to-back, meaning that informants would not 
acknowledge that there are other informants of this project within his 
organization. 
However, it became rather difficult when several people from the same 
office had been invited to the interviews simultaneously. In addition, 
CDM presents a rather small circle with only about 2000 people who are 
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directly engaged in this newly emerged business. It is almost impossible 
to conduct purely back-to-back interviews as people might start talking 
about this research after being interviewed. In the later phase of field 
study, some of the interviewees already somehow acknowledged this 
research project and the researcher. One of them even made a comment 
like: ‘Finally, it is my turn’, when I firstly dialed their numbers to gauge 
their availability. In this regard, a slight ‘contamination’ due to the 
intimate engagement to the researched community, a phenomenon 
discussed once by Mason (1996), seems also inevitable for this research.  
On the other hand, informants sometimes are seeking ‘expertise opinions’ 
from the researcher as well. For example, since CDM is facing a ‘turning 
point’ as the Phase I of KP will soon be expired in 2012 some informants 
are very worried about their own jobs and hence seeking advice from the 
researcher during the interviews. Another example is that when visiting a 
local renewable energy investment fair, the local officers insisted the 
researcher do a presentation on renewable policies in front of all the 
participants. It is very difficult to reject such requests from time to time, 
but in order to minimize the influence of the researcher on the research 
subject, I usually agreed to have a ‘Q&A’ session at the end of the 
interviews or observation sessions and answer some of the informants’ 
questions.  
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4.4. Qualitative data analysis  
There are many different approaches to qualitative data analysis, but in 
this research I mainly used Nvivo 7 software to organize and analyze 
data. All the written materials including document papers, observations 
notes and interview transcriptions were input into the software. I did not 
translate the Chinese documents or transcriptions because the time 
constraint of this research, and I am afraid that translation would 
somehow reduce the originality and representation strength of the data. 
Therefore, I decided to translate Chinese transcriptions only when they 
are directly cited in the thesis. Thankfully, most of the functions in Nvivo 
7 are applicable to Chinese materials too, even though I had to work out a 
twin set of code and nodes with English and Chinese respectively.  
I began organizing the data by coding text and breaking it down into 
more manageable segments. I developed three overarching code 
categories (tree nodes) based upon the theoretical frameworks, the 
research questions, and the overall impression of the data. Therefore it is 
initially a ‘top-down’ way of dealing with data. But later I realized that 
this ‘top down’ process might not be capable of capturing important 
insights that ‘naturally emerge from the data’. So I modified and updated 
the tree nodes constantly in accordance with the changing analytical focus 
and new themes found in the data. Most of the sub-nodes were developed 
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from the topics raised in the data. The final outcome of the coding sets 
was a mixture of both inductive and deductive effort.  
Using software in the data analysis process has been thought by some to 
add rigor to qualitative research (Richards & Richards, 1991). One of the 
benefits of using such software is the flexibility of being able to define 
and easily alter the coding scheme during the coding process (Kelle, 
2004). 
However, during the research I have not abandoned manual analysis 
completely, because there are ambiguous and synonymous terms used in 
the texts regarding the same idea or situation. Taking into the 
consideration that the materials consist of both English and Chinese 
language, the problem is very serious. Just taking the node ‘integrity’ as 
an example, in some cases, the integrity issue was referred to as 
‘cheating’ or ‘a moral deviation’. But some responded to the issue with 
‘second best choice’, or even ‘creativity’. The way in which respondents 
express similar ideas in completely different ways makes it difficult to 
recover all responses simply by computer software. In such a case, some 
manual search and inspection were necessary so that data are in fact 
thoroughly interrogated. In fact, during the data analysis period I had to 
navigate between the raw data and the coded data so that I could reveal 
the most relevant and important themes.  
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4.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have clarified the methodological issues that underpin 
the design and analysis of this PhD research. It is noted that these issues 
may be interlocked with epistemological or ontological categorizations, 
based on the divided perceptions of quantitative or qualitative methods in 
research. As for this research, qualitative case study is selected as a 
preferred research design, yet such choice is not based on the researcher’s 
preferable knowledge tradition (epistemology) or philosophical approach. 
On the contrary, the researcher holds that the quantitative or qualitative 
research have different values and intends to answer different research 
questions, which require different methods for collecting and analyzing 
data. The bottom-up approach of this research to understand an 
innovative governance system or the political economy of a new 
industrial sector that cuts cross many existing ones indicates a set of 
research questions to be formulated which mainly focus on the power 
interactions and social processes around the CDM arena. It is this nature 
of such research inquires that induced a qualitative case study strategy.  
Based on this strategy, three methodological techniques, namely 
ethnographic observation, document analysis and open-ended interviews, 
are identified as the major resources for data generation. Each of these 
methods is used to reveal certain aspects of CDM governance in China 
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and they are combined to illustrate the relationship between the 
normative, subjective and actual situations. Triangulation between these 
three spheres is carried out in order to make more reliable and credible 
generalization. It is noted that the three spheres may not always be 
presented in a consistent way, yet the division or contradiction can serve 
as a good starting point for investigating the key variables such as power, 
interests, and influences among the social actors involved in the RE-
CDM activities.  
As with most qualitative case studies, this research design and its 
methodical strategy has some advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
hand, it allows the researcher to explore the in-depth cause and context of 
some of the major problems that CDM claims to have since its inception. 
It also opens the possibility to reveal the ‘black box’ of governance as a 
process at CDM’s implementation level via the lens of business power 
and influence in the Chinese political economy. Whether the problems of 
CDM, if any, are due to a problematic governance architecture imposed 
from the top (inter-state negotiations)? Or it is just the same old story that 
even a perfectly designed mechanism can go wrong when meeting with 
domestic structures, traditions and cultures? This research’s ultimate goal 
is to provide some empirical evidence to this rather implicit but important 
debate over the cause of CDM’s inefficiencies. Because no matter what 
happened to CDM in the post-2012 scenario, the real causes of its 
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problems should be learnt to avoid similar mistakes in designing other 
flexible mechanisms (REDD, or CDM in LDCs) in combating climate 
change.  
Yet, it should be noted that the findings of this research can be highly 
contingent for various reasons. Among them is the relatively unique 
political culture in China and the cross-sectoral features of CDM. 
Therefore the inferences delivered in this case study should be 
complimented with other empirical and theoretical studies at cross-
sectoral and national levels. Furthermore, China is a country that has 
witnessed tremendous transformations in terms of its political economy, 
governance models and climate strategies in the past decade, which may 
well continue to be the case in the foreseeable future. Hence the 
‘snapshots’ that are taken today for this research may not be sufficient to 
explain the dynamics of change in the future. Therefore, more 
comparative studies will be welcomed to test the generalizations 
established in this research by applying them in various timeframes or 
historical moments in time.  
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5. The political economy of RE-CDMs in China 
In this chapter I discuss the relationship between state regulations and 
market activities in the RE-CDM market. I start with a section of 
contextual background regarding the role of various business groups in 
the RE-CDM activities, as well as a brief description of Chinese 
regulations and policies on renewable energy development and CDM. 
The following section presents the analysis concerning both the 
constraints upon state actors, and the capacity or leverage of business 
actors in governing Chinese RE-CDM activities. The manifestations of 
business power are analyzed via their strength to either promote or 
marginalize certain types of methodologies, project types, and contractual 
relations of the CDM projects, as well as their impact on creating a 
dominant discourse that supports and legitimizes renewable CDMs as 
China’s efforts to combat climate change.  
The third section discusses the findings based on the preceding analysis, 
which particularly focuses on the impact or consequences of the 
advancement of business power in governing the carbon offset activities. 
I argue that the implications of business influence and their relationship 
with state actors relate closely to many problems noted in the CDM 
market today, namely an unequal distribution of projects and CDM 
revenues, the integrity or additionality of these offset activities and their 
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arguable insignificance of contributions to sustainability. The Chapter 
concludes with the argument that the CDM has created a vacuum space 
for governance in host countries that both market and state actors intend 
to capture. Yet it is the market actors that eventually seize many crucial 
aspects of governance roles. However, they cannot achieve it without 
connecting closely with the national policy makers, since the latter 
provide not only the legitimacy input for their CDM operations, but a 
relatively slack regulatory framework for CDM activities. The findings of 
this research reinforce Breslin’s conclusion that the relationship between 
political elites and new economic elites represent a new social class in 
China, which not only regulates the economy to generate profits for itself, 
but also allies with outsiders to promote neo-liberal projects (Breslin, 
2007).  
Therefore the pattern of state-business relationship in this market fix only 
loosely to the existing explanations of Chinese political economy, where 
the business do not interact with states in a typical pluralistic or 
corporatist fashion. Business are neither ‘barnacles on a ship’ nor decisive 
forces that can determines the policy outcome alone, as some structuralist 
theorists would suggest (Cox, 1987). The power of business actors 
revealed in this research is rather unevenly spread within the markets, and 
its dynamics changes constantly throughout various stages of the market 
development. However, business actors are arguably the major drive to a 
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thriving RE-CDM market in China, which are at the same time also 
responsible for some of CDM’s most worrying deficiencies.  
5.1. RE-CDM: business actors and policy framework 
The CDM is often regarded as a new mode of governance since it 
exhibits a two-tired and hybrid governance structure (Streck and Lin, 
2008), which incorporates private and public actors to oversee both the 
flow of finance into the non-Annex 1 countries and carbon credits back to 
the Annex 1 countries (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). It comprises of a 
regulatory framework at the international level and an operational 
framework at national level. The latter, can be viewed as a rich empirical 
site of hybrid networks among various non-state actors (Lovell and 
Liverman, 2010) that cut across almost all the important economic sectors 
in the host countries (See Table 5.1). 
5.1.1. A new carbon bourgeois: who they are and what 
they do?  
The current governing structure of CDM activities involves the sheer 
number of entities around the project cycle and a complicated role 
sharing system. The successful implementation of every project needs 
participation from formal international regulatory institutions (EB), 
multinational corporations (MNCs), financial institutions, national and 
local governments from both Annex 1 and Non-annex 1 countries, 
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domestic public or private companies, independent consultants, and 
professional validators. All these actors are generating inputs into the 
governance system. For such a complicated system, it is noted the 
interaction and collaborations of the state and non-state actor groups that 
will serve a crucial role in securing successful implementation of market 
based offset mechanism under the international treaty (Streck, 2004).  
In this research, I broadly separate business actors into four categories, 
known as the CER buyer, CER supplier, project developers and DOEs. 
This categorization is mainly due to their distinctive roles in promoting 
and developing CDM activities. However, it should be noted that many 
business organizations have multiple roles in the market. For example, it 
is noted that both CER buyers and suppliers may own a project developer 
team to standardize and streamline their CDM business. The impact of 
integrated roles on the market development is discussed at the later part 
of this section. In addition, there are peripheral non-state actors that are 
included in the project cycle and have an important role to play, such as 
the financiers and lawyers.  
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Table 5.1: CDM Project Cycle and Role Sharing Map 
 
5.1.1.1. CER Buyers 
CER buyers are public or private entities from Annex-1 countries who 
wish to acquire carbon credits, either to offset their own emission caps 
under the KP or to trade these credits at secondary market for a profit. 
The buyers that are actively engaged in CDM activities include various 
types of organizations, ranging from public and private utilities, private 
companies, investment banks, government agencies, and institutional or 
private hedge funds. NDRC, China’s CDM regulator or Designated 
National Authority (DNA) in CDM terminology, records 90 buyer 
companies that are formally engaged in CDM business in China. Most of 
the biggest players in the market, such as Ecosecurities, Tricorona, EDF 
Trading, Enel, established their offices at the dawn of China’s CDM 
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boom between 2003 and 2005.  
It should be noted that CDM is created with the primary concern of the 
efficiency rather than GHG emission mitigation. The rationale behind this 
flexible market mechanism is cost-effectiveness as they allow actions to 
be taken in developing countries without compromising too much 
economic burden for the developed countries and their companies. 
Therefore, the demand side of the market, or the total volume of the 
CERs to be purchased by Annex-1 parties to offset their own climate 
obligations, is more or less fixed at the international level. KP requires 
that ‘Annex I Parties must provide information in their national 
communications under the Protocol to demonstrate that their use of the 
mechanisms is “supplemental to domestic action” to achieve their 
targets’ (UNFCCC, 2007). In reality, this constraint demand has largely 
increased the power of the CER buyers in the market. Their attitude and 
risk appetite determines some crucial elements of the market, such as the 
CER price or the favorite project types.  
In addition, buyers are allowed to purchase CERs from a highly 
diversified project portfolio regardless of its own industrial background 
because CER is a standardized commodity. For example, a utility 
company from Annex-1 country can purchase carbon credits that are 
generated from any project type in China such as waste disposal projects, 
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or metal production facilities, besides energy related facility. This 
‘freedom of choice’ has significantly enhanced the power of the CER 
buyers in the market as they could compare the potential profitability 
among various CDM project types and select the easiest options to reap 
CERs. The dominance of HFCs and later on RE-CDM activities in China 
is partly due to the buyers’ preference on this project segment, which is 
discussed at the later sections in this Chapter. 
5.1.1.2. CER suppliers (Project owners) 
On the sell-side, CER suppliers refer to project owners based in host 
countries. These are typically entities which own the assets that can be 
developed into CDM projects e.g. farms, chemical factories, steel plants, 
cement plants, or state-owned energy companies seeking to develop 
alternative power generation sources. As for the RE-CDM, most of the 
wind farm CDM projects are owned by state utility companies, while a 
large number of small hydro projects are owned by independent private 
power producers. 
Any CDM project, whatever type it may be, is in the first place a 
‘conventional commercial project’ which needs a capable investor to 
initiate investment plans, secure land and finance, purchase and install 
equipment, construct the building facility, maintain the operations, and 
finally benefits from the output(s). Project owners are hence unique and 
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important because they are the only legal entities being responsible for 
the sponsorship, delivery and function of the CDM project, and the only 
direct beneficiary for the sales of CERs as one of the outputs for their 
investment.  
Unlike CER buyers who can simultaneously lay their hands on a variety 
of CDM projects, the suppliers of the CERs or the project owners are 
usually constrained to their core business fields. For example, the project 
owners of wind farms or solar power plants are very unlikely to travel 
into the domains of non-energy production sectors due to their lack of 
expertise and experience of project development other than within their 
own areas. Cross-domain investment is rare in China’s CDM market.  
As a result, the industrial strength and capacity of the project owners in a 
given economic sector has become a crucial determinant of a thriving 
CDM market in that particular sector. Chinese wind farm CDMs serve as 
a very illustrative example here. Most of the project owners are highly 
capable state-owned utility companies who are able to mobilize a large 
pool of finance and human resources needed for the capital investment of 
wind farms. Their closeness to the officialdom and familiarity of the 
bureaucratic procedures make them a reliable source of CDM projects.  
‘Our (CDM) projects seldom stopped midway. We are familiar with the 
bureaucratic process and if the project is stuck somewhere, we know 
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which government agency and which person we need to find and talk to.’ 
     ------ Interview transcript of ZNW 
ZNW is speaking for his organization, a state-owned utility company 
whose capability in project implementation is much stronger than the 
average project owners. During the interviews, the buyers unanimously 
concur that wind farms are one of the best projects in their portfolio 
because the suppliers of the credits are often these large utilities which 
are ‘reliable and capable to get things done in time’ (Interview transcript 
with LYR, CL and ZL). 
5.1.1.3. Project developers 
CDM has created fertile business ground for dedicated carbon 
consultancy companies who act not only as intermediary knowledge 
brokers between the CER buyers and sellers, but also as the technical 
experts who advise on project implementation, compile the required 
project documentation, and manage the bulk of the CDM process. 
In the CDM market, project developers or consultancies are indispensable 
parties for several reasons. At the outset, CER buyers from Annex-1 
countries rely heavily on external consultants to get access to the local 
market and identify potential CDM deals. On the contrary, project owners 
in host countries usually have very limited knowledge regarding the 
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CDM rules and procedures. They need carbon expertise to help them 
going through the bureaucratic process if they wish to materialize their 
potential carbon revenue. Besides, CDM is a rather ‘bottom-up’ 
mechanism since new methodologies and eligible project types are not 
handpicked by the dicision makers at EB (Kollmuss et al, 2010). Instead, 
they are designed and proposed by the market actors and this task has 
essentially become the project developers’ core duty in their daily 
business. Appropriate methodologies are the base for developing CDM 
projects. Hence the initial designers of methodologies, namely these 
project developers, become the on-the-ground decision maker of the 
appropriateness, feasibility and even eligibility of a given project type to 
be labeled as a CDM.  
5.1.1.4. DOEs 
DOEs are the independent third-parties which act as the "auditors" for the 
CDM project. These companies have to be certified by the EB before 
they are able to provide validation and verification service to the project 
owners. DOEs main duty is to check if a project is eligible to be 
registered as a CDM project (known as ‘validation’), and to confirm if the 
registered project has been properly implemented and monitored so that 
the project performance sustains the claimed emission reductions (known 
as ‘verification’).  
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DOEs are often regarded as the outreach arms of EB and the ‘watch dogs’ 
that guarantee the quality of each CDM project. However, these entities 
are usually part of business organizations and their performance is largely 
subject to the business logic. DOEs in China can be categorized into two 
groups. On the one hand, there are domestic institutions such as China 
Environmental United Certification Centre (CEC) and China Quality 
Certification Centre (CQCC) who are essentially quasi-government 
organizations. On the other hand, many foreign DOEs are also operating 
in the Chinese CDM market. Institutions like Det Norske Veritas (DNV) 
and Energy Resource Management (ERM) are active players in auditing 
Chinese CDM projects. But regardless of their ownership, their auditing 
services were paid by the project owners rather than by EB, meaning they 
have to strike a balance between their reputation as an independent 
agency and a severe competition in the Chinese CDM market.  
‘As DOE, if we say ‘yes’ all the time during the project validation or 
verification, EB would question our credibility. But if we say ‘no’ all the 
time, no project owner would like to hire us and we are out of the 
business. That is really tricky.’ 
------Interview transcript with DW 
So far I have identified the four business groups in CDM market based on 
their distinctive functions and roles in the project cycle. However, it 
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should be noted that market is never a static place and the roles and 
functions of the actors can be blurry, fluid and overlapping from time to 
time. A good example is that since 2007, both CER buyers and suppliers 
started to mount up their expertise and knowledge about CDM rules, and 
consequently setting up their own team dedicated to project development, 
rather than relying purely on external project developers or consultancies. 
Up to day, all the ‘Big 5’ state utilities companies in China, known as 
Guodian, Huadian, Datang, Huaneng, and Zhongdiantou, have 
established dedicated carbon expertise team to facilitate their own CDM 
business. Buyers like EDF (a French utility company) have also 
purchased a Chinese carbon consultant company in 2009 to strengthen its 
project developing capability.  
Beside this notable trend of ‘internalizing’ carbon expertise in the market, 
the workforce among these private entities are particularly fluid when 
people are often seen job hopping among buyers, DOEs and project 
developers. In addition, there are public officers trying to tap the CDM 
benefits. Some of them resigned their previous public jobs and joined the 
CDM related business.  
5.1.2. Policy and legislation framework of RE-CDM 
CDM created not only new market players but also new policy domains, 
regulatory institutions and bureaucratic procedures at national level, 
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which needs to be integrated into an existing policy framework in order to 
make CDM work. In the case of renewable energy sectors in China, two 
policy documents are at the centre of the policy web concerning the 
development of wind energy CDMs in China. One is the ground-breaking 
Renewable Energy Law (REL) passed in 2005. REL and its following 
supplementary measures and guidelines govern all the renewable energy 
production projects in China and proactively promote policy tools such as 
feed-in tariff, grid connection, regional renewable plan, and so forth. The 
other document is Measures for Operation and Management of CDM 
Projects in China (MOMCP), which serves as the guiding policy paper 
governing all the CDM activities in China.  
5.1.2.1. Renewable Energy Law (REL) 
Renewable Energy Law (REL) was passed in February 2005 and formally 
enacted on 1 January 2006. It provides a comprehensive guideline and 
framework for developing renewable energy activities. The purpose of 
this law, as described in the Article 1, is to ‘increase the energy supply, 
improve the energy mix, safeguard energy security, protect the 
environment, and achieve sustainable development.’ These objectives are 
highly compatible with the national development strategy set out in the 
11th national Five Year Plans.  
It is noted that REL prescribes several favorable policy instruments to 
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promote renewable energy. Firstly, the government will set out a mid-to-
long term overall renewables target in the national energy mix. The 
renewable target set out for the 11th FYP (NDRC, 2007) is 10% for 2010 
and 15% for 2020 in the total energy consumption (NDRC, 2007). Yet it 
is noted that the 2010 target of 10% has not yet been achieved despite the 
massive development of renewable projects (see table 5.2). The second 
policy element of REL is the compulsory synchronization requirement for 
the national power grid. This policy aims to protect renewable power 
producers by increasing their bargaining power with monopoly like grid 
companies (only two are in operation at the moment, known as State Grid 
and China Southern Power Grid). 
REL also allows government to intervene in the pricing system for 
renewable energy production. According to Measures for Price 
Management and Cost Distribution on Renewable Energy Power 
Generation Projects, issued by NDRC in 2006, there are two types of 
interventions. The fixed floor price (feed-in tariff) is set out by NDRC, 
which have a legally binding effect for the power purchasers. It applies to 
all the biomass, solar, wave and geothermal power projects that are not 
developed through the government controlled national bidding system.  
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Table 4.2: Total Consumption of Energy and Its Composition 
Year 
  
As Percentage of Total Energy Consumption (%) 
Total Energy 
          
 Consumption Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas Hydro-power, Nuclear  
(10 000 tons of SCE)       Power, Wind Power 
  
     
2001 150,406 68.3 21.8 2.4 7.5 
2002 159,431 68.0 22.3 2.4 7.3 
2003 183,792 69.8 21.2 2.5 6.5 
2004 213,456 69.5 21.3 2.5 6.7 
2005 235,997 70.8 19.8 2.6 6.8 
2006 258,676 71.1 19.3 2.9 6.7 
2007 280,508 71.1 18.8 3.3 6.8 
2008 291,448 70.3 18.3 3.7 7.7 
2009 306,647 70.4 17.9 3.9 7.8 
(Source: National Statistical Bureau, 2013) 
The other type of intervention is called the guideline price. It does not 
have any legally binding effect for the power purchasers. Guideline prices 
apply to wind farms and most of renewable projects that go through the 
national bidding system. However, in 2009, NDRC decided to apply four 
categories of feed-in tariff for its onshore wind projects according to the 
quality of wind resource among various regions. Areas with better wind 
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resources will have lower feed-in tariffs, while those with lower outputs 
will be able to access more generous tariffs (ranging from RMB 0.51 
Yuan to 0.61 Yuan). As for the incremental cost occurred by purchasing 
and synchronizing renewable energy into the grid facility, REL 
establishes a cost-sharing mechanism so that the accrued cost will be 
shared among utility consumers (about 0.63$/kw since 2009).  
5.1.2.2. Measures for Operation and Management of CDM Projects in 
China (MOMCP) 
This document was firstly issued in 2005, and was revised in 2011. The 
analytical focus is given to the 2005 version because it is the document 
that was in force throughout the years when the majority of the CDM 
projects were developed. However, comparative analysis is also carried 
out to examine some new elements of the updated version.  
In general, the measure is a protective and restrictive document in a 
number of ways. It reiterates the dual purpose of CDM as ‘to assist 
developing country Parties in achieving sustainable development and in 
contributing to the realization of the ultimate objective of the Convention 
as well as to assist developed country Parties in achieving compliance 
with their quantified GHG emission limitation and reduction 
commitments.’ (Article 2) 
China, like many developing countries, was reluctant to support the CDM 
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at the initial stage, in the fear that it would quickly exhaust the nation’s 
most cost-effective mitigation options (Qi et al, 2008). In addition, the 
government worries that developed countries would use CDM payment 
as a part of compensation for their historical and financial obligations 
under the convention (Zhang, 2006). Therefore, the measure is to ‘protect 
Chinese rights and interests’ (Article 1) and make sure the CDM revenues 
are additional to any ODA loans or financial programs under the 
convention (Article 9). For the same reason, only Chinese companies 
with majority ownership can apply for the CDM (Article 11). All these 
protective regulations, together with unofficial rules such as a floor price 
requirement, reflect a cautious yet supportive attitude of government 
officials towards the CDM.  
The measures also shows the government’s intention to integrate the 
CDM into its national development strategy by promoting specifically 
three project types, namely energy efficiency improvement, development 
and utilization of new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and 
utilization (Article 4).  
The measures declare a joint ownership between the Chinese government 
and project owners, while the Chinese government collects a 65% share 
of CER revenue of HFC or PFC projects, 30% for NO2 projects and 2% 
for projects within priority areas or forestation projects (Article 24). 
184 
 
Article 24 states clearly that ‘whereas emission reduction resource is 
owned by the Government of China and the emission reductions 
generated by specific CDM project belong to the project owner, revenue 
from the transfer of CERs shall be owned jointly by the Government of 
China and the project owner.’  However, realizing that such regulation 
may conflict with the Property Law, adopted in 2007, the 2011 version 
changed the wording and only insists on a joint ownership on CER 
revenue, but not the state ownership of the emission reduction resource as 
a whole.  
In 2007, the Energy Bureau under NDRC published a compiled 
regulation for renewable energy sectors and altogether 18 regulations 
have been included in that edition. This research does not provide 
detailed analysis for all these regulations but instead I argue that prior to 
the arrival of the CDM, China already has a complicated policy 
framework to regulate its renewable energy sector, together with a large 
number of existing law and regulations for electricity generation. Behind 
this complicated legal framework is the web of institutional or ministerial 
interests that CDM has to be accommodated. An old theme of the Chinese 
politics hence emerges here in the CDM market: the difficulties for inter-
ministerial coordination and the problems of too much regulation, or a 
‘fragmented authority at the central level’ (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992; 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1998), which will be analyzed in detail in the 
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following sections.   
5.2. RE-CDM with Chinese characteristics 
The previous section presents some contextual backgrounds for the 
development of China’s RE-CDM activities by illustrating the key 
business actors in the market and in which policy or regulatory 
framework these entities are operating their carbon business. This section 
analyses the relationship between business and policy makers in order to 
shed some light on the following puzzles. Firstly, what is the major drive, 
either public or private, that is responsible for the massive development 
of RE-CDM activities in China? Secondly, what leverages that business 
actors possess in shaping the process of how CDM is governed? Or, does 
the business have a say in ‘what is to be governed’ at the project 
implementation level, and how?  
5.2.1. State’s interests and power in developing RE-CDMs 
The prevalence of China’s ‘top-down’ or strong state intervention in its 
industrial and development policies is often treated as a ‘taken for 
granted’ explanation for a thriving market (Nee, 2010). This logic has 
been applied to analyzing CDM market development in China in previous 
studies, whereas a strong state support and institutional capacity of the 
regulators, such as a powerful Chinese DNA, has been identified as the 
main drive for the CDM boom in China (Ganapati and Liu, 2008). This 
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argument is echoed with both mushrooming RE-CDMs and an equally 
astonishing expansion of renewable energy sectors in China (see Table 
5.3 and 5.4), indicating that CDM policies can effectively address the 
‘market failure’ problem by shifting market’s interests from ‘low hanging 
fruits’, such as HFC23 projects, to activities with more sustainability 
benefits and strategic importance, namely the renewable sectors (Lewis, 
2010). The fieldwork of this research reveals a somehow different story 
on the ground with some of the findings elaborated in the following 
paragraphs. 
In general, it is argued in this research that new political institutions and 
regulatory capacities are built up mainly to serve the interests of 
expanding regulatory power from a particular regulatory institution via 
CDM development. In this regard, the institutional power of the states is 
therefore enabled by, rather than enabling, market development. Without 
market expansion there would be very limited CDM activities to be 
regulated and hence no regulatory power for the CDM officers. Secondly, 
although there is clear evidence that state actors intend to occupy the 
governance vacuum created by CDM, their effectiveness to implement 
these policies is often affected by business actors who enjoy the freedom 
either to comply or to get around these policies.  
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Table 5.3: Total installed wind energy capacity (MW) in China  
 
Source: Global Wind Energy Council, 2011 
Moreover, it is not just the market actors that constraint the capability of 
CDM regulators. The existing bureaucratic systems on development and 
industrial policies in China often overlap with the CDM regulations, as 
explained in the previous section. One of the findings of this research 
indicates that the expansion of the RE-CDM depends critically on to what 
extent the newly emerged CDM procedures can interact with existing 
bureaucratic rules and institutions smoothly, and avoid potential conflicts 
with a wide range of governing authorities within the bureaucratic 
system. In this regard, Chinese DNA is content to accept CDM 
procedures as a mere side-line process, and they impose with very slack 
and lassie faire attitude (explained with more details in the following 
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section) to the non-carbon elements of the projects, such as their social or 
environmental contributions, which are usually under the authority of 
other government institutions. 
Table 5.4: Chinese wind energy CDM projects registered with EB: 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe, 2012 
5.2.1.1. Policy makers’ role in facilitating CDM projects: from a market 
promoter to a market regulator  
The officers’ role in promoting CDM is well understood in the market. 
SZQ, a veteran project developer, provided a vivid account of the 
difficulties he faced without governmental support at the earlier 
developmental stage of this market.  
‘With no government approval, no credit history, no relative project 
experience, a young project developer came into a local entrepreneur’s 
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office. He talked enthusiastically about UN, international cooperation, 
etc., and offered the entrepreneur a promising opportunity to make some 
handsome additional revenues. The most amazing part is that, according 
to the young man, there is no extra cost! The entrepreneur doesn’t need to 
do anything, except for handing over the detailed technical data of the 
project. If you were that entrepreneur, what do you think of the young 
man? Swindler!’  
------ Interview transcript with SZQ 
SZQ is not the only person who has been treated as a swindler when he 
firstly peddled the idea of CDM to the potential project owners across 
China in 2005. Another informant gave me a more dramatic account of 
how they were investigated by the local police, who were called up by the 
project owner after their first meeting. These accounts revealed a unique 
role of state actors to enhance the credibility of market participants with 
its official endorsement and legitimization. Therefore many informants 
believe that the most important value of a series of capacity building 
programs initiated by the government is that they guaranteed the 
genuineness of the CDM and enforcing the trust among the market actors 
(Interviews transcript with ZL, LYU and LHL).  
However, once the trust is established among the business actors the 
government’s role in promoting CDM is significantly diminished. If the 
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project owners are convinced the realness of this innovative mechanism, 
they would then like to know how it can be done step by step. This is a 
question that is often beyond government officers’ capability to answer. It 
is the business actors, such as CER buyers and project developers, that 
often act as teachers to enlighten project owners how to dig up potential 
projects and benefit from them.  
‘To have private companies in these capacity building activities is a win-
win solution for both (government and business), because government 
officers only know some background knowledge, international rules and 
approval process around the project. But most local people want to know 
how a specific project should be carried out. How can we make the 
project be eligible as a CDM? How to prepare the documents? And most 
importantly, when and how can they benefit from it? Etc. A presentation 
of real cases is the best way to answer these questions, like what we do in 
most of the seminars or workshops. People then really believe it is true 
and workable. Consequently, they came to us to discuss more projects in 
the area.’ 
      ------ Interview transcript with ZL 
Promoting CDM is a process of integration of mindset of all the parties 
from public and private domain, and both state and non-state actors have 
indispensable roles to play. Most of the interviewees from private 
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domains expressed their superiorities in terms of their expertise and 
knowledge over public actors, while retaining their deference of central 
officers during the process since official endorsement and support are an 
essential (yet sufficient) condition for market development.  
5.2.1.2. Political needs for CDM: a constrained wish for institutional power 
China’s DNA is arguably the most efficient DNA in the world, which has 
approved more than 3400 projects since 2005. NDRC is a mammoth 
ministry in China’s political system and often referred to as the ‘mini 
state-council’ among Chinese people. However, one often overlooked fact 
is that NDRC was only formed in 2003, and its climate change division 
was then a relatively small agency. Its administrative power is limited 
comparing those regulatory institutions that oversee the energy industry, 
electricity production, and renewable energy policy in China. During the 
interviews, many market participants mentioned the growing institutional 
power of this office along with China’s CDM boom.  
“In the earliest days, nobody knows what a CDM is. Neither did they 
know who governs it in the government. We visited various government 
departments until we are told that it is the Climate Change Office in 
NDRC who is in charge. It was an office with only 4 or 5 officers and 
temporary employees, and it has no formal bureaucratic ranking. ” 
In a hierarchy political system, bureaucratic ranking is considered as a 
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very important evaluator for the state office’s institutional power in 
China. It is noted that Climate Change Office was upgraded to a full-
fledged bureau-level institution (Ju Ji Dan Wei) only in 2008. The 
argument is that it is the fast growing CDM market that enables its 
regulatory institution, not vice versa. Market participants’ perception 
strongly echoes with this observation. When asked about DNA’s 
incentives in promoting CDM activities in China, the need to expand 
extra institutional and regulatory power has been raised by many 
informants as the crucial incentives for government officials in 
supporting the CDM (Interviews with LHL, LX1, and MZM). 
GJ, one of the senior managers of a major CER buyer in Beijing 
mentioned during the interview:  
‘On the one hand they (officials) have to create a supportive environment 
for developing CDMs, by organizing capacity building activities and 
passing favorable policies and so on. On the other hand, they also create 
constraints for the market participants via certain procedures, such as 
creating an internal evaluation committee. Their argument is that without 
such checking procedures the rate of successful registration at EB would 
be even lower. That’s not convincing. EB, DOEs, CER buyers and 
projects developers are the ones who are responsible for the quality of 
CDM, not DNAs. Why they are doing that? Climate officers are among 
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the most powerless in NDRC, now suddenly there are thousands of 
projects waiting to be approved by them. They would never let go of this 
opportunity.’  
However, DNA’s intention to intervene the market practices is obvious. 
The declaration of CERs as a ‘state property’ in MOMCP is a vivid 
example, and a biased CER sharing system according to preferable 
project types is another. The government also insists on a Chinese 
ownership majority for the CER suppliers. Beside these written 
regulations, there are some unspoken rules too. NDRC intervenes in the 
carbon price by approving only those projects above a floor price of 8 
Euros. It also prohibits project developers to share CERs revenues with 
project owners. These written or tacit rules are manifestations’ of state’s 
intention to seize a rather open ground of governing CDM activities. 
Eventually, these policies have seen largely ineffective in changing 
markets’ perspectives and their day-to-day practices as the market actors 
have invented new moves to outpace these regulations when they see fit. 
For example, business parties often sign two set of contracts. One is for 
the approval procedures, the other, which is de facto carried out on the 
ground, stipulates the real CER price and revenue sharing mechanism 
between project owners and project developers. The Chinese ownership 
majority requirement can also be breached by artificially changing the 
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shareholding structure of the joint ventures. In general, the regulative 
power of these policies is not as strong as they appear on the surface. 
‘In the carbon market, policy follows the moves of business. Because they 
(governments) have no idea what are we (business) going to do next. We 
invented some new moves, and then they start to think of how to regulate 
it.’ 
---Interview transcript with KWW 
It would be simplistic to describe this relationship as a cat-and-mouse 
game, rather the development of the CDM market provides another vivid 
example of the triumphs of those ‘bottom up’ initiatives over the ‘top-
down’ intervening policies if they fundamentally contradict the overall 
market interests (Chen et al, 1992; Johnson, 1988), as illustrated 
previously.  
5.2.1.3. Regulating RE-CDMs: managing the policy overlaps and vacuums 
The regulatory power of DNA is also confined according to the pre-
existing regulatory system that governs various industrial or development 
activities in China. Taking wind energy projects for example, according to 
the Measures for Management of Implementation and Development of 
Wind Energy Projects issued in 2011 (NDRC, 2011), the wind farm 
builders have to provide the following documents to make their projects 
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approved from the Energy Bureau of NDRC, a different bureau that 
regulate overall energy project activities in China:  
 Evidence that the project is in accordance with national, provincial 
plan for wind energy production, which is set out by government 
institutions at various levels; 
 Chartered provision or preliminary approval from the government 
for conducting pre-construction works 
 Feasibility studies complied by an eligible independent research 
institution 
 Land use permission from land use authorities 
 Environmental impact assessment and approval from 
environmental ministries 
 On-site security evaluation by concerned government institutions 
 Preliminary opinion from grid companies or province level energy 
authority about the grid connection and power transportation 
 Letter from financial institutions for preliminary agreement to 
finance the projects 
 Other documents 
This list presents some basic requirements for any potential wind farm 
investors. However, if the investor wishes to accredit its project with a 
CDM label, it needs to get another approval from DNA from the Climate 
Change Division of NDRC, which checks the following aspects: 
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 Eligibility of the project participants; 
 Documents necessary to implement the projects (including 
application form, feasibility studies, PDDs, environmental 
assessment, etc); 
 Methodologies 
 Calculation of CERs 
 CER prices  
 If the funding for purchasing CERs is additional  
 Technology Transfer 
 Estimated transfer period of CER 
 Plan for monitoring and verification 
 Sustainable development contribution 
Intra-ministerial conflicts or relationship is not the main area to be 
investigated in this research. However, the above approval procedures 
reveal several crucial elements of how RE-CDM is governed on the 
ground in China. At the outset there is a clear separation of governing 
RE-CDM activities in terms of its physical element (renewable energy 
production) and carbon element (CER production), which follow parallel 
tracks of decision making process in different regulatory arenas. 
Secondly, since any given wind farm CDM is essentially a project that 
comprise both physical and carbon element, there are obvious 
overlapping items that are double-checked by the regulatory bodies.  
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For example, the request for a independent feasibility study and financial 
plan is required twice for the RE project approval and CDM approval 
respectively. The Energy Bureau under NDRC wants to check if the 
project is financially viable, while the CDM regulators try to identify the 
additionality of the project, an indeed opposite direction to look at 
project’s potential profitability. Hence the field study indicate an innate 
conflict for such double-check process. If a project presents a rosy picture 
of its profitability, it may be accepted by the Energy Bureau as a good 
project but tends to be rejected by DNA since its additionality claim is 
dubious. On the contrary, a non-profitable project would not likely be 
approved by the Energy Bureau in the first place, even if it can pass the 
additionality check by DNA. Although in theory the project owners can 
argue that it is the potential CDM revenue that helps turning an 
unprofitable project into a profitable one, so that their projects can be 
approved at both occasions, in reality few policy makers and banks would 
accept such argument (a situation that will be fully explored in later 
paragraphs).  
For the same reason, environmental and social impacts are also double-
checked under this parallel approval system. Any RE project with Energy 
Bureau’s approval is self-evident of its positive environmental and social 
impact because these impacts were on the checking list. The challenge of 
project’s sustainability effect is essentially challenging the credibility the 
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Energy Bureau. As LYR, a senior manager informed the researcher during 
the interview: 
‘As buyers we believe that all of our projects are delivering sustainability 
benefits, otherwise they would not be approved by the Chinese 
government in the first place.’ 
--- Interview transcript with LYR 
Therefore, DNA’s sustainability check for its CDM projects is reduced to 
a mere procedure on the paper. In order to carefully shun the potential 
conflict with other governing authorities, the sustainability check of CDM 
is largely conducted in a laissez-faire manner (Newell, 2009). The result 
is a highly ‘efficient’ DNA which is able to evaluate more than 35 
projects in a one-day evaluation meeting and each project participants 
only have two minutes or so to present their projects at these meeting. 
One can hardly expect any serious challenges from the regulators.  
As WAW, a project developer who often attends these meetings, 
comments during the interview: ‘It’s just for procedure purposes and the 
evaluators seldom raise tough questions. They sometimes pointed out 
spelling mistakes or format problems in the reports.’  
------ Interview transcript with WAW 
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5.2.2. Business leverage in governing the RE-CDMs 
In previous sections, I illustrate that policy makers are largely constrained 
in governing a new market instrument such as a CDM. Their relatively 
insufficient knowledge of ‘on-the-ground’ CDM practices, such as the 
methodology designs, as well as the existing domestic political 
framework make their strong intention of direct intervention to the market 
activities a difficult task to be achieved. Therefore, the reason why certain 
projects type is particularly popular in the project pipeline cannot be 
taken for granted as a result of ‘a strong hand of the state from above’. In 
this section, I turn my focus on business actors and argue that RE-CDM’s 
dominance in China’s CDM portfolio is mainly due to a market logic and 
self-governed filtering system, due to the fact that business actors have 
notable structural power in advancing their preferred methodologies, 
financial pattern, and a favorable image of RE-CDM in China. All these 
efforts have become major causes for a thriving RE-CDM market. 
5.2.2.1. Methodologies: all CERs are equal, but some are more equal than 
others 
As explained in preceding paragraphs, one of the distinctive features of 
CDM’s governance is that the methodologies and eligible project types 
are proposed by the market players rather than handpicked by the policy 
makers. Nevertheless, China’s DNA prescribed renewables, energy 
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efficiency and methane recovery as the nation’s most favorable project 
types. Hence the state priorities may collide with the business ones as the 
market focuses only on the easiest option in order to expand their 
business quickly. There are obvious synergies between state and market 
interests. Taking wind farm projects as an example, it can be easily 
packaged into the CDM due to its simple methodologies for calculating 
CERs. These methodologies are reliable and hardly challenged by DOEs 
or EBs and hence welcomed by project developers. Among 559 registered 
wind farm CDMs from China, only three methodologies are ever used. 
544 projects choose methodology ACM2, which is ‘so simple even for 
college students.’  (Interviews transcript with MQF). The wind energy 
CDM hence become a project type that can be massively copied in a very 
short period of time.  
On the contrary, methane recovery and energy efficiency projects, though 
supported by the state equally to the renewables, are not that lucky to win 
business’ favor. Methodologies concerning these project types are much 
more complicated and needs more tailor-making efforts for each project 
design and development. Therefore the interviews indicate that most of 
the project developers are less enthusiastic to put forth these projects. In 
China’s CDM pipeline today, methane recovery and energy efficiency 
projects only account for 6.28% and 8% in respective, comparing to an 
81.16% share of renewable energy projects (NDRC, 2013). The empirical 
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data shows that market forces are in effect much more capable in 
promoting their favorable project types than their state counterparts by 
filtering unwelcomed projects through their day-to-day practices.  
Falkner (2008) points out that companies possess ‘technological power’ 
because they are able to direct technological innovation and diffusion, 
and such technological knowledge renders business with privileged 
position in the environmental governance. The findings of this research 
reinforce this argument by illustrating the indispensable role of individual 
private companies to create accounting standards for the entire market.  
5.2.2.2. Financing the projects: material power  
Financial arrangement is the core issue of any industrial project. 
According to KP, Article 12, ‘The clean development mechanism shall 
assist in arranging funding of certified project activities as necessary.’ 
But until today, there are no regulations or rules, either from international 
or national level, on how should CDM project be funded and financed. 
The underlying assumption is that the market will sort it out by itself. In 
reality, this open ground of governance has been eventually taken up by 
the business actors to advance their own favorite pattern of financial 
arrangement.   
Theoretically, CDM is designed to encourage Annex-1 parties injecting 
capital or technological investment in the project activities with potential 
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GHG emission reduction effects in developing countries. Once these 
investment projects are implemented, Annex-1 parties can reap the CERs 
generated by their own projects, either to offset their own cap, or trade 
them for a profit in the secondary market. However, this direct investment 
model is not favored by the business actors due to tremendous risks 
associated with equity investment. There are many uncertainties with a 
highly capital intensive project such as a wind farm. The project owner 
may run out of funding, the cost of the equipment may rise sharply, the 
bureaucratic procedure can wear out even the most patient investors, local 
residents and officers can be hostile, and the energy purchasers may 
breach the contract. The list of risks can be endless. Therefore, the 
Annex-1 parties prefer to take up another business model that eventually 
changing the whole picture of CDM from an ideally bilateral investment 
scheme to a mere CER trading floor. Instead of investing and produce 
carbon credits in the host countries, they started to purchase these 
reduction units directly from Chinese project owners (shown in table 4.4 
and 4.5).  
As LYR explains during the interview, ‘As a carbon fund, we are only 
interested in carbon assets, not the physical investment of the project. ’ 
------Interview Transcript with LYR 
This finding echoes with Lutken and Michaelowa’s (2008) striking 
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argument that it is essentially the developing countries that finance most 
of CDM projects to meet developed countries commitment under KP. But 
set aside the fairness issue of this arrangement, it has led to some 
significant underlying assumptions about the quality of the CDM. One of 
them is that only those project owners that are capable of securing large 
amount of bank loans will eventually take up the lion’s share of CDM 
revenues. Local finance becomes a crucial manifestation of business 
power and determinant for the carbon market development, because 
without finance there would be no physical projects, and consequently no 
CDM. The key to a thriving market depends on how project owners in the 
host countries can successfully arrange adequate funding needed for 
project implementation (Lutken and Michaelowa, 2008). 
Figure 5.5 CDM activities as bilateral investment projects 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 CDM activities as CER trading scheme 
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The empirical findings of this research justify this assumption as it is 
noted that CDM projects have been concentrated on those large 
corporations with strong capability to arrange capital intensive investment 
such as wind farms. On the contrary, those who are less capable to 
arrange funding for projects implementations on their own, are found 
often being marginalized in the CDM system.  
‘The key (of CDM) is not the sales of carbon credits. That is the easy 
part. If you produce CERs someone would buy it anyway…The most 
important thing is the project itself, you have to set it up first, that is 
the most difficult part for average project investors.’  
------Interview transcript with LHL 
According to LHL and other project developers, a large portion of failed 
projects they once developed are due to project owners’ incapability to 
implement these projects in the first place. But for large corporations it is 
a completely different story. For example, Longyuan group, a renewable 
flagship entity under the State Power Corporation, is the largest state-
owned wind farm builder in China (fifth largest in the world). It has now 
CER 
Project income 
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100 CDM projects registered in EB (over 1/5 of total Chinese wind CDM 
projects), with an overall generation capacity of 5,505 MW. In the 
company’s annual report in 2010, Longyuan proudly announced that the 
credit line granted by its banks exceeds 100 billion RMB Yuan (15.87 
billion USD), an unimaginable figure for ordinary small or medium sized 
companies who have difficulties to secure an even small loan from the 
banks. As a result, it is the giant companies like Longyuan that have 
become the dominant CER suppliers in China.  
SZQ, a veteran wind farm CDM project developer, refers to the 
advancement of state-utilities into the CDM arena as ‘the aircraft carriers 
rushing into a swimming pool’, since the financial and political strength 
of these giant companies are simply overwhelming that they have 
changed the outlook of the CDM market completely. As for the CER 
buyers, the emergence of powerful project owners is a desirable situation. 
Their preference of being a carbon traders rather than equity investors, 
explained in preceding paragraphs, means that they have to ally with 
strong domestic companies who are able to get the projects done 
independently of foreign financial or technological assistance. To this 
regard, the alliance between the buy-side and sell-side provides solid 
rationale for advancing wind farm CDMs as a strategically preferable 
segment because of its fitness to advance a trade-dominant mechanism 
rather than a bilateral investment scheme.  
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5.2.2.3. RE-CDM as a green label: discursive power 
The above observation leads to an obvious paradox in the CDM market: 
if only strong and capable project owners are favored by Annex-1 parties 
to cooperate with, and if the project owners are indeed those highly 
capable companies who can arrange adequate finance, override domestic 
bureaucratic hurdles, and mitigate or hedge all kinds of project risks, then 
these project owners must be the most financially robust players in a 
given economic sector, just like the ‘big five’ utility companies in the 
power generation market. Their investment projects should be among the 
most profitable ones as well. In such a case, why do these successful 
companies bother to engage in CDM activities, particularly when CER 
revenues are trivial comparing to their profitability, and highly contingent 
due to a complex bureaucratic procedures imposed by EB, as illustrated 
in previous studies (Lewis, 2010; Schroeder, 2009)?  
For example, Longyuan’s annual report indicates that the group’s CDM 
revenue only accounts for less than 2.75% of its total income in 2010. 
There are obvious non-economic reasons for its active involvement in 
CDM development. The company’s website reveals a clue, where CDM 
business has been labeled as environmental friendly activities as the 
company states that: 
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‘Green Movement and carbon credits development: Longyuan Group 
actively develops the carbon credits generated by its renewable energy 
projects, facilitating its partners in meeting their compliance or voluntary 
target of emission reductions.’ (Cited from Longyuan Groups official 
website, 2012) 
This is a typical example of how CDM’s role has been carefully fine-
tuned from a cost-effective mechanism into a perfect example of utilizing 
market mechanism as an innovative tool for the environment governance 
in China. RE-CDM, in particular, is regarded as the most suitable project 
type for CDM as these activities provide ‘win-win-win’ solutions for the 
economic development, environmental protection and social benefits in 
China.  
Since the benefits of RE-CDM has been taken for granted, the 
participants of wind farms CDMs are therefore labeled themselves as ‘the 
promoters and pioneers of low carbon development strategy’ (cited from 
a major carbon fund’s website), which enables business actors larger 
power in suppressing any contesting voices from other corners. A vivid 
example is the rejection of 10 wind CDMs by the EB in December, 2009, 
which sparked off enormous criticism from Chinese CDM officers and 
business organizations through media and press conferences. It is the 
business actors, most of them are strong utility companies mentioned in 
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the earlier paragraphs, that efficiently organized the press conference and 
released a joint statement with the Chinese government to challenge EB’s 
decision and demanding a re-evaluation of these projects.  
The press conference was held before the COP 15 (Copenhagen) and 
therefore caught huge amount of media attention. Most of the media 
reports united this issue to a general dissatisfaction of developed 
countries sluggish efforts in combating global climate change. However, 
beside the impressive capabilities of business actors in generating 
supportive public opinions in this occasion, this event also indicates a 
strong coalition existing among public and private spheres.  
A senior NDRC officer was invited to have a strong opening speech at 
the press conference, questioning the transparency and decision making 
process with the EB. In addition, in their joint statement to the EB, the 
project owners praised Chinese government’s effort in helping dissipate 
the suspicion from the EB. 
‘EB raised a question (mainly concerning the pricing system of China’s 
off-shore wind energy project) that is eventually beyond any individual 
project developer’s capability to answer… The Chinese government 
already presented a formal report in a highly responsible and sincere 
character (referring to The Report on Development of China’s Wind 
Energy and Its Pricing System, issued in Nov, 2009)…Who else is in a 
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better position, other than the host government, in answering these policy 
oriented questions?’(Quote from Sina News, 2009) 
However, the ‘government report’ referred in this statement was not 
compiled by any government entities, but rather by China Renewable 
Energy Industries Association (CREIA) and the Chinese-Danish Wind 
Energy Development Programme (CD-WED), both are quasi government 
sponsored entities. But set aside the nature of this report, the business’ 
leverage in sustaining and defending a favorable image of RE-CDMs by 
allying with state and quasi state actors is more than obvious.  
5.3. Implications and discussion  
Section 4.2 presents the argument that although state actors have strong 
intention to seize the open spaced created by CDM, their capability to 
achieve this goal is largely constrained. On the contrary, business actors 
have some unique advantages in advancing their preferable project types, 
financial models and supportive discourse in the public, making them 
important ‘governors on the ground’. The dominance of RE-CDMs is 
essentially driven by market players and their interests, rather than the 
policy makers. Yet, it should be noticed that business cannot achieve their 
goals alone and they have to seek alliance with state actors, who are also 
benefited from a fast growing market in terms of a continuously 
increasing institutional power throughout the years. But the obvious 
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question is: no matter who is the dominant driver of the RE-CDM 
activities, as long as these activities are providing genuine carbon 
reduction credits and promoting national clean development, things are 
going on the right track. Are they not? 
This section provides some implications and consequences of a rather 
market-oriented governance model as explained previously. I argue that 
the present market-led model of governance in RE-CDMs is largely 
responsible for a number of significant failures that have been observed 
in the CDM arena today, namely the unequal distribution of CDM 
benefits domestically, a profound misunderstanding of projects’ 
additionality, and an often exaggerated statement of CDM’s contribution 
to the host countries clean and sustainable development (at national 
level).  
5.3.1. CDM revenue: too small, too late and too pro-elite 
Many previous studies referred to CDM as ‘the icing on the cake’ 
(Schroeder, 2009), meaning that the CDM subsidiary are rarely the reason 
of a project to be developed in the first place, because the amount is too 
small in scale in comparison to the total capital investment for the project 
implementation (Lewis, 2010; Schroeder, 2009). In this research, I echo 
these findings and advance my argument further that CDM revenues are 
not only too small in size, but also too tardy for the investors. As a result, 
211 
 
only big players can benefits from it. Since those big players are mostly 
profitable organizations even without CDM support, the mechanism is 
eventually subsidizing the strongest players who are arguably not in need 
of any financial assistance in developing projects with GHG mitigation 
potentials. As for those small sized activities which do need additional 
CDM boost, they are often not favored by the market and eventually 
marginalized and filtered out of the project pipeline.  
I hereby use a wind farm project to illustrate how CDM support is 
insignificant to an investment project. According to UNFCCC, the most 
recent registered Chinese wind project is a 30MW off-shore wind farm in 
Heilongjiang Province (Project No. 5173). According to its PDD, the total 
static investment for the project reaches 264 million RMB Yuan (or 
roughly 40 million USD). The annual expected CER is 73,260 tons of 
CO2 equivalent. As the present carbon price stays at around 4.2 Euros, the 
annual CER income is about 0.3 million Euros or 0.4 million USD. 
According to the present market practice in China, CER buyers are often 
willing to pay around 20% of the expected annual CER value as the 
upfront fee to the project owners. So the project owner is estimated to 
receive only around 80,000 USD as a CDM ‘symbolic finance’ in the 
construction phase of the project. For a project that needs 42 million USD 
capital investment, this 80.000 USD boost is a tiny figure and certainly 
would not have any meaningful impact on investors decision.  
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For the same reason, banks are also reluctant to lend to the projects based 
on the additional CDM revenues. In theory, such revenues would 
significantly enhance the attractiveness to the financial institutions. In 
reality, no banks would change their minds if they simply look at the 
NDRC’s official website and realize that the rate of successful 
registration with EB stays only at 50.5% at the moment, not mentioning 
an even more miserable rate of successful issuance (less than 20%) of 
CERs (NDRC, 2012).  
One UNEP report documents this problem as it noticed that ‘many project 
developers identify lack of access to financing as one of the key reasons 
why numerous CDM project concepts never materialize’ (UNEP, 2008. 
pp. 3). The result is that capable CER suppliers are concentrated on those 
who can develop projects without CDM support, which is a fundamental 
threat to the legitimacy of the whole mechanism.  
5.3.2. Additionality: how complex can it be? 
Additionality is the crucial criteria to evaluate the integrity of CDM 
activities. If projects are believed to be built anyway without CDM 
support, then the CERs generated from these activities and used to offset 
Annex-1 entities’ liability are de facto allowing Annex-1 countries to 
increase GHG emissions, rather than reducing them. But proving 
additionality is never easy, simply because any argument ‘that without a 
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given condition something would never happen’ is logically impossible to 
be fully tested. But beside this innate philosophical challenge, another 
difficulty is that what set of benchmarks that can be applied to judge if 
there is a change of investor’s decision to carry on a project (with CDM) 
or give it up (without CDM). 
The most often used benchmark in present CDM evaluation system is the 
profitability level of the project (or IRR), which means that if a project 
developer can prove that CDM revenue would turn an unprofitable 
project into a profitable one, then the additionality argument is by and 
large valid. The underlying assumption is that profit-seeking investors are 
always rational and would never take up unprofitable investment, because 
it is simply against their nature of profit maximizing.  
In reality, large state-owned businesses in China do invest in non-
profitable projects from time to time due to various non-economic 
reasons. In the preceding paragraphs I demonstrate that CER suppliers 
have been concentrated into a handful of big companies based on strong 
market logic. How to evaluate the additionality of the projects developed 
by these powerful companies raises new challenges for an already over-
burdened checking system.  
Let me again use Longyuan Group as an example. The company in 2010 
has a newly installed wind capacity of 2054 MW across the country and 
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the total profit of 2.77 billion RMB Yuan. But it would be naïve to 
suggest that each project developed by Longyuan must be a profitable 
one. Some wind farms would be unprofitable as they are meant to be, but 
consequently eligible to be developed as CDM projects. The additionality 
argument is valid on a project by project basis, but somehow questionable 
if the analytical focus is shifted to the overall operation of the company as 
a whole, because without CDM support, organizations like Longyuan 
would probably carry on these unprofitable projects as long as its overall 
profitability can sustain these ‘bad investment’ activities.  
As an anonymous manager in Longyuan revealed to the researcher, the 
head office evaluate its branches all over China by three key indicators, 
among which the most important indicator is the newly added installed 
capacity of the year. The potential capacity for the next year is the second 
most important criteria. As for the profitability, it serves only as the third 
and arguably least important indicator to evaluate its managers’ 
performance. This internal policy clearly indicates the group’s strategic 
priority of capacity over profitability, posing a big question mark to the 
legitimacy of subsidizing the company’s non-profitable activities via 
CDM.  
Longyuan is not a special case because most of the state-owned utility 
companies are fighting hard in market share and therefore exhibited some 
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level of tolerance for the negative-profit projects. Hence I would argue 
that the present tool-kit in checking CDM project’s additionality is at 
least too simplified to make sense of those non-economically driven 
activities developed by highly profitable business organizations, as can be 
seen in China’s RE-CDMs. There are life-saving CDM supports, but there 
are also cases of ‘icing on the cakes’. One obvious failure of CDM is that 
the former has been diminishing while the latter has become the major 
trend in the market. Understanding how to integrate these rather different 
scenarios into the CDM checking systems will largely determine the 
ultimate level integrity of the mechanism as a whole.  
5.3.3. Governing CDM for sustainability? 
The research findings in the preceding sections also provide new 
explanations for CDM’s inefficiency to promote sustainability benefits 
for the host countries. Firstly, due to the nature of CDM as domestically 
financed industrial projects, instead of a bilateral-investment mechanism, 
the sustainability contribution of these projects is indeed a domestic issue. 
The Annex-1 entities, as mere CER buyers rather than direct investors, do 
not have any contractual or legal liability to safeguard CDM’s social or 
environmental impact, simply because they do not own those projects. 
Attributing a lack of sustainability in CDM projects to the advancement 
of international business interests (Bohm and Dhabbi, 2009) is therefore 
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not a valid argument at least in China’s case. Rather, if CDMs indeed 
creating negative environmental or social impacts, it is mainly due to a 
weak but pre-existing domestic regulation or enforcement on these issues.  
In addition, DNA’s lassie faire attitude towards sustainability benefits is 
not the main reason for CDM’s weak contribution to SD. Although DNA 
is the responsible institution to safeguard CDM’s sustainability benefits 
according to the official CDM procedures, its intention to do so is 
significantly constrained in the pre-existing bureaucratic framework. The 
guarding authorities that supervise various industrial activities such as 
electricity production or renewable investment often have specific social 
and environmental requirements for the investment projects they oversee. 
CDM is after all a supplementary procedure and its regulators chose to 
shun away from any direct confrontations with other powerful institutions 
such as the Energy Bureau under NDRC.  
The activities’ lack of sustainability has nothing to do with the 
mechanism or its DNA itself, but have a deeper political and economic 
root. There is a strong political preference for economic benefits of 
industrial activities over their social or environmental impacts in China’s 
overall development strategy. Huge number of previous studies revealed 
how environmental protection or social welfare sectors are subdued to the 
economic development for the past 30 years in China (Economy, 2004 
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and 2006; Jahiel, 1997). Such tendency, though needs to be addressed 
urgently and properly, is not likely (and probably should not be expected 
to be) cured only by the introduction an international carbon offset 
program.  
5.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I present the analysis on the relationship between business 
actors and their state regulators in the CDM market in China. I argue that 
CDM created new space for governance that both state and private actors 
wish to take up. However, due to a numbers of constraints that state 
regulators face and some privileged power that business actors possess, it 
is the business actors that eventually grab some crucial elements of how 
CDM is governed on the ground. The thrive of RE-CDM, the favor of 
trading rather than investing, the favorable public opinions are all 
attributed to business actors endeavours through their day to day practices. 
Yet such findings are not suggesting a ‘retreat of state’ in carbon 
governance, business cannot achieve these tasks alone and they have to 
build up strong alliance with the state actors and a public-private coalition 
is obvious in China’s CDM market. 
Such public-private alliances have multiple implications. Firstly, the 
range of project types and capable participants of the CDM activities 
have been significantly reduced. Powerful companies with abundant 
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financial resources have become, paradoxically, the major sources of 
CER supply and beneficiaries of CDM revenue. The integrity of the 
projects is hence questionable, even if these activities are truly additional 
on the project level. At the organizational level, some projects are 
obviously non-additional since they are to be built anyway. Finally, given 
the pro-development or pro-profitability priority of state and market 
actors, the sustainability contribution of these activities is largely ignored. 
To what extent the CDM projects are contributing to SD actually depends 
on various political or economic roots that are essentially outside the 
governance sphere of CDM itself. In general, at the national level, subtle 
inter-ministerial relationship and close state-market alliances are two 
major responsible reasons for the main features of China’s CDM market 
today.  
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6. CDM at localities 
In this chapter I discuss the influence of business actors in local climate 
politics and governance in China through the lens of RE-CDM 
implementations. China’s environmental governance has long been 
characterized with ambitious political rhetoric at central level and 
ineffective policy implementation at the local level (Economy, 2004 and 
2006; Schroeder 2012). This central-local gap indicates profound 
setbacks of ‘command-and-control’ way of governing environmental 
crisis, particularly when aspirations for economic growth are at the top of 
the local political agenda over environmental issues. In order to address 
this problem, several market-based instruments were borrowed from 
developed countries since late 1990’s (Economy, 2006). China’s early 
experiment on market instruments confines within several sectoral and 
local contexts with mixed consequences (Stavins, 2000; Tao & Mah, 
2009). CDM, however, provides the national-level introduction of market 
instrument for environmental governance for the first time in China. The 
advancement of CDM hence opens up the possibilities of business 
influences for the first time in the local governance system for 
environment and climate issues.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. I will first discuss the 
economic incentive and capability constraint of local governments in 
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promoting and regulating RE-CDMs activities. The second section 
provides detailed analysis on how business actors take up the governance 
vacuum at the local level. The following section reveals some 
implications of business influences and local state – market relationships. 
The chapter concludes with the argument that CDM has somehow 
transformed the local environmental governance model from a typical 
‘command and control’ one into a multi-level, hybrid governance system 
with highly fluid and ad-hoc nature (see Figure 5.1).  
6.1. RE-CDMs: incentives and constraints of local policy makers 
CDM is designed as an international market mechanism according mainly 
to experiences of OECD countries, but has been imposed on transitional 
economies like China (Schroeder, 2012). In Chapter 4 I illustrate that 
although Chinese national policy makers tried to intervene in the market 
for their own political purpose, their efforts have been largely 
constrained. It will be interesting to see if these constraints are also 
reflected at the local level and whether these constraint allows business 
actors to creep into the local policy and governance domain via the 
implementation process of CDM projects.  
The investigation of local political and economic dynamics is crucial for 
various reasons. At the outset, any CDM project, whichever type it may 
be, must be grounded in specific localities and local political support 
221 
 
plays a vital role to guarantee successful implementation of project 
activities. In addition, the dual goals of the CDM are to allow 
industrialized countries to earn emissions credits from emission reduction 
projects and to promote sustainable development in developing countries. 
While the former is vigorously checked by EB and its accredited auditors, 
the latter, however, is arguably only to be justified at local level where the 
projects are to be erected. Hence the dynamics of local governance not 
only determine the quantity of CDM projects to be successfully 
developed in the political purview, but also the social and environmental 
qualities of these activities. 
6.1.1. Economic return as a political incentive 
China’s economic reform in most-Mao area is distinctively committed to 
economic growth since it is regarded as the main pillar of legitimacy of 
Communist Party’s rule (Schroeder, 2012). Oi (1996) argues that China’s 
economic miracle can be termed as ‘local state corporatism’ because 
‘local governments treat enterprises within their administrative purview 
as one component of a larger corporate whole’ (Oi, 1999; pp.170) and 
various localities compete fiercely with each other for economic 
resources and benefits such as large profit-maximizing corporations in the 
market.  
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6.1.1.1. Climate governance and Local entrepreneur states 
Like many environmental issues, climate change has not been a priority 
for local governments in China because climate change mitigation and 
energy consumption reduction efforts were believed to work against local 
interests since these efforts could slow economic growth (Pan, 2003). A 
typical illustration of local governments’ ineffective implementation of 
national climate policy is a massive round of power cuts in many 
provinces by December 2010, when the local governments tried 
desperately to meet their energy saving target set out in the 11th Five Year 
Plan in the last few days of the year. In addition, climate change has been 
treated primarily as an international issue to be dealt with by the central 
government and well beyond the jurisdiction and responsibility of local 
governments (Qi et al, 2008).  
However, the introduction of market mechanisms for climate governance 
into the local economic system, such as CDM, is particularly welcomed 
by local officers, who regard this new instrument as a tool to boost 
economic development and thus become a zealous promoter of CDM 
activities within their administrative purview. Most of the interviewees 
from the business circle claim that emphasizing the monetary benefits of 
CDM is the best way to communicate with the local officers and get their 
support for CDM.  
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Figure 6.1: CDM: A multi-level and hybrid governance system 
 
 
 “The local governments’ major incentive to promote CDM activities are 
rather monetary, because they see it as an additional channel to attract 
capital investment in the area, which helps to develop its economy. The 
air can be traded for money, so money is more important (to them) than 
the environmental concerns.”  
------ Interview transcript with ZJJ 
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Unlike central NDRC officers who have direct decision power over CDM 
projects (by evaluating projects and awarding LOAs) and hence promote 
CDM activities mainly to expand their institutional power, the local 
officers do not have any direct regulative power over CDM projects. 
Their role is mainly to summon and encourage local enterprises to get 
into the CDM pipeline. It should be noted that during the reform, local 
officers’ administrative autonomy has been substantially increased than in 
the Mao’s planned economy, after a ‘retreat of the central state’ from local 
economic affairs (Oi, 1999). The local entrepreneurs and business 
managers rely heavily on the patronage of local officers, whose support 
for the CDM activities has become a strong boost for market 
development.  
As LX revealed during the interview: “Those who have close connections 
with local DRC or MOST offices has a clear advantage in promoting 
CDM deals at the earlier years of market development. The officers 
would simply call up the heads of local enterprises for a one-day seminar, 
during which we (the project developers) make a live case show and 
educate them how to exploit CDM resources. Sometimes, at the end of the 
day, we could even reach the deals and sign the contract on the spot. ” 
------ Interview transcript of LX 
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6.1.1.2. A craving for CDM investment  
In China, the majority share of the CDM projects is located in the 
relatively underdeveloped regions of Northwest and Southwest provinces 
due to their abundant wind, hydro and solar resources. As illustrated in 
Figure 6.2, among top five CDM host provinces, three of them (Sichuan, 
Yunnan and Gansu) are also among the poorest provinces in China in 
terms of the GDP per capita in 2010 (NBSC, 2011).  
Figure 6.2: Top 5 CDM Host Provinces in China  
 
(Resource: NDRC, 2012) 
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lack robust industrial basis for the rapid industrialization and economic 
development, they eventually focus on the newly burgeoning renewable 
sectors as the most valuable potential engine for local economic take-off. 
During the field study, I paid a visit to four poverty-stricken counties in 
Gansu province along with a group of senior business managers, who 
were invited by the local governments to investigate local economic 
resources. During the trip, all the local political leaders unanimously 
pointed out their rich wind, solar and biomass resources as the 
strategically important areas to attract external investment and stimulate 
economic growth.  
The existing party cadre management system in Communist party also 
has a key role to play in shaping local officers motivations to support 
renewable energy and other relative instruments like CDM. The cadre 
performance is usually measured by the ‘hard targets’ of local economic 
growth (Liu et al, 2006), which often award the leaders in the fastest 
growing localities with more promising promotion prospects. Taking 
Gansu for example, one of the senior provincial leaders, Li Jianhua, was 
promoted from Jiuquan locality in 2011. Since 2004, Jiuquan has been 
developed into the largest off-shore wind base in China with an estimated 
total wind capacity of 20,000 MW by 2015. The fast growing wind sector 
helped Jiuquan surpass Lanzhou, the capital city of Gansu province, to be 
the top GDP contributor in Gansu province. This achievement is rather 
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rare because most of the province capitals in China are the largest and 
most industrialized city in the province. Many local officers thus believe 
that the main reason for Mr. Li’s extraordinary promotion to the 
provincial leader is Jiuquan’s ‘wind success’. Li’s legendary story has 
made him as the role model for other local officers, who wish to copy 
‘Jiuquan’ model of development by attracting large amount of capital to 
materialize their renewable potentials. Considering that copying 
neighbor’s successful development model is rampant at Chinese localities 
(Breslin, 2007), the regional fervent of renewable energy investment is 
hardly a surprise.   
As a result, many localities have prescribed a number of favorable 
policies to attract renewable investment in Gansu. As the county leaders 
informed the researcher during the field study, policy tools such as further 
tax exemption (as long as ten years), refund of land lease fee (in the name 
of local awards) and governmental assistance in land clearing are in place 
to encourage investment.  
‘We have provided all our efforts to support the growth of this key sector 
and I believe the investment environment is the most favorable among all 
Gansu localities at present stage. In short, the local government has 
constructed the perfect nest for the golden phoenix to settle down.’  
------ Transcript of a county leaders’ speech 
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To sum up, the field study indicates that due to the strong 
entrepreneurship nature of the local governments in governing its 
economic affairs, their motivation to support renewable energy 
development is predominantly economic driven. For the same reason, the 
local officers’ incentive to facilitate CDM is motivated by the assumption 
that this innovative instrument would serve as a supplementary but 
important financial resources for those renewable projects in their 
political purview. It is hence not a surprise to observe that the most active 
and experienced CDM centers in China are indeed those from poor 
provinces but with abundant renewable resources, such as in Hunan and 
Ningxia. 
6.1.2. Constraints faced by the local governments 
In the preceding paragraphs I argue that the local states in China has been 
transformed from the agents of the central state to the heads of local 
entrepreneurs during post-Mao economic reforms, and hence welcome 
CDM as a new business opportunity or additional financial instrument to 
develop its renewable potentials. Therefore, their support for CDM 
should not be regarded as the natural consequences of a top-down or 
hierarchical governance system, because the logic and motivations of 
local officers to embrace CDM are very different from those of central 
officers in NDRC (see Chapter 5).  
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However, the local states’ intention and efforts to encourage CDM are 
largely constrained for several reasons. At the outset is the lack of 
expertise and knowledge of governing a highly technical and 
sophisticated market instrument such as the CDM. In addition, the on-
going economic reform and industrialization has continuously expanded 
the autonomy of financial institutions and state-owned business actors in 
the key economic areas, enabling these actors to escape the supervision 
and interference from local officers, and behave more independently for 
their own interests and strategies. Consequently, as economic actors 
instead of agents of the central government, local states’ financial and 
institutional power to directly fund and support favored sectors, 
particularly capital intensive sectors such as renewable energy, has been 
shrinking considerably comparing to the earlier stages of economic 
reform in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Lastly, the fierce inter-localities 
competition for economic resources at all municipal levels has created 
further constraints on the local officers in regulating economic affairs as 
they are forced to adopt more pro-market regulations for the business 
actors. The creation of local CDM offices and their largely self-regulated 
status is a typical example for such pro-market policy inventions 
(Schroeder, 2012).  
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6.1.2.1. Expertise and knowledge as the new challenge 
Oi (1995) raise the concern that the sustainability of China’s local 
corporatist state model is questionable, since most of the local industries 
require little expertise and start-up cost at the earlier stage of 
development, but along with a deepening marketization and reforms there 
must be more sophisticated sectors emerged, imposing a severe capacity 
challenge for the local officers if they wish to remain as CEOs of local 
business. The introduction of CDM provides a dramatic example of this 
argument because it is a highly complex and technological intensive 
mechanism that suddenly landed at local officers’ doorsteps, waiting to be 
governed.  
During the interviews, many interviewees revealed an appalling shortage 
of knowledge and experience among the local officers in governing this 
fashionable carbon market.  
“They (local officers) could not even tell the differences between CDM 
and CDMA (a 3-G wireless communication system), and often misuse 
CDMA at various CDM capacity building seminars or promotion 
events”.  
------ Interview transcription with LZ1 
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Unlike governing other traditional local industries, where local officers 
are capable of ranking most capable and profitable enterprises and 
determine the level of supportive assistance accordingly, the newly 
emergent CDM business provides little clue as to which type of projects 
are most suitable to be packaged into CDM suite. Neither are they able to 
estimate the prospect and potential of CDM market within their 
administrative areas and set out suitable plans for its long-term 
development accordingly. Moreover, even the information assets that the 
local officers hold due to their expansive connections with senior 
officialdom, a once prominent advantage of local party cadres to be the 
corporatist leaders (Qi, 1999), no longer exists in the CDM arena, 
because climate change related issues is an area that they have very 
limited experiences in communicating with their senior officers.  
LHL, a former carbon consultant, accounted for their first CDM 
experience in Shandong province: ‘At first, some local NDRC officers do 
not even know who is the contact point of CDM affairs at NDRC’s 
headquarter in Beijing. And it was us who told them to whom they should 
speak to… Later the local officer called me claiming that he got troubles 
in writing reports to the central officers regarding this CDM project. I 
provided the information as they requested, but they still do not know 
how to process these information, so eventually they just stamp on my 
story and send it to their senior officers as their final report.’ 
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------ Interview transcript with LHL 
Consequently, although local officers are still capable of using their 
administrative or bureaucratic power to facilitate CDM indirectly, such as 
by enhancing local awareness or organizing CDM seminars, the degree of 
their involvement in the governance process is largely waning comparing 
to other traditional economic sectors. As one informant admitted in the 
interview: ‘local officers are by and large the brokers of CDM deals 
whose main role is only to encourage local enterprises to get in touch 
with potential CER buyers or consultancies, so that to help local business 
to tap into the CDM resources.’ 
------ Interview transcript with MC 
6.1.2.2. Institutional and financial capacity of localities 
Another constraint of the local officers in steering and overseeing CDM 
activities comes from the insufficient institutions and funds at local level. 
Probably, the most important institutional change in the local CDM 
governance is the establishment of provincial CDM centers since 2002, 
which are responsible for promoting and developing CDM projects in the 
local area. However, a closer look at these institutions reveals that these 
centers are not formal government institutions but rather hybrid actors 
with mixed ownership structure, rules and organizational strategies 
(Schroeder, 2011). Some of the CDM centers are essentially wholly 
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private owned institutions, while other centers are with quasi-public 
features. The governing authorities that oversee these centers are also 
different from one province to another. Some of these centers are 
affiliated to local Bureau of Science and Technology, while others were 
supervised by local Development and Reform Commission or 
Environmental Protection Bureaus. This rather messy picture of how 
local CDM promotional institutions are established and governed 
indicates a strong tendency towards lack of top-down regulation and local 
officers’ strong intention to outsource their regulative power over CDM 
to private sectors.  
Another related institutional change is the ongoing restructuring of SOEs, 
large state banks, as well as local credit institutions in China since mid-
1990s, during which a new strategy called ‘grasping the big and letting go 
of the small’ (zhuada fangxiao) was carried out. The result is that more 
than 85% of the small and medium sized SOEs were merged, restructured 
or sold out by the end of 2003 (OECD, 2005), but large SOEs of key 
economic sectors (yang qi) started to bulge and be regulated directly by 
central government (a phenomenon to be explained in the following 
sections). Meanwhile, the state banks are being commercialized and 
starting to strengthen the supervision of the operations of their local 
branches, which once were largely controlled by local officers prior to the 
reforms. These industrial and financial reforms since late 1990’s 
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significantly reduced the localities’ material power in supporting its 
economic activities and funding favourable industrial sectors. Therefore 
the establishment of hybrid and private sponsored governance institutions 
such as CDM centers around China can be understood as merely another 
illustration of local officers’ waning authority over industrial activities 
during this period.  
One DOE validator revealed that: ‘I haven’t met any local officer that is 
not supporting CDM projects. But my observation is that their support is 
rather symbolic. Before validation most project developers would come to 
the project site and meet local officers to teach them how to respond to 
our questions. Local governments want these projects to be done, so they 
are happy to listen to these project developers. We as DOEs can’t do 
anything about it.’  
------ Interview transcript with DW 
SZQ also mentioned that local officers are not able to help securing kick-
off finance needed for his CDM project. ‘I have all the supportive 
documents from the local government, but the bank manager won’t look 
at it because he believes the financial outlook of this project is not robust 
enough to give a green light for the loan.’ 
------ Interview transcript with SZQ 
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The bank manager’s view represents an often overlooked fact in the 
CDM market that the local government support’s is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for accessing adequate finance for the project 
implementation, a situation that could hardly be imagined prior to the 
1990’s reform, when local leaders had a critical power to influence local 
state bank’s lending decision.  
6.1.2.3. Inter-localities competition as a further constraint 
In 2010, I joined a business delegation to investigate the renewable 
resources of Dingxi prefecture in Gansu province. The trip was organized 
by Dingxi government, which was by that time desperate to attract 
outside investment to materialize its wind and solar potential in the 
region. During our two days visit, the neighboring prefecture, Zhangye, 
acknowledged our visit and its government leaders insisted that we visit 
their prefecture too. He sent designated chauffeur who drove over 370km 
from their city to our hotel. ‘Our leaders are expecting all of you. 
Zhangye is a wonderful place for the investors.’ The chauffeur tried his 
best to persuade us to go with him.   
During my field trips to Gansu, this is one of the few anecdotes that 
provide vivid account of how localities in the same region compete with 
each other for economic resources and investment opportunities. 
Renewable industry is obviously another newly emergent lucrative sector 
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that every locality wishes to have a larger share. Previous studies 
illustrated that the intense inter-locality competition has its pros and cons 
(Bai et al, 2004; Zhou, 2004). On the one side, it encourages local 
officers to embark on creative policy experiments in stimulating 
economic development, which arguably serve as a major engine for 
economic growth. On the other side, it deters the possibility of inter-
governmental networking, coordination and cooperation. Taking wind 
farms as an example, ‘lack of integrated regional plan for wind farm 
construction’ is claimed by central officers and many Chinese scholars as 
the main reason for a rampant growth of wind energy production in the 
last decade, which eventually leads to NDRC’s new regulations in 2010 
that requires local provinces to provide detailed development plans for 
local wind energy development as a prerequisite for any new project 
approval. The local development plans will be approved by NDRC and 
only those wind projects in accordance with these development plans 
could possibly be approved (NDRC, 2010).  
However, the causation between inter-localities competition and a further 
constraint of local governments in governing its economic fairs is an 
overlooked issue. One of the few studies concerning this topic is by 
famous Chinese scholars, Weiying Zhang and Shu Li (Zhang and Li, 
1998), who argue that the intensifying competition of the local politicians 
leads to a rapid expansion of private business sector. The interviews in 
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this research also indicate that the institutional barriers resulted from local 
competitions that restrain the local capability to support CDM, as 
provincial CDM centers have to restrain their business within their 
geographic domain. One senior manager at Ningxia CDM centers 
revealed to me that: ‘Ningxia is a small and poor province, so if we travel 
into other provinces to deliver CDM related service, it may not be 
welcomed by the locals, who have their own promotional units for CDM. 
Therefore we established another fully private organization, a de facto 
limited company, which is based in Beijing, to expand our business in 
other provinces.’ 
------ Interview transcript with SZQ 
This account indicates that hybrid or private institutions are in a better 
shape compared to the government institutions in terms of getting over 
the local protectionism and market barriers at least in the CDM arena. 
That is arguably another reason why local governments prefer to 
outsource some of its governance responsibilities to ad-hoc, quasi-public 
organizations in dealing with CDM, other than supporting it directly with 
more official channels. 
6.2. Private power at local level 
The constraints of the local governments in overseeing CDM activities, as 
explained in the preceding paragraphs, are in reality the strongholds of 
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private actors. Comparing to the local state actors, private actors possess 
greater financial resources that are needed for the capital investment and 
project implementation, they are better informed with EB’s highly 
complicated and constantly changing rules of CDM and national climate 
policies and regulations, and lastly, they enjoy greater autonomy to 
execute activities across various political domains in China. In the 
following section, I would analyze how business actors are using these 
advantages to influence the local climate governance dynamics in order to 
sustain their strategic preferences in the CDM market.  
The analytical focus is given to three sites of local public-private 
interactions concerning CDM governance. The first set of observations 
looks at how large centrally controlled SOEs (Yang Qi) conduct their 
CDM related business at local level. The second focus is given to the 
validation and verification activities of DOEs at local project site, since 
these activities comprise some major elements of DOEs daily job as CER 
auditors. Lastly, the analytical lens shifts to project developers or 
consultancy companies, whose duties require them to establish and 
maintain effective communication channels among all the parties 
associated with CDM, both at local, national and international level.  
6.2.1. The rise of centrally controlled SOEs 
One of the findings explained in Chapter 4 is that CDM itself does not 
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automatically create new investment or new project activities in the host 
countries, as the monetary incentive of CERs are too small and contingent 
to encourage investors to embark on highly risky projects (see also Lewis, 
2010; Schroeder, 2009 for the similar conclusions). Consequently, the 
market will automatically identify the most capable actors, who can 
usually carry out a large number of industrial projects independently, as 
the most reliable CDM project resources. In such a case accrediting the 
projects developed by the strongest players with CDM as added value 
becomes a common practice in China’s CDM market. Based on this logic, 
the centrally controlled SOEs, emerged as the most suitable non-annex 1 
partners in the eyes of both CER buyers and carbon consultants.  
6.2.1.1. Financial capabilities of centrally controlled SOEs in renewable 
energy sector 
According to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), a specialized bureaucratic institution governed 
directly by State Council, there are 117 SOEs altogether that are directly 
controlled by the Chinese central government via SASAC (SASAC, 
2011). Most of these enterprises are monopolistic players in key 
economic sectors that are believed to be of strategic importance to the 
country, such as telecommunication, power, natural resources, heavy or 
military machinery and transportation.  
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Probably in contrast to an often taken for granted assumption that most of 
China’s state-controlled companies are becoming less important in the 
national economy since the marketization reform starts, the centrally 
controlled SOEs are actually growing dramatically in terms of their total 
assets, output and profit during the latest phase of economic reform (see 
Yasheng Huang, 2008 for a detailed account of this phenomenon). The 
reasons for central government to support of these giant companies are 
two fold. Firstly, there is a political reverse to the conservative thoughts 
after 1989 incidents from a marketization orientation to the old mentality 
of rigid state control. Secondly, Chinese leaders wish to cultivate a 
number of competent state-owned companies to explore the overseas 
market. In 1992’s congress report, the then Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin claimed that China should adopt a so-called ‘going out’ strategy, 
meaning to encourage Chinese companies’ overseas investment or 
international business operation. Strengthening and fostering a ‘national 
champion team’ of SOEs is deemed as the most important preparation for 
implementing this strategy.  
However, once these companies started to grow they believe there is an 
easier option for profit making and business expansion, which is ‘going 
down (to the localities)’ rather than ‘going out (into the global 
competition)’. Since late 1990’s these giant companies started to expand 
their business across various localities in China, and soon become the 
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most welcomed investors by the local politicians due to the massive 
amount of credits these companies promised to supply for the local 
economic development (Zhang et al, 2008). Zhang el al (2008) also 
pointed out that in early 2000s, ‘linking up with centrally controlled 
SOEs’ has become a common development policy at local level.  
The on-going renewable ‘great leap forward’, typically in wind and solar 
energy field, is another example of this political trend. Taking Longyuan 
group as an example, the company has established over 100 branches, 
subsidiaries and SPVs for its wind energy projects all over China. The 
local managers of Longyuan revealed to the researcher most of these 
projects received little financial assistance at the local level, as the group 
or its parent company, China Guodian Corporation, has ample credit line 
to sponsor its investment activities (Interview transcript with ZNW). 
The financial power of companies like Longyuan is recognized even by 
environmental NGOs. A senior campaigner of Greenpeace in China 
commented during the interview ‘I can’t imagine a picture of a rapid 
expansion of renewable sector and carbon market without the 
contribution of the BIG 5 utilities SOEs in China. They may not do it 
voluntarily, but I can’t think of any other group who have the comparable 
capability to do so.’  
------ Interview transcript with LY 
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There is no official data of the centrally controlled SOEs’ market share in 
Chinese wind energy market so far, yet the estimate can reach over 70% 
to 90% of total installed capacity.  
6.2.1.2. The institutional power of centrally controlled SOEs 
One of the key roles that local governments used to perform in governing 
local industrial activities is to fill up the communication gap between the 
senior or central public officers and local market players. As Oi (1999) 
observe that networking with senior officers over specific investment 
decisions or project approvals has become a daily routine of local 
officers, whose diaries are filled with trips to higher municipals or even 
directly to Beijing. However, such role has been significantly diminished 
along with the expansion of centrally controlled SOEs at the local level, 
as these organizations usually have closer contact with the central officers 
than the local state officers. Hence most of the local states in the end 
delegate the networking functions with their senior officers to the 
managers of these large SOEs.  
A project developer informed the researcher, ‘the necessary bureaucratic 
procedures and approval process are mainly carried out by the project 
owners since they are SOEs. They know the rules. CDM has a centralized 
approving system and need to go through many parallel ministries in 
Beijing. Local governments would assist us to prepare the documents or 
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gather information and data at the local level. We believe such an 
arrangement is more efficient because SOEs are also based in Beijing 
and know the system much better than others.’  
------ Interview transcript with KWW 
Therefore, the centrally controlled SOEs become essentially the 
intermediaries of central-local communications via the issues around 
project development and implementations (see figure 6.2). On the one 
hand, a large part of the updated policy related information is transmitted 
from central to local via SOEs rather than the officially established 
hierarchies, often due to SOEs’ closeness to the central officialdom. On 
the other, local states are not reluctant to give up part of their governance 
roles in order to trade for the central SOEs’ ‘political resources’ in 
Beijing. However, the only ‘side effect’ is that their control of the project 
activities has been largely reduced during this process, because the 
project entities at the local level are de facto integral parts of the parent 
companies, whose operational strategy can hardly be affected anyway by 
the local governments (see Figure 6.2). 
As a project developer comments in the interview: ‘Local governments 
are more interested in how many wind farms can be built up rather than 
how many of them can be packaged in to CDM. They know once the 
projects are done, SOEs would deal with the CDM element by themselves 
244 
 
(explained in Chapter 5) even without any local help. To be frank, if 
companies like Guodian and Datang (big 5 utilities) could not make it 
(going through project approval process and CDM procedures), neither 
could the local officers.’ 
------ Interview transcript of LHL 
In this regard, the CDM has not changed the general feature of how 
industrial activities are governed in China at the local level. 
Figure 6.2: Governance of CDMs developed by centrally controlled SOEs 
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6.2.2. DOEs at project sites: ‘carbon judgers’ on the 
ground 
DOEs are theoretically the only actor group that are capable of putting 
sands in the wheel of a fast growing CDM market. As independent 
auditors appointed by the EB, DOEs main job is to ensure the overall 
quality, rather than the quantity, of the project activities in the market. On 
site validations and verifications are the central tasks of DOE employees 
whose diaries are full of trips to visit remote project sites around China. 
They are the on-the-ground decision maker of whether a project is 
eligible as a CDM, and whether the CERs generated by these project are 
genuine.  
 
‘The power of DOEs actually ties to its capability to say “no”. When we 
give green light to the projects, they will still need to go through the EB. 
But if we give out a negative review of the project, the project is 
essentially dead on arrival. That’s the situation that most project 
developers and project owners do not want to see. We are the first level 
boss, particularly when we are standing at the project sites and asking 
tough questions.’ 
------ Interview transcript with HP 
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However, what makes DOEs an important source of governance input is 
not only their power to reject a project, but their capability to point out 
possible solutions for the problematic CDM projects in order to get it 
approved eventually. The incentive for DOEs to do so is obvious as their 
job is ‘making sure the CDM is going the right way at a right speed, but 
not stopping the vehicle completely. Questioning a project to its death is 
only too easy for DOE validators, and unfortunately there are many 
young validators trying to do so. But we have to resist such temptation 
and be more constructive.’  
------ Interview transcript with HP 
As a result, DOE validators are often seen as another source of expertise 
at the project sites. They provide the most updated insights of EB’s rules 
and regulations and explain how these rules are to be carried out for 
individual project inspections. They sometimes use other cases they once 
validated as illustrations of how to make an improvement. They request 
local officers and project developers to seek alternative data resources 
that can be used to evidence projects’ eligibility as a CDM, and 
essentially they help to standardize the project development processes 
according to their own handbooks of validation and verification.  
‘EB’s rules and requirements are not always easy to be applied directly in 
China, we have our rather unique context and characteristics. For 
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example, some data required by EB are simply non-existent in China. So 
DOEs can be a bridge between international rules and local context. 
Sometimes, by asking questions, we are de facto educating them on how 
to do things right and how to find the supportive evidence. As time goes 
by, our questions are becoming more and more streamlined, and so are 
the solutions.’ 
------ Interview transcript with HP 
These are the clear advantages that local states do not possess because 
most of the officers lack either sufficient understanding of the 
international rules, or some comparable CDM experiences outside their 
political purview that can be learnt or even copied as their own practices 
and strategy for developing CDM activities. The field research hence 
indicates that DOEs are using their leverage of ‘saying no’ to influence 
the governance system by prescribing and promoting the best, or at least 
most standardized, practices of CDM projects in the market, such as what 
data can be used as supportive evidence, where to locate them and how it 
shall be interpreted according to the international rules.  
6.2.3. Project developer as a policy intermediary? 
If DOEs are de facto the transmitters that help to translate international 
regulative rules into on-the-ground codes of practices in the CDM 
market, then the carbon consultancy companies or project developers are 
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the interpreters for national policy and international market trends to the 
local municipals. A massive growth of carbon consultancies at the earlier 
stage of CDM development can be described as one of China’s distinct 
features and their important contributions in the early capacity building 
activities have been well recognized by the policy makers at all levels.  
As ZL, one of the CDM technical expert, explained during an interview: 
‘Most local people want to know how a specific project should be carried 
out. How can we make the project be eligible as a CDM? How to prepare 
the documents? And most importantly, when and how can they benefits 
from it? Etc. Only a presentation of real cases can possibly provide 
convincing answers. People then really believe it is true and workable. 
Consequently, they came to us to discuss more projects in the area.’ 
------ Interview transcript with ZL 
Similar remarks have been noticed in several interviews with people from 
the private sector (Interview transcript with LHL, LYU and KWW). It is 
revealed that local officers rely heavily on experts from business actors 
for disseminating practical knowledge and on-the-ground skills, which 
cannot be obtained from central government or high level academics. 
Hence business actors are playing an important role in filling the 
governance gap between policy and practice, making them an emergent 
power in governing China’s CDM market.  
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These observations lead to a rather general argument, that in China’s 
political context, the most effective tool for local environmental 
governance are based not only on the increase in local officers’ 
knowledge, awareness and regulatory capability. Rather, its success lies in 
the extent to which it can change local leaders’ perspective on carbon 
offset activities as a new tool to address environmental issues. According 
to Oi (1999), local leaders’ dual identity as a political and business leader, 
means that they will only respond when ‘sticks (political pressure from 
the top) and ‘carrots’ (economic benefits from the market) co-exist as a 
joint incentive. China’s CDM success lies in the fact that they offer both 
in one delivery. On the one hand, local officers need political 
legitimization from central officers to confirm that there are ‘cakes falling 
from the sky’. On the other hand, they also require economic 
legitimization of the mechanism to confirm the economic viabilities and 
benefits of CDM, or ‘the availability and taste of the cakes’, a task that 
arguably can only be implemented by the business actors.  
Moreover, large carbon consultancy companies are often seen not just 
promoting specific CDM deals, but actively involved in discussion with 
local officers of the local ‘low carbon’ development model and plan. 
During the field trips in Gansu, I noticed that a carbon consultant 
manager had been enthusiastically educating the local officers on how to 
transform local industrial parks into ‘low-carbon flagships’ by installing 
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solar PVs or other energy efficient facilities for the main buildings inside 
the parks.  
When asked the purpose of such effort, he said: ‘if we only focus on the 
CDM deals we can hardly win the trust of local officers. We have to show 
our capabilities to deliver solutions for the local ‘low carbon’ 
development, a task that local officers has not yet quite sure how to 
implement. If our suggestions can be absorbed into the local development 
strategies, it may help to secure more CDM related deals.’ Hence, CDM 
has opened the possibilities for the carbon consultancy companies to get 
involved in a broader range of carbon related governance issues at local 
level, and allowed them to become the ‘on-the-ground’ advisors to meet 
the local challenges of climate policies and governance. 
6.3. Impacts of local political economy to the performance of 
CDM 
Based on the analysis of local states’ constraints and business actors’ 
advantages and leverages in governing RE-CDM activities on the ground, 
this section turns to the discussion of how can we make sense of this local 
state-business relationship and understand its impacts on the performance 
of CDM as an innovative instrument of local climate governance. 
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6.3.1. Hybrid governance in a fragile coalition 
At the outset, I argue that the traditional division between public and 
private actors is not helpful in grasping the real picture of how carbon 
market is governed on the ground in China. Most of the actors involved in 
the decision making process, either formally or informally, have a hybrid 
nature. For example, local governments are highly entrepreneur and they 
treat CDM as another financial resource to develop a fashionable 
renewable sector. The SOEs are often controlled directly by the central 
governments and use their political resources as a major arsenal to 
negotiate and arrange their deals at local level. The DOEs as independent 
auditors also have distinctive private nature who does not only respect the 
quality of individual projects but are also concerned with the economic 
return of their overall operation and their market share. Validation and 
verification works, in this regard, are business.  
The hybrid nature creates a blurred public-private boundary that needs to 
be carefully examined before reaching the claims of either a ‘dispersed 
state authority’ or a fundamental change of ‘role sharing system’ between 
the state and other social actors (Eckerberg & Joas, 2004; Pierre, 2000). 
6.3.1.1. A marriage of local states and SOEs 
The preceding analysis supports the assumption that local state actors 
have been delegating some of its major functions to business actors due to 
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their lack of capabilities and expertise. The paramount objectives of local 
states and business actors are highly matching in the CDM area, which 
provide a common ground for the local state actors to consent business 
actors to perform some of its roles. Local states’ dependence on business 
actors to lobby senior officers in Beijing over certain projects is an 
obvious example. Because, just as one SOE managers revealed to me 
that: ‘After all we are all state entities and serve the same big boss, who 
is the party state, we have the same goal.’  
However, it should be noted that such delegation is purely benefits driven 
and hence highly momentary and contingent in principal. This emerging 
role-sharing mechanism is inevitably subject to the political and 
economic status of the local states and business, which are changing 
constantly throughout China’s 30 years of economic reforms. As both the 
entrepreneurship of local states and the political power of SOEs may be 
weakened along with a continuing marketization reforms, this sweet 
marriage between SOEs and local states in the renewable sectors and 
CDM market may face some fundamental challenges.  
6.3.1.2. Knowledge is (infinite) power? 
As for the project developers’ influences to the local polity at the earlier 
stages of CDM development, this originates mainly from a profound 
knowledge gap between international, national and local levels. Once 
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CDM started to move towards a mature market their advantages may 
significantly decreased.  
SZQ, the senior carbon manager, informs the researcher that: ‘our 
company has weekly internal meetings and seminars about most updated 
regulations and rules of EB, we discuss the possible influence of these 
rules to our business practices and strategy. CDM is such a fast changing 
sector that you need to constantly update your knowledge system. I 
assume that’s something most of the government officers won’t do.’  
------ Interview transcript with SZQ 
But like many other interviewees, SZQ also admit that the local officers 
are catching up the gap and some of the local officers do have a very clear 
vision of how to develop local carbon market and low carbon related 
sectors. ‘Most of the project developers are now based in Beijing plus a 
handful of Shanghai based companies. But I assume that there will be 
more and more local carbon consultancies in the near future. Local 
provinces already have CDM centers, which can be effectively packaged 
into local flagships of carbon business.’ 
------ Interview transcript with SZQ 
But it is not only local states’ knowledge about national climate policy 
and international mechanism that has been significantly increased, the 
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national policy makers and international buyers’ knowledge of local 
context has also been largely augmented along with the market growth. 
Many large CER buyers have build up dedicated expertise to expand 
local connections and develop new CDM projects. The knowledge gaps 
between the various levels are dramatically narrower, and so is the 
influence of the dedicated project developers in the CDM governance. 
6.3.1.3. DOEs at the centre of contestation  
DOEs have been a center of criticism since the inception of CDM and 
their low efficiency is viewed as the bottleneck of a fast growing market 
(World Bank, 2010). In China, both NDRC officers and market 
participants claims at various occasions that DOEs have a severe shortage 
of capable auditors and expertise to support a fast growing market and 
call for more home grown DOEs. But according to some DOE managers, 
at the heart of these claims are the conflicts of the stringent checking 
process and aspirations for market expansion, which are not likely to be 
reconciled unless one side could make significant compromises.  
‘I think DOE is a largely marginalized group. It is not because we do not 
have enough auditors, or the verification or validation process can be 
painfully long though I admit that is true. But the real reason is that 
DOEs’ role is basically in conflict with everybody’s interest to expand the 
market. Nobody likes a ‘brake hitter’ in such situation, but that’s 
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something we have to do.’ 
------ Interview transcript with DW 
Some auditors also revealed that DOEs are now actually being pressed by 
both sides. While EB are constantly pulling the string and sometimes 
questioning the credibility of DOEs’ operation, the markets are requesting 
them to speed up the process. ‘This is a job that will offend someone 
inevitably.’ Argued on auditor, who also mentioned that: ‘Project 
developers and investors will often meet up at the project sites prior to 
DOE’s visits for validation. They will work out the standard answers for 
our inquiries.’   
------ Interview transcript with LX1 
One dramatic case is the lawsuit between DNV, the largest DOE operated 
in China, and a CDM project developer in Shanghai. The later claimed 
that DNV’s inefficient work had caused considerable damages for its 
business. The lawsuit highlights the contestations of market participants 
in the CDM arena. But probably the most worrying fact is that it is far 
from certain to which side DOEs are more likely to compromise, either to 
their nominal superiors at EB, or to the market forces who paid for their 
works. The field work indicate a divergent opinions from inside DOEs 
employees in this regard, as one auditor of a foreign DOE clearly 
informed the researcher that: ‘The decision makers in our head office 
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often question our auditors’ performance in Beijing as they believe some 
of the reports are too positive. They don’t want to put their DOE license 
at risk, but sometimes they worried too much.’  
------ Interview transcript with HP 
However, how these two contrasting views are evolving will largely 
determine DOE’s future role in the governance system of CDM. 
6.3.2. Hollowing out the local states? 
Another significant implication of the local political economy to the 
governance of CDM market is the hollowness of local decision making 
process in the CDM arena. As it can be seen from figure 6.1, most of the 
actor groups that are directly involved in the implementation works of 
RE-CDM projects are not local entities. The technical, financial and even 
political supports for the CDM projects are either directly or indirectly 
from central government, or the business actors that are based outside the 
locality. Local officers have been left with little decision power over 
CDM activities inside their political purview, and hence have little 
control of the benefits that these activities are expected to produce. I 
argue that this is the most unstable factor that may fundamentally 
challenge the already fragile coalition of RE-CDM market, as it 
exacerbates the local-central tension over institutional power as well as 
the public-private tension over economic power. The manifestations of 
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these contestations are already obvious, as revealed in the following 
paragraphs. 
6.3.2.1. Administrative permission for CDM 
In NDRC’s 2011 revision of CDM Measures, it for the first time 
delegates some of its administrative permission to the provincial DRC 
offices. However, these offices are not given the power to reject any 
CDM application, and all the applications have to be reviewed and 
approved by the central officers as it used to be. Hence it is believed that 
the bureaucratic authority that has been delegated to the local level is 
rather nominal. 
‘I think it is only a gratitude gesture from the central government to 
award local officers for their support of CDM, who have put tremendous 
efforts in it but have little direct benefits in terms of the decision powers. 
Some of the local leaders already expressed their upset. So sharing the 
approval authority with the local institutions is indeed an attempt to gain 
the continuing support of CDM at the local level.’  
------ Interview transcript with MC 
Another interviewee, however, offered another interpretation of this 
policy: ‘The Climate Change Bureau at NDRC becomes more and more 
multi-functional nowadays, and CDM is only a small part of its regulative 
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operations. So the central officers are willing to hand over some of 
administrative authorities to the local level so that they can focus on 
more urgent tasks.’ 
Interview transcript with GJ 
Whichever the explanation can be closer to the true motives of NDRC, 
the assumption is clear that at present stage local states have little 
meaningful decision power over the CDM projects that are to be 
implemented at their door steps. Although the major incentive for local 
officers to promote CDM is rather economic, it is evident that they have 
also been actively bargaining with central officers for the institutional 
power. The bargaining process is even more intensified as the CDM 
revenues are not as appealing as local officers once estimated, which is 
arguably the real reason for NDRC to concede some of its authorities to 
the local politicians. 
6.3.2.2. The empty promise of CDM benefits 
Another noteworthy article in the revised CDM Measures is the 
protection of centrally controlled SOEs as these companies (altogether 41 
according to NDRC) are allowed to surpass local states to make CDM 
applications directly to the central NDRC offices. This policy not only 
clearly indicates the prominent statues of these companies in the CDM 
area, but also suggests a growing tension between these organizations and 
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the local officers, as explained in the preceding paragraphs. As more and 
more local officers realized that the massive wave of developing 
renewable projects and CDMs have not achieved the economic benefits 
that they once expected.  
For example, there are many complaints from both large SOEs and local 
officers and the confrontational focus are the issues of the local tax and 
local protectionism. In May 2011, the largest wind energy base in China, 
Jiuquan government, passed a local policy that require all the wind farm 
investors in Jiuquan to purchase only the local equipment. Such 
outrageous protectionism sparked off SOEs intense rejection and the 
disputes were only eased when the Energy Bureau in NDRC issued two 
specific announcement to declare Jiuquan government’s policy an 
‘inappropriate’ decision. The signal of this incident is that the alliance 
between local officers and SOEs is far from stable. 
‘The most obvious benefits for the local government are the tax income 
from these projects, but most wind energy projects enjoy tax exemption 
treatment. Local governments provide the wind resources and land almost 
for free but their tax revenues are highly instable, which ultimately 
change their attitudes towards these large SOEs massive investment for 
wind farms.’  
------ Interview transcript with MQF 
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This remark is evidenced by a local newspaper report concerning Yumen 
city’s wind farms in Gansu, which claims that the over 2,000 billion RMB 
investment in local wind energy sector only produced a tiny amount of 
tax revenue of 73.44 million RMB in the last 16 years (Netease News, 
2012).  
In addition, the direct economic benefits for CDM and its promotional 
effects to local renewable development are substantially lower than local 
officers’ expectation. In Chapter 5 I present the empirical evidence to 
echo the argument that CDM has a very limited role to promote 
additional projects (Schneider, 2009), particularly in the renewable 
energy sector (Lewis, 2010), which make more and more local officers 
realize that the once believed the causation between ‘wind or solar rush’ 
and CDM boom is simply non-existent.  
In wind energy sector, the materialization of CDM revenues is further 
limited by the fact that actual energy outputs from wind farms are often 
much lower than their designed capacity. The massive construction of 
wind farms in the last decade has far outpaced the expansion of connected 
grid system, and hence put severe pressures on the stability and the safety 
of grid networks. Although Renewable Energy Law (REL) requires grid 
companies to take all the wind power by force, in reality the grid 
companies often curb the output of wind farms in order to maintain the 
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reliable permanence of their grid networks (see Chapter 7). The ‘rejection 
of wind energy’ has become a common situation in large wind bases since 
2008, which significantly reduce the potentials of CERs delivery of wind 
CDMs in these areas. 
Lastly, the enduring bureaucratic process for verification and uncertain 
prospect of CER issuance also wear out many local officers’ patience. 
Currently the complete validation and verification process can be as long 
as 18 months and only less than 20% of the approved projects have 
actually delivered CERs successfully (NDRC, 2012). One project 
developer informed the researcher: ‘Sometime I really feel bad to go back 
to the failed project site. The local people have done a great deal of 
works and to cooperate with us in the hope of CER revenues, which in the 
end never materialized. Of course, there are many reasons for the non-
delivery of CERs and we, as project developer, are not wholly responsible 
for this situation. But you can feel local people’s upset and their 
dubiousness of this mechanism.’ 
------ Interview transcript with LX1 
6.3.2.3. Local attempts to regain control 
The strategic coalition in the carbon market, particularly in RE-CDM 
arena, is created and sustained when various social actors agree to 
compromise some of its autonomy in order to make alliance with other 
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actor groups to achieve a shared goal. Previous paragraphs illustrated that 
local states decided to give up some of its previous governance roles as a 
trade for the economic returns originated from a rapid development of 
local renewable sector and carbon business. However, as these benefits 
are not materialized their enticement to support this ‘carbon’ coalition is 
significantly weakened.  
The manifestations of local officers’ changing attitude towards RE-CDMs 
are obvious. Firstly, local government has seen less supportive for wind 
energy projects and CDM activities since 2008. For example, in 2011, the 
government of Inner Mongolia, as one of the largest wind resource base 
in China, enacted several local measures to essentially constraint its wind 
energy development by substantially increasing the entrant barrier for its 
new wind projects (Inner Mongolia DRC, 2011). The document also 
provides evidence of local government’s determination to strengthen its 
control of local wind sector by reducing the number of wind energy 
producer to a large extent (from more than 60 entities to 25). As Inner 
Mongolia is the leading host locality for wind energy projects, these 
documents are believed to have further impact on other provinces which 
are in the similar situations. 
As for the CDM and climate governance, local officers also started to 
shift their focus to other governance domains such as provincial local 
263 
 
environmental protections and promoting ‘low-carbon city’ campaigns, in 
which they could retain much larger administrative authority comparing 
to the present CDM system and a highly centralized renewable business.  
‘Most of the local officers are not as enthusiastic about CDM as they 
were in just 5 years ago. They shift their interests to other low-carbon 
activities. They believe there are larger benefits for them in those areas 
other than sticking to CDM only. I’m not saying that they are no longer 
supportive of CDM, don’t get me wrong, they just look a bit apathy to it 
now.’ 
------ Interview transcript with KWW 
Another observable effort of local officers to strengthen their governing 
roles is to start cultivating local expertise both in carbon and renewable 
sectors in the hope of being less dependent on ‘outsiders’. During the 
field trip many interviewees informed the researcher that local 
governments are enthusiastically encouraging ‘home grown’ enterprises 
to recruit ‘best brains’ from the renewable SOEs and carbon consultancy 
companies.  
The local states’ effort to regain its governance authorities in handling 
RE-CDMs related sectors can shed some light on one of the often 
overlooked aspect of CDM, namely the local sustainability contributions 
of these activities. Previously, the relentless pursue of economic returns 
264 
 
drives local officers to align with business actors, and consequently 
depend on their expertise and political resource to expand large scale, 
capital intensive renewable investment, which eventually become the 
dominant project type of CDM in China. However, when the illusion of 
RE-CDM starts to dissipate and local states try to recapture some of its 
governance autonomy, it will be interesting to see if they wish to shift its 
focus to small sized and diversified project types that often have larger 
sustainability potentials and can be supported by local financial or 
political resources.  
The Inner Mongolia’s new policy on its wind resources provides a clue of 
such shift. For the first time local officers exhibits a somewhat different 
attitude towards small-sized, distributed wind energy production and 
large scale wind farms investment. The former has obvious stronger 
sustainability effects as the generated power is mainly consumed locally. 
Schroeder (2012) raised an important argument that the lack of integrity 
and sustainability effects of CDM is mainly due to an almost undisputed 
perception among various social groups, including local governments, 
which treat CDM as a mere business opportunity. From the earliest 
dominance of HFC23 to the present ‘wind-rush’, the development of 
CDMs in China clearly followed the market logic of reaping the ‘low-
hanging fruits’, or the cheapest and easiest options to produce large 
amount of CERs (Castro, 2010; Narain & Veld, 2008). But now the local 
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states realized that these low-hanging fruits are not as tasty as they 
appeared and decided to reach for the higher branches.  
The strong entrepreneurship of local states is not likely to be changed in 
the foreseeable future, and their alliance with the market players in 
governing this newly emerged market mechanism is unlikely to be 
completely disbanded. But a waning local support for the capital 
intensive renewable investment would at least open up the possibility to 
focus on those marginalized project types that can produce genuine 
sustainability effects for the local people.  
6.4. Concluding remarks 
To sum up, in this chapter, I argue that the local states’ incentive to 
develop CDM is mainly economic driven due to CDM’s potential benefits 
for local economic development, particularly in promoting a rapid growth 
for the renewable energy sector. However, during the process local 
officers often lack political, financial and knowledge resources that are 
needed for regulating and developing CDM activities. Some of their 
governance roles have been delegated to the business actors, who become 
essentially the ‘on-the-ground’ decision makers for the RE-CDM related 
affairs. A strong social coalition is hence established under the form of a 
hybrid and multi-level governance system.  
Yet this coalition is highly contestable as local officers’ role has been 
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hollowed out and their delegation of power is not sufficiently 
compensated by the economic returns they once expected. In such a 
situation, in the last couple of years, they have been attempting to 
strengthen their roles in governing both carbon and renewable sectors 
through passing new policies, expanding new climate related domains, 
and cultivating local expertise, as the efforts of regaining some of its 
authorities. As the previous coalition has largely failed in terms of 
promoting non-economic benefits of CDM projects at the local level, the 
struggle of the local states to re-enter the stage could have potential 
impacts on the overall architecture of CDM governance and its 
performance on local sustainability.  
The question is therefore how business will respond to such contestation 
over the existing coalition in the carbon market. As one SOE manager 
mentioned: ‘We understand the localities received less benefit than they 
expect from these projects, but that’s a structural effect rather than a 
problem of individual cases. Given the existing international system and 
national policies, it would be pointless to just ask for more benefits from 
us since we just do what profit-maximizing organizations should do.’  
------ Interview transcript with MQF 
The findings from the field study of this research highly reinforce the 
above statement. Most of the inefficiencies observed in renewable CDM 
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market today are manifestations of some deeply rooted incoherence of 
governance system within China, rather than the problems of market 
mechanism itself. The lack of integrity check and meaningful 
sustainability contribution at the local level, as observed in this research 
and many previous studies, is primarily due to the distinctive features of 
the local political economy, where non-economic incentives are almost 
non-existent among the local leaders, and the power structure and role 
sharing system between public and private spheres are (and will likely 
remain to be) blurry, overlapping, and even self-contradictory. In such 
case, any attempt to enhance the mechanism from top-down reforms can 
have little effect, if any at all. 
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7. Inter-business conflicts in CDM market 
In the previous chapters, I argue that the dramatic development of CDM 
activities in China, and the dominance of RE-CDMs in the project 
pipeline, is due to a strong social coalition that has been forged to endorse 
the carbon offset as the major solution to tackling the severe challenges in 
China’s climate governance. Business actors emerge as one of the pillars 
of this coalition due to their privileged position compared to the central or 
local state actors, mainly due to its abundant financial resources, political 
connections at bureaucratic system, as well as their knowledge or 
technological expertise at project implementation level. The rise of 
business actors in China’s climate governance along with the introduction 
of the CDM produces significant impacts on the overall quality of CDM 
projects in terms of their environmental integrity and sustainability 
effectiveness.  
However, the neo-pluralist approach of this research requires not only 
investigating the resources and manifestations of business power to 
sustain and expand carbon market, but also exploring their limitations to 
achieve and maintain their strategic preferences. Falkner (2008) argues 
that business power and interests are constrained by both external and 
internal countervailing forces so that it does not itself determine the 
outcomes in either domestic or international policy processes. Indeed, if 
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business interests always prevail in climate politics, there is no need for 
any form of lobbying (Meckling, 2011). In chapter 5 and 6 I have 
illustrated the state-business relationship in China’s CDM market and I 
argue that business rely on state actors in many occasions in order to 
acquire and maintain its governance legitimacy. Business actors hence do 
not confront state regulators openly. They instead seek to create a ‘win-
win’ situation with the officialdom. However, set aside the state power, 
there are also obvious conflicting interests among the business groups 
that shape the overall capabilities of the business community of 
influencing the governance of the CDM market. In this chapter, I shift the 
analytical focus on the countervailing forces among business actors in 
order to reveal the tensions and conflicts that may weaken their leading 
positions of governing CDM in China.  
At the outset, the analytical purpose of this chapter rejects the notion of 
treating business communities that engage with the CDM projects as a 
‘monolithic bloc’. Rather, I disaggregate the business actors in the 
CDM market to analyze the constituent parts of the business community. 
I argue that in order to understand the governance system in a given 
sector, neither the state actors nor the business actors shall be viewed as a 
unified group as the dominant interests of the groups as a whole have to 
accommodate different and often competing business interests in a given 
economic sector or policy domain.  
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In order to present the countervailing business interests in the carbon 
market, two elements of business conflict will receive particular 
analytical attention in this chapter. At the outset is the division of 
international and the domestic business actors in the CDM market. 
Previous studies on business interests in a globalized world economy 
suggest that international firms are often more likely to support 
international rule setting, and they focus mainly on integrating their 
business into national and local regulation frameworks (Vogel, 1995). As 
for the CDM market, international companies are believed to possess 
greater expertise than domestic ones in terms of the rules and norms at 
UN. In addition foreign companies like CER buyers often possess unique 
identity as Annex-1 parties, which also provide a de-facto monopolistic 
advantage over domestic companies.  
Compared with international companies, domestic companies often enjoy 
a more comfortable connection with the local political system. The 
interview data reveals that they are sometimes skeptical about the carbon 
credits as a viable or stable source of revenue. In addition, the dubious 
prospect of this mechanism in the post-Kyoto era becomes a big concern 
among domestic players. They are often convinced that the CDM is 
essentially in the control of the ‘Westerners’, namely the ‘Annex-1 
parties’. Therefore, even if domestic companies are not in direct 
competition with foreign companies in the CDM market, they have 
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distinct concerns about the future of the CDM market and the role of 
offset in China’s climate governance. Whether or to what extend these 
mentalities are translated into the policy influence will be explored in 
detail in Section 1 of this chapter. 
The second but closely related element of business conflict arises 
between actors in various economic sectors that are related to the CDM. 
The carbon market is not an independent economic sector but rather 
embedded in various existing industrial sectors. Hence, it is very difficult 
to establish a ‘union’-like organization to represent the carbon trading 
industry as companies in various sectors may engage in carbon trading 
for different purposes and priorities and adopt different strategies in 
approaching the carbon market. Coordination among business actors with 
various sectorial background is almost impossible even for a powerful 
government ministry like NDRC. However, the dominance of renewable 
projects activities in China’s CDM portfolio, as explained in the 
preceding chapters, indicates that other important sectors related to 
climate change or GHG mitigation are at least to some extent neglected 
by the present system. The unbalanced development of the market hence 
cultivated dissident opinions and countervailing forces to the existing 
coalition of the CDM market. The manifestations of these conflicting 
interests will be analyzed in Section 2 of this chapter.  
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Lastly, there are ‘periphery’ actors that are not formally involved in the 
CDM governance circle or decision making process, but have tremendous 
influence on the successful implementation of the project activities. The 
domestic financial sector is a typical example and its (lack of) 
endorsement of the carbon market has been largely overlooked in 
previous empirical studies regarding the governance of the CDM. As 
explained in earlier chapters, the present CDM system relies heavily on 
the domestic financial capabilities to invest or sponsor potential carbon 
offset projects. I hereby argue that the risk appetite, lending policies and 
internal procedures of Chinese banks and insurance companies has a 
determinant effect on how the projects are to be implemented on the 
ground in China. Therefore these actors’ interests and strategies have 
some strong implications on which direction the carbon coalition in China 
will be evolving in the future.  
The chapter concludes with the argument that CDM governance in China 
is an open-ended policy process with both pro-development forces and 
pro-market elite forces constantly challenging the existing coalition of the 
carbon market that was established only a decade ago. Although in 
China’s case the overarching strategy of this coalition focuses merely on 
accumulating economic benefits from this newly imported carbon market, 
how this strategy is to be defended and sustained, and in what direction 
this coalition is evolving remains largely uncertain at the present stage. 
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7.1. International and national business actors in the CDM 
market: division or integration?  
After comparing the different strategies of transnational companies and 
domestic industries on ozone layer protection, Falkner (2008) reaches the 
conclusion that transnational companies are more willing to support the 
international restrictions on ozone-depletion substances, because these 
restrictions are in general rendering them a competitive advantage over 
domestic companies in the host countries. Vogel (1995) argues that 
international firms often promote higher environmental standards in order 
to compete with local companies, and consequently nations have to adopt 
standards of their greener partners, a so-called ‘California effect’ or the 
shift of environmental regulations in the direction of stricter regulatory 
standards. Similar findings can be observed in the financial sector, 
whereas the Equator Principles were adopted by most of the global 
commercial banks for their project finance’s environmental and social 
integrity in developing countries (Wright & Rwabizambuga, 2006) and 
financial institutions in the developing countries were pushed to follow 
these principles (Industrial Bank is the only ‘Equator’ bank in China so 
far, which is only a small sized regional bank who wishes to use ‘Equator 
Principles’ to enhance its green identity). It would be interesting to see if 
a similar trend can be observed in the newly internationalized carbon 
offset market.  
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International companies are the pioneers of the Chinese CDM market. 
NDRC’s website documented 91 CER buyers from Annex-1 countries 
that have been actively engaged in China’s CDM market (NDRC, 2012) 
since 2003. The majority of these buyers are carbon funds or trading 
companies who purchase CERs only for trading purposes rather than to 
offset their own emission reduction obligations under the KP. Unlike 
other sectors where international companies have to compete with local 
companies in terms of the market share and economic resources, the 
buyers from Annex-1 parties enjoy a non-competition status since no 
domestic companies are allowed to purchase and trade CERs for a profit 
according to the CDM Measures.  
Dividing international and national firms in the studies of business 
influence in environmental governance is not a new analytical trend, yet 
the purposes of such division are often two-fold. On the one hand, 
multinational corporations, along with the ongoing economic 
globalization, are often viewed as the major force to steering and 
supporting supra-national forms of governance over some most 
challenging global issues such as international trade or a changing climate 
(Vogel, 1995). Transnational firms are active agents that advocate and 
incorporate the international rules, norms and regulations into the national 
regulatory context. On the other hand, although local companies do not 
always oppose those new mechanisms or instruments imposed from the 
275 
 
international level, they are often highly dependent on their traditional 
business model and political protectionism and hence have different 
strategies and preferences regarding the newly introduced international 
regulations (Child and Tsai, 2005).  
Therefore, in this research, I argue that both the integration of the carbon 
coalition from international level and domestic contestation from below 
need to be investigated simultaneously in order to understand the power 
dynamics among business companies in the host markets of the CDM. 
The analysis of the business conflicts between the international and 
domestic companies in the carbon market focuses simultaneously on the 
integration process of the so-called transnational carbon coalition 
(Meckling, 2012) into the Chinese context, and the Chinese companies’ 
reaction to this tendency and their struggles to maintain their own 
strategic advantage in the market.  
7.1.1. Internationalization of market instruments and its 
scepticism in China 
Many previous studies have indentified the case of carbon trading as a 
manifestation of the broader policy trend in developed countries that 
favors market-based instruments over traditional ‘top-down’ or 
‘command and control’ ways of governing environmental issues, such as 
a carbon tax or a pollution penalty system (Boyd et al, 2007; Meckling, 
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2011; Newell, 2009; Paulsson, 2009; Schroeder, 2011). The fetishism of 
market mechanisms is deeply rooted in the dominant and pervasive neo-
liberalist beliefs and policies in capitalist societies in the past decade 
(Newell and Paterson, 2010), and there is strong empirical evidence of 
the coalition-building process around market mechanisms in many 
Western countries such as in the UK and US. This transformation is 
notably supported and sustained by major business actors in key 
economic industries such as the energy and finance sectors (Levy and 
Egan, 2003; Newell and Levy, 2005; Falkner, 2008).  
Apart from a mounting fetishism of market instruments for climate 
governance in developed economies, the adoption of the CDM under the 
KP is arguably the first attempt to integrate developing countries into this 
existing coalition of carbon traders. It is a process of reconfiguration and 
integration of these previous individual national alliances in the West 
(Levy and Egan, 2003) into a truly ‘global’ carbon coalition, from which 
the business companies are found as active agents to promote the 
ideology of market instruments. 
7.1.2. International companies: unchallenged 
missionaries  
One of the unique advantages for international companies engaged in the 
CDM market is that they face no local competition because no domestic 
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institutions are allowed to purchase and trade CERs within China 
according to the NDRC’s regulation. This unchallenged market status 
tremendously enhances the international buyers’ leverage in promoting 
ideas or discourse in accordance with their business strategy. The idea 
that market instruments such as the CDM is an ultimate solution to the 
environmental issues is a vivid example of such influence. The benefits of 
this market mechanism have been reiterated through companies’ websites, 
capacity building seminars and business fairs until these benefits have 
been taken for granted by policy makers and public audiences.  
In 2011, the Chinese government enacted the ‘Working Plan of Energy 
Saving and Emission Reduction during the 11th Five Year Plan Period’ 
(NDRC, 2011) as the guiding principles of the country’s climate change 
policy. The plan requires ‘Further advancement and promotion of 
market mechanisms, which will internalize the enterprises’ needs for 
energy saving and emission reduction…The task will be led by 
government with enterprises as the main force. It will be driven by the 
market with all the social actors are able to participate.’ This statement 
highlights the government’s attitude towards market mechanisms. 
‘The carbon trading is a genius idea for addressing the problem of 
climate change. I have strong faith in market mechanisms. Government is 
not part of the solution, that’s obvious. Just look at those environmental 
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disasters after all these years of poor regulations. Market solution is our 
only hope.’ 
------ Interview transcript with ZH 
ZH also mentioned that when he decided to take up the CDM as a new 
career in 2007 (previously ZH worked as a bank manager in a state bank, 
an often admired job for its security and salary), he described his new job 
with pride in front of his friends as a ‘sun-rise’ industry. The firm belief 
of market solutions is not rare among interview participants from both 
public and private sectors, who regard offset instruments as well-tested 
governance inventions in some advanced economies (Interview 
transcripts with KWW, SZQ, LYR, HP and DW). Many people raised the 
ozone protection treaties or the SO2 offset system in the US as the 
example to justify the promotion of carbon offsets and the CDM. In 
addition, there are extensive media coverage and officers’ speeches that 
promote market mechanism (21CN, 2010; People’s Daily, 2008; Sina 
News, 2013). In a country whose economy had been completely shattered 
by centrally planned socialism and only embarked on marketization 
reforms gradually since the 1980’s, such advocating voice of market 
mechanisms is understandably easy to gain ground among both policy 
makers and ordinary people.  
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However, a notable difference between these previous mechanisms and 
the CDM is that developing countries can benefit from the 
internationalization of offset programs just like developed countries once 
did. A project developer commented during the interview: ‘I believe that 
using market instruments such as CDM to tackle environmental issues is 
a great idea. In a perfect world it will provide perfect solutions…But I 
feel confused sometimes because the funding is from rich countries. It is 
the Europeans that give you the money, so the whole system is in their 
control. It is their ideas, their price, and their rules. It is more or less like 
donation. If they decide to stop then everything will stop.’  
------ Interview transcript with LHL 
These remarks reveal a rather strange mentality among Chinese 
employees in foreign carbon companies regarding the internationalization 
of offset mechanisms. In theory the CDM was designed mainly to assist 
developed countries to meet their emission cap in a more cost effective 
manner. The mechanism therefore was designed to help Annex-1 
countries rather than non-Annex 1 countries, yet the field study in China 
indicates a rather opposite understanding among the market actors who 
regard the CDM as a‘benevolent gesture’ from Annex-1 entities in 
assisting host countries’ transitions into low carbon undertakings, in other 
words: ‘cakes falling from the sky.’ 
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The nature of the buyers in the Chinese CDM market provides a clue to 
how this transformation of perception took place. At the outset, as I 
mentioned earlier that most of the carbon funds operated in China do not 
have an emission cap and only trade CERs for a profit. In such a case, the 
price of CERs to be traded is the biggest concern for the buyers when a 
potential CDM deal is put on the negotiating table. If the CER price 
becomes too high for the buyer to make a profit, few would purchase 
these credits even if they were to be generated from high quality projects. 
Besides the CER price, there are other factors that force these carbon 
funds to be more selective. For example, the healthy portfolio of carbon 
funds often relies heavily on the rate of successful issuance of carbon 
credits, meaning that they are not very keen to reach deals with less 
capable CER suppliers, as the capability of the project owners will 
directly affect the possibility of CER issuance (see detailed analysis in 
Chapter 5).  
For the same reason, buyers are reluctant to experiment with the 
‘creative’ methodologies. As one interviewee revealed, in the earlier days 
of the market the buyers were essentially the first round reviewers of the 
newly proposed methodologies from the project developers: ‘At that time 
our technological experts’ main job is to explore the new methodologies, 
an effort often thwarted by the buyers once they believe these 
methodologies won’t work out in the market.’  
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------ Interview transcript of LX1 
International buyers’ highly selective attitude has left Chinese carbon 
credit suppliers with the impression that selling carbon credits is not an 
easy task. The buyer’s appetite and preference hence has become the 
guiding principles of the market as a whole. Most of the project 
developers will only focus on the credit suppliers and project types that 
are welcomed by the buyers. The cakes are actually not ‘falling from the 
sky’: they are essentially in the hands of the international carbon funds.  
Another advantage that international companies have in the CDM market 
is their perceived richer experience in market instruments and 
international rules compared to those of the domestic companies, 
particularly at the initial stage of the market development, even though 
both EU and Japan, the biggest two buyer groups in China, had no 
previous experience of emissions trading and most of their carbon funds 
were only established along with the inception of flexible mechanisms 
under the KP. Yet, companies like Eco-securities, Tricorona or Arreon 
Carbon have successfully packaged themselves as highly experienced and 
dedicated carbon trading experts.  
These companies are also in a better position to communicate with CDM 
regulators, DOEs, or CER end-users at the international level. Apart from 
being an active force in local capacity building programs, these 
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companies organize regular seminars and events in Brussels, Bonn and 
London to present their ‘local’ or ‘first-hand’ experience and knowledge 
accumulated in host countries to policy makers in Annex-1 countries. 
Their role as a transmission belt of information is often regarded as an 
important alternative way of communication between Annex-1 and non-
Annex 1 parties apart from the official bilateral climate negotiations or 
meetings among civil servants. This function can hardly be replaced by 
any domestic corporations in the host countries.  
Yet the power relations between domestic companies and international 
ones would shift dramatically if this international offset mechanism is to 
be replaced by a domestic carbon market. The power of buyers would be 
waning for certain, as it can be seen today in China that few foreign 
companies are involved in the design of China’s ambitious domestic 
carbon market, which is a sharp contrast to the CDM capacity building 
programs where foreign companies are often the main facilitators. Today, 
most of these buyers, together with a large number of Chinese private 
carbon consultancies, are forced to expand the business into non-offset 
areas such as consultancies on low-carbon technologies or urban 
development. Hence, the domestic-foreign variance or conflicts would be 
largely replaced by domestic power dynamics among Chinese companies.  
But that does not mean the ‘elite’ nature of the carbon market would 
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somehow diminish with the retreat of foreign companies. On the contrary, 
the political economy that explained in previous chapters indicates that 
large SOEs would possibly take up an even decisive role in the future 
carbon market for two reasons. Firstly, given the poor statistic system of 
industry emissions in China, most of the key data regarding the emissions 
are kept in the hands of SOEs who dominate most of the carbon intensive 
sectors. Their willingness to cooperate with the state on data reporting 
and monitoring of their emissions is the key precondition of domestic 
carbon market. Secondly, the role of the SOEs from CER suppliers in the 
present CDM context would change too, as some of them would 
eventually become buyers of the carbon credits from other SOEs. This 
shift of roles would intensify the competitions among SOEs across the 
nation, leading to new power dynamics between central and local states 
since most of them would utilize their political and economic power to 
guarantee their strategic advantage in the market. 
7.1.3. Local rhetoric on the CDM: a sense of apathy 
Compared with international companies, local companies are at an 
obvious disadvantage in terms of their CDM related knowledge and their 
familiarity with international rules. They are the rule takers and the mere 
receivers of an expanded ‘carbon coalition’ from the West. Many 
interviewees expressed the idea that domestic companies are particularly 
284 
 
vulnerable at the earlier stage of the CDM while negotiating with foreign 
companies (Interview transcript with YAM and MC). Besides, the market 
is highly competitive for local consultancy companies and project owners 
since the buyers can compare and purchase carbon credits across various 
project types but the suppliers can only produce one or two types of 
CERs within their core business sector.  
As the rule followers, Chinese companies in general do not care too much 
about the overall quality of the CDM’s governance structure or the future 
design of the mechanism as many Western companies do, since these 
issues are out of their control. A ‘fatalistic’ mentality is found common 
among Chinese market participants. Realizing that the future of the 
market is totally beyond their controllability, most domestic companies 
use their connections within the government institutions only for the 
purpose of short term benefits of individual cases rather than deter or 
advance a policy issue in general. 
‘The rules of EB are very slippery, but I think even the Chinese 
government can’t do anything about it (regarding a reform of redesigning 
of CDM in the future). CDM is just a small issue in the climate 
negotiation after all and it is essentially a game controlled by the buyers 
and their governments. We Chinese can do nothing about it but to adapt’,  
------Interview transcript of SZQ  
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7.2. Divided opinions on protectionism in the CDM market 
The Chinese government has revealed a clear protectionist approach to 
the CDM market by introducing a number of policies that aim to protect 
domestic interests since the beginning of the market development. Among 
these policies are the declaration of joint ownership of CERs with 
Chinese enterprises and a tiered taxation system of CER revenues, a 
requirement of Chinese majority ownership for the CDM project, and an 
implicit floor price prerequisite for CER sales. All these policies are 
crafted in order to‘protect’ Chinese project owners who are believed to 
be in a disadvantaged position when negotiating with foreign carbon 
credit purchasers.  
Theoretically, these measures are designed to help domestic companies 
from being exploited by the foreign companies due to the asymmetric 
information and unbalanced capability. However, the field study 
illustrated that not all protectionist measures are disliked among foreign 
companies. More surprisingly, it is domestic companies that often 
challenge the justification of these measures and try to adjust the rules 
that are meant to protect them. 
7.2.1. Is the floor price requirement out-dated? 
Guiding price is not a rare policy instrument in China. According to the 
Price Law of PRC, enacted in 1998, government institutions are allowed 
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to set guiding prices for products and services that are crucial for national 
economic development, in extreme scarcity, naturally monopolized, or 
key to the public or social welfare (Price Law of PRC: Article 18, Chapter 
3). Most of the products or services that abide by a guiding price are 
formally prescribed in ‘Official Regulated Price Lists’ published by 
NDRC or its local offices. CER is not on the list.  
However, most the interviewees regard floor price of CER as an effective 
policy only at the earlier stage of market development, but largely 
outdated at the later phases. ‘Back in 2004 and 2005 when few people 
knew about CDM, some project owners were willing to sell their CERs 
with a daunting low price of 1 or 2 dollars. The asymmetric information 
is high between the buyers and suppliers... NDRC’s floor price really 
helped to protect the Chinese project owners. But now, everyone in the 
business knows how to check the carbon price on a daily basis. The 
market price is transparent and updated every day.’  
------ Interview transcript with KWW 
KWW’s remarks represent the common feeling towards this once 
effective intervention policy among the business actors. However, there is 
a clear divided opinion among domestic companies on whether or not the 
policy should be abandoned. SZQ argues during the interview that there 
are some small project owners in remote areas who may still find this 
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protectionist policy useful, if the government ‘can adjust its floor price 
more frequently and with flexibility.’  
Other interviewees believe that the floor price is becoming meaningless 
as its deviation from the actual carbon price is increasing (Interview with 
PP). For example, one interviewee revealed that their company tried hard 
and succeeded to convince NDRC officers to allow them to negotiate a 
floating CER sales contract (ERPA) with the buyer, which was essentially 
a significant departure from NDRC’s original approach. Once asked if 
they would consider NDRC’s floor price policy as appropriate for future 
CDM projects, she believes the floating price should be taken as the 
landmark for future policy considerations: ‘it is already a very difficult 
moment for all the CER suppliers in China when the buyers’ appetite for 
CERs is shrinking. We need to follow the market signals if we want to 
secure more deals.’ 
------Interview transcript with QY 
On the contrary, international companies are (quite surprisingly) less 
worried about the floor price policy. The price prescribed by Chinese 
policy makers is often regarded as a benchmark that has only vague, if 
any, implications in the actual business decisions. Their confidence is 
rooted in the rationale that if the price gap is too high, they would 
renegotiate the price with the project owners regardless of the Chinese 
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government’s floor price requirement, or simply forfeit the ERPA. Due to 
their stronghold on legal expertise and knowledge of the ERPA compared 
to the project owners, they could often achieve a more desirable price 
during the negotiations or successfully forfeit the contract without 
triggering any legal disputes (Interview transcript with PP). 
It should also be noted that the current carbon price in the EU-ETS has 
been much lower than the Chinese government’s floor price, which has 
already sparked off a wave of re-negotiation between buyers and project 
owners over the delivery price of CER. The adjustment of the floor price 
requirement has become an urgent issue for companies that are desperate 
to sell their verified CERs in the fear of a further plummeting of the 
carbon price. To these companies, this requirement is no longer a 
protection but a cumbersome rule that stops them from making 
independent business decisions in line with their strategies. 
7.2.2. Co-ownership and CERs revenue sharing policy 
Another protectionist policy in China’s CDM market is the nature of 
CERs as a ‘quasi-public’ product. The Chinese government declares in its 
CDM Measures (NDRC, 2011) that the revenues generated from CERs 
are shared by state and project owners. No other entities are allowed to 
share the revenues from CER shares. In addition, in case the project 
owners fail to reach a sales contract with any Annex-1 party at the time of 
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project approval, the potential CERs will be transferred into the 
‘national account’ and project owners are not allowed to sell it if the 
buyer is identified later without the formal consent of national 
government.  
The revenue from CERs collected by the state is transferred into a CDM 
fund, which is managed by a consortium of ministries with the Ministry 
of Finance as the operational chief. The total funding available can reach 
10 billion RMB by the 2012 according to Mr. Wen Gang, the deputy fund 
president, in a press interview in 2010. The fund is designed to promote 
capacity building efforts or increasing public awareness of climate 
change by either donating or lending to the low carbon projects. In 2011, 
the Measures to Manage CDM Fund were enacted by the inter-ministerial 
consortium (MOF, 2011). Yet its operational procedures remain 
mysterious to most of the business people who are currently involved in 
CDM activities.  
‘Nobody knows how the fund is to be used, and nobody cares, to be 
honest. The fund will not be big enough to support ordinary clean 
development projects across all over China, so the competition must be 
intensive. Only people with very close ties to the officialdom have the 
chance (to use the fund)’.  
--- Interview transcript with LHL 
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But beside the lack of transparency and accountability of how the state 
would like to spend its revenue from CDM projects, there are other 
problems originating from the co-ownership of the CERs. Among them is 
how the government should react when a dispute emerges between 
Annex-1 and non-Annex 1 parties over particular CER deals. It is often 
during the contractual disputes that domestic and international companies 
hold opposite opinions and expectations of the government.  
PP illustrated this situation during the interview: ‘If there are some 
frictions between the buyer and the project owner under ERPA, as it can 
be seen more frequently now in the market, buyers always want to control 
the issue within the ‘pure commercial domain’. Obviously they do not 
want government officials to sit opposite at the negotiation tables. The 
project owners, however, believe that since CERs are co-owned by the 
state, government officers shall share the responsibility to defend the 
suppliers’ right under the ERPA. They want the party cadres on their 
side.’  
--- Interview transcript with PP 
Such comments reveal a common problem with a protectionist policy, 
which may expose government officers in the commercial context as the 
policy travels too far into the business realm. The neutrality role of state 
actors can be jeopardized as they have to take sides over the business 
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disputes as another contractual party. NDRC as the guardian authority has 
not yet been involved in any direct confrontation with international 
buyers regarding any given contractual dispute; instead its support to 
domestic companies is rather implicit, often by providing guidelines, 
presenting showcases of disputes and organizing closed door discussions 
with Chinese companies. But as more and more Chinese companies are 
seeking direct government support to deal with the emerging wave of 
buyers’ default under ERPA or business disputes, Chinese policy makers 
are facing pressure to strengthen their protectionist approach, which may 
further discourage an already waning enthusiasm from the buyers. 
7.2.3. The majority Chinese ownership requirement 
The Chinese government requires that only Chinese companies or 
Chinese controlled joint-ventures (51% or above ownership) are eligible 
to develop and own CDM projects. This has been by far the most 
controversial and bizarre policy in the market during last decade. 
Schroeder (2009) argues that this policy reflects a mixed and 
contradictory mentality of Chinese policy makers in terms of how to 
deploy the CDM to support the renewables sector. A strategic priority has 
been given to cultivating a Chinese renewable technological advantage 
globally to deter, rather than encourage, foreign investment in this area.  
For foreign investors who intend to invest in the project activities that 
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have the potential to generate CERs, such policy is the final straw that 
crushed their investment scheme. A UK carbon fund manager mentioned 
during the interview that: ‘For an investor we may face many difficulties 
in a country like China. Particularly for the carbon projects, since the 
procedure to successfully sell your CERs is simply a daunting task to 
everyone. As long as we realized that such investment is not favored by 
the government, we gave up the plan of investing, and reduced to be a 
mere CERs purchaser as everybody else here.’  
------Interview transcript with MC 
According to MC, his company has invested dozens of biogas power 
projects across South East Asia, but in China, no plan of direct investment 
has ever been considered seriously. The political risk in China is just too 
high. 
However, most Chinese companies view this issue in a pragmatic way. 
The energy production sector has long been controlled by the state for its 
relevance to the national security and public welfare. Even domestic 
private companies find it difficult to enter the market, not to mention 
foreign investment. But LHL believes that at least other less strategically 
important areas should be opened up for foreign CDM investment, such 
as the animal waste projects he has embarked upon, which was finally 
dead on arrival without sufficient capital investment (Interview transcript 
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with LHL).  
Unfortunately, not all the buyers share LHL’s belief. For example, GJ 
mentioned during the interview: ‘It is already too late for this argument 
(Chinese majority of ownership). Most of the buyers in China are just 
carbon funds which are not capable of erecting a project from ground 
zero with their own hands. They will stick to the current mode even if the 
policy changed to accept foreign ownership in CDM projects.’ 
------ Interview transcript with GJ 
However, besides various opinions among business people towards this 
policy, some business has already learnt how to get around the policy. It 
is not a rare phenomenon that project parties modify the shareholding 
agreement to meet NDRC’s requirement and get foreign controlled 
projects approved as domestically owned projects. It is time consuming 
and often very complicated for government officers to check out the real 
shareholding structure of a jointly invested project, if business parties 
intend to conceal the truth. Such move indicates that any attempt of full-
scale deterrence of foreign investment in the carbon market is destined to 
be a rather futile effort. 
Whether the policy would be changed by the Chinese government 
remains unclear, since most foreign entities are not keen to invest in real 
project activities as long as CERs can be purchased from Chinese owned 
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projects. As for those who are indeed in favor of direct investment, 
finding a Chinese local partner who is willing to ‘cooperate’ with an 
artificial shareholding agreement is a much easier option than lobbying 
state officers in Beijing over this issue.  
To sum up, in this section I presented the different mentalities, attitudes 
and ways of influences between international and domestic companies 
towards international rules, and domestic policies in the CDM arena. It is 
noted from the data that domestic companies are less interested in the 
governance system of the CDM and the possibilities of its improvement. 
It is not because they lack communicative channels with the rule makers 
in the UN (on the contrary, many business companies are frequent 
participants of international climate negotiations), but rather, their apathy 
is due to a lack of confidence of the durability of the international offset 
mechanism. The CDM is often regarded by Chinese companies as a 
transitional or temporary instrument. As no decisive commitment has 
been made on the part of the major CER buyer countries for the second 
commitment phase under the KP and the possibility for China to take up a 
legally binding emission cap grew higher, this indifferent attitude has 
been gaining ground since 2008.  
There are no obvious lobbying activities by either international or 
domestic companies to oppose or endorse the Chinese government’s 
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protectionist measures, even if some of them are clearly not functioning 
well and are rather outdated. International companies chose to press the 
Chinese government through business activities, such as renegotiations of 
the CER producers of the carbon price regardless of the floor price 
guidelines. Chinese companies may prefer to gain official support 
through closed door or back-to-back meetings. Neither group has decisive 
capability to determine the policy outcome concerning the future of the 
CDM in China.  
7.3. Cross-sectoral conflicts in the CDM market 
The CDM market, or carbon market in a broader sense, is not a single 
market that the industrial operations and commercial activities are 
organized and managed to produce only one set of products or services, 
namely carbon offset credits. Rather, these credits are merely ‘by-
products’ of the existing industrial or public service operations. For 
example, renewable energy projects may produce both electricity and 
CERs (for CDM) or VERs (for voluntary carbon market), while a newly 
installed waste heat recovery facility in a cement factory is an integral 
part of the existing production lines, which produce cement, power and 
carbon credits at the same time. There is no carbon market that can be 
abstracted from its embedded sector and governed as an independent 
industrial sector.  
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The ‘by-product’ feature of carbon offset credits has several implications 
for understanding inter-business relationship in the carbon market. Firstly, 
the relationship among the market players of any given or closely related 
industries (such as various types of renewable energy production) inflict a 
huge influence upon how the production of carbon credits is managed 
(Table 7.1). The trans-sectoral nature of the carbon offset credits make the 
cooperation or coordination among the actors from various sectors a very 
difficult task due to a lack of communication channels between parallel 
economic sectors. There is no single representative organization for 
project owners with various ownership structures, production capabilities 
and business cultures. In the end actors from more strategically important 
or financially robust sectors in the national economy stand out as the 
representatives of the ‘carbon industry’. In China, these are the energy 
production and heavy industry sectors.  
The other implication is that some ‘peripheral’ actors such as financiers 
and legal advisors, though not directly involved in the carbon credits 
production process, play a vital role for the development of the carbon 
market since their support is almost unanimously crucial for all the key 
sectors that are involved in the carbon market. A change of policy 
orientation or business strategy in the cement industry may only affect a 
small number of CDM projects, but similar alteration of the bank’s 
lending policy may produce profound impacts on all the CDM projects 
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that need capital injections for their implementation.  
In this section I present some analytical findings that illustrate how the 
carbon market is highly subjective to the inter-business relationships of 
actors in the renewable energy sector, how the most powerful actors 
emerged as the representatives of the whole carbon industry when the 
union like organization is hard to be created in China, and how peripheral 
actors like banks are influencing the carbon market with their internal 
lending policies and procedures.  
7.3.1. Wind and solar: a tale of two renewables  
Wind and solar power are arguably the major two segments of renewable 
energy production in China and both sectors have witnessed spectacular 
growth since 2009. However, their representation in the China’s CDM 
pipeline has been dramatically different (see Table 7.2), compared to 650 
wind projects that are registered with EB, only 17 solar power production 
projects are currently in the CDM pipeline (UNEP, 2013). In the 
following paragraphs I explain the political and economic causes for such 
variation and argue that the different ‘fate’ of solar and wind projects is 
de facto the result of the business actors’ power in the market.  
7.3.1.1. Progressive vs. passive development 
One of the distinctive differences between China’s wind and solar sectors 
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is that most of the wind projects are conducted by state-owned utility 
companies, who embark on wind energy mainly to fulfill their renewable 
energy quota imposed by the government. In the solar power sector, most 
of the active companies are privately owned, medium sized companies 
that produce solar panel for foreign companies prior to 2008. The major 
cut of solar subsidies in some major European countries has put many of 
these Chinese suppliers on the verge of collapse. As a result, some solar 
panel producers have decided to look toward a domestic solar market and 
take on investment projects for new solar power stations. Their 
involvement in such kind of investment activities is motivated by the sale 
of solar panels and other equipment as a rescue plan in facing the massive 
reduction of purchase orders from Europe. 
Therefore there is a tremendous capability gap between these small or 
medium sized private investors who once were mere equipment providers 
for solar power stations. They often lack experience and expertise in 
project financing, construction and maintenance compared to large state-
owned companies that dominated the wind sectors, which are specialized 
in developing and investing in capital intensive energy projects. This 
capability variance largely determines their level of involvement in the 
CDM market. As explained in Chapter 5, CER buyers are only interested 
in projects that are being carried out by financially robust and 
experienced project owners. Most of the private investors in the solar 
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sector do not fall into this category. Furthermore, their financial constraint 
only allows them to invest in projects with limited generation capacity. 
The amounts of CERs and the potential CDM revenues that can be 
extracted from these projects are insignificant in these small sized 
investment projects. A careful examination of the solar power CDMs 
illustrate that most of these projects are being carried out by large SOEs, 
which do not represent the main tendency of the solar power market in 
China since 2005 (see table 6.3), where leading private companies like 
Shangde and Yingli have not yet been involved in any CDM deals. 
Table 7.1: Carbon credits as a ‘by-product’ of various economic sectors: 
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7.3.1.2. Solar power: the next‘big’ thing? 
‘What we are seeing today in the solar power market is just what had 
happened five years ago in the wind power sector’, FJG, a senior 
manager of a Beijing based solar PV company, mentioned during his 
interview. He became an interview target because of his firsthand 
experience of the so called ‘Golden Sun’ Project, which were launched in 
2009 by the Ministry of Finance in order to‘support and scale up the 
domestic solar PV power production as a cultivating policy for an 
emerging industry with strategic importance.’ (MOF, 2009) The policy 
aims to provide subsidies up to 70% of the total investment of solar PV 
projects with a planned funding program amounting to 10 billion RMB 
per year. However, three years after its implementation, to what extent 
this landmark policy is able to assist private investors is at least dubious 
to business managers like FJG. He went on to speak frankly about how 
irrelevant or even counter-productive the supportive policies that were 
recently introduced are, at least to small and medium sized companies.  
‘There was a fervent pursuit of Golden Sun in 2009 and 2010 among the 
small and medium solar PV producers because it was once regarded as 
the crucial rescue plan after the 2008 crises. But now it is obvious that 
most of the subsidies are not in place due to a complicated bureaucratic 
process. The huge burden of the investors has not yet been relieved. Even 
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if the fund could be in place, it would not be sufficient to make these 
projects profitable, particularly when there is not yet any specific feed-in 
tariff policy for the solar power at the moment.’  
------ Interview transcript with FJG 
FJG is not the only person who questions the efficiency of this ambitious 
government flagship policy on solar power sector. According to the 
Chinese press most of the small and medium sized solar power builders 
believed the Golden Sun program itself would not help them much to 
make profitable green-field investment, a more comprehensive policy 
approach, such as a direct feed-in tariff needs to be introduced (Southern 
Weekly, 2010). 
Yet instead of the feed-in tariff that the solar industry dream of, the 
Chinese government launched another policy tool toward the end of 
2009, which had also once been adopted by the wind sector a few years 
earlier: a national bidding program. This familiar policy produced 
familiar consequences. After two rounds of bidding in 2009 and 2010 
across China, foreign investors and most of the small sized private 
investors retreated from the market completely due to the daunting low 
prices offered by the large Chinese state-owned companies. That is 
exactly the same situation compared to the bidding programs for wind 
energy projects in the early 2000s. It should be noted that most of these 
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state-owned companies are very familiar with the CDM as they have 
learnt their experience on wind investment since 2005, and as a result 
many of their solar projects were also packaged as CDM and come into 
the pipeline.  
Table 7.3: Solar PV projects in China’s CDM pipeline:  
CDM Project 
Ref. no. 
Host company 
and ownership 
Total Installed 
Capacity (MW) 
Total Investment 
(in RMB million) 
4082 Huaneng (SOE) 100 50,000 
4775 CECIC (SOE) 10.28 208 
4919 Ningxia Electricity 
(SOE) 
50 12,900 
4981 CECIC (SOE) 10 208 
5077 Huadian (SOE) 10 163 
5148 SDIC (SOE) 20 358.66 
4994 Ningxia Electricity 
(SOE) 
10 236.74 
5177 CECIC (SOE) 8.68 141.25 
5245 Huadian (SOE) 10 247.48 
5391 CECIC (SOE) 2.2 n/a 
4982 Guodian (SOE) 10 216.18 
5374 Guodian (SOE) 10 202.86 
5379 Longyuan (SOE) 20 389.86 
5628 Huaneng (SOE) 20 404.8 
5229 CPIC (SOE) 10 200.36 
5677 Huadian (SOE) 10 171.1 
5716 CPIC(SOE) 10 n/a 
5763 CGN (SOE) 10 n/a 
(Source: UNEP, 2013) 
The bidding program is often regarded as the dawn of a feed-in tariff in 
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China, since the winning prices can serve as an important reference or 
benchmarks for the regulators to set out a feed-in tariff. In March 2011, 
just a few months after the interview with FJG, the Chinese government 
launched a formal feed-in tariff system, which received a polarized 
response by the business circle. For state-owned companies it means the 
start of a new era of solar rush, as what happened in the wind sector only 
a couple of years ago. For FJG, to use his own words in the interview (a 
few months ago before the launch of the policy): ‘It means we would be 
forced back to the roof-top projects and forget about the large scale 
projects completely.’  
The other implication, and probably a more worrying one, is that the 
Chinese experience on wind and solar energy indicates that those 
companies that are not able to benefit from the domestic policy, are not 
able to take advantage of an international mechanism at the same time. 
Although CDM and national renewable policies are, at least in a 
normative sense, to complement each other, it seems that they have a 
similar preference or bias system that promotes a particular group of 
actors while neglecting others. The variance of representation of wind 
and solar power CDMs in China is a typical example of how powerful 
and resourceful business actors are emerging as the major recipients of 
CDM benefits despite their market share in a given sector. If the current 
trend continues as state-owned companies start to take over the private 
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led market to invest in large scale solar energy projects, it would be 
almost certain that a larger number of solar CDMs would come into the 
pipeline. But in what way and to what extent the CDM as an international 
mechanism is providing additional benefits to host countries’ clean 
development is dubious not just because it is an ‘icing on the cake’, but 
rather it provides ‘icing’ only to those who already own the ‘cake’. 
7.3.2. ‘Carbon’ finance: the hidden master of the CDM 
Carbon finance is a slippery phrase which is now used in various contexts 
to describe almost any form of financial service either directly or 
indirectly related to a GHG emission reduction project. Within the CDM 
context, the term ‘carbon finance’ also has multiple meanings. At the 
outset, it is used to describe the payment effected by Annex-1 parties to 
secure an ERPA with non-Annex 1 parties. In the host countries, it 
sometimes also refers to the loan facility that is arranged by the financial 
institutions to support an industrial investment activity that has the 
potential to be registered as a CDM project. In Annex-1 countries, 
however, the operation of a number of newly created derivative products 
in the secondary CER market is also called the carbon finance. For the 
sake of clarity, carbon finance in this research refers to the first two forms 
of financial operations only because these activities are bounded in the 
host countries and hence relevant to the domestic governance and 
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political economy.  
Financiers are the traditionally powerful actors in project investment 
because their lending decisions may determine the fate of capital 
intensive investment. In addition, the Chinese government often relies on 
banks to screen out unreliable investment initiatives, requiring that only 
projects with a letter of lending intent from a commercial bank are 
allowed to go though the approving process. Therefore commercial banks 
are an integral part of governance in industrial sectors such as energy and 
infrastructure. Bearing this context in mind, two questions around CDM 
financing are to be explored in the following paragraphs. Firstly, is CDM 
finance somehow different from traditional financial arrangements for the 
capital intensive projects? The answer to this question would be crucial 
for understanding if the carbon offset mechanism has any significant 
enabling or disabling effect for the financial institutions in the governance 
domain of a given industry. Secondly, how do financial institutions’ 
perceptions and attitudes constrain or support other business actors’ 
interests during the project approval and implementation stages? This 
inquiry not only helps to clarify the role of finance and financiers in these 
projects, but also reveals the potential contestations that may shape the 
future configuration of industrial-financial power dynamics and its 
influence in the policy domain of the carbon market. 
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7.3.2.1. ERPA as a form of project financing?  
ERPA is a unique project document because it distinguishes a CDM 
activity from any traditional domestic project investment. It also lays a 
contractual foundation for carbon deals between international parties. 
However, the field study revealed a significant gap between an ERPA’s 
rhetorical meaning and its real function in the CDM business. 
Rhetorically the payment from Annex-1 parties under ERPA at the 
initiation stage of project development is often regarded as an illustration 
of how additional cash flow is provided to promote project activities. 
However, in reality, it is indispensible in the CDM project negotiation 
process only because the suppliers are suspicious of the credibility of 
CER buyers for the future purchase of carbon credits. In this regard, the 
initial payment from the buyers under ERPA is more like a down payment 
that secures buyers’ entitlements to CERs as a future output of the 
project. The ERPA itself is not a financing instrument as it is neither a 
debt nor equity based contract. Therefore the meaning of this kind of 
payment to the project owners is rather symbolic. It is a mere goodwill 
payment, which is by and large subjected to the power relationships 
between the contractual parties.  
‘The buyers would not pay the upfront fees at all times. If the project 
prospect (chances to get project registered and CERs issued) are low, 
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they don’t pay a penny to the project investors.’  
------ Interview transcript with ZL 
Another interviewee, LHL, compared the nature of ERPA with the power 
purchase agreement (PPA) under a power plant with the monopolistic 
grid companies in China;  
‘If you were a power producer you would be very lucky if the grid 
company agreed to purchase your future power and reach a PPA. But you 
would be very bold to ask for a down payment from the grid company. 
Similar things happening with this ERPA thing in the carbon market, 
sometimes the project owners look for a buyer so anxiously that they lost 
any bargaining power for the up-front payments.’ 
Even in the case that buyers agree to pay the down payment, the money is 
most likely spent by the project owners to facilitate the‘carbon element’ 
of the project, such as paying a consultant fee for the project developers 
or PDD writers, rather than using it for physical construction of the 
project. Here comes another dilemma for the carbon finance in the CDM 
market. The ‘difficult’ projects with unorthodox methodologies, 
complicated baselines, incomplete data and validation procedures may 
cost the project owners more consultant fees than ‘standard’ projects like 
wind farms. However, these are the projects that CER buyers would not 
be willing to pay any down payment due to their highly uncertain 
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prospect of being registered by the EB. Project owners hence often have 
to pay the consultant fee out of their own project investment budget if 
they wish to embark on the CDM. In such circumstances, the CDM 
would only increase the initial cost of the project investment. Some 
project developers may agree to forfeit the consultancy fee for a share of 
future CER revenues with the project owners, but such arrangements are 
against government policy, which declared that only project owners and 
Chinese governments are entitled to the benefits from the sale of CERs. 
In addition, the sharing arrangement of CERs between project owners and 
project developers would only encourage project developers to focus on 
‘easy projects’ just like everybody else does in the market.  
To conclude, the ERPA mode should not be understood as a form of 
carbon finance since it provides no additional fund to facilitate the 
‘physical’ construction of the project. It is in reality a down payment for 
purchasing CERs, which is essentially an end (and side) product of an 
investment project. The amount of the down payment for each ERPA is 
largely determined by the power relations between the CER trading 
parties, therefore it does not always decrease the initial capital cost of 
CDM investment as carbon finance is supposed to deliver.  
‘Let us compare the carbon market with the other sectors, say shoe 
making market. If Wal-Mart orders shoes from a shoe manufacturer in 
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China, they might pay some amount of down payment in order to show 
their sincerity of business. But no matter how much they pay, they won’t 
be treated as a financier and their down payment would never be called 
as ‘finance’. Because after all Wal-Mart is just a shoe purchaser. But in 
the carbon market, such business activities have a fascinating name: 
carbon finance.’ 
------ Interview transcript with LHL 
7.3.2.2. The CDM and traditional project financing  
If ERPA does not fall into any category of real project financing, the next 
question could be if the ‘carbon element’ of a project changes the 
traditional project financing model. CER is a new product and profit 
resource for the investment project which has theoretical potential to 
improve the financial return for the project owners. Projects with CDM 
revenue hence are likely to be more welcomed by the lenders compared 
to investments without CDM support. However, in reality, the profit from 
sales from carbon credits seldom changes the banks’ lending decisions on 
a potential CDM project; the reasons are explained in the following 
paragraphs. 
Three risks are particularly worrying to banks when underwriting the 
risks associated with CDM. First is the low rate of successful registration 
and uncertain prospects of validation. At present barely above 20% of 
310 
 
projects developed in China are registered as qualified CDM activity. The 
constantly changing rules and procedures from the EB also exacerbate the 
uncertainties of the materialization of CER sales. SZQ mentioned his 
experience with the banks: ‘the bankers call CER a contingent income 
and it serves little for the credit enhancement of the project. They would 
usually examine the projects’ viability and test the future cash flow in a 
non-CDM scenario when underwriting a loan.’  
Interview transcript from SZQ 
The other concern of the banks is the repayment credibility of the buyers. 
Since most of the carbon funds are newly established businesses with a 
very short credit history, their capability to honor ERPA in the future is 
often viewed as questionable by the lenders. Taking wind farms as an 
example, ERPA and PPA are two similar documents that guarantee, at 
least contractually, the sales of end products (carbon credits and 
electricity). As long as CERs and electricity are produced, the investment 
projects are expected to make a profit. However, in a banker’s view, 
ERPA and PPA are significantly different as the power purchasers under 
PPA are large state grid companies whose credit ratings are almost equal 
to the sovereign rate of the Chinese government. Therefore the future 
repayment of the grid companies under PPA can often be escrowed as the 
guarantee for the project owners to repay the bank loans. But the ERPA is 
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a different story when the credit ratings of the carbon buyers are not as 
good as those of the grid companies. CER buyers’ contractual 
commitment of future payment hence cannot be used by the project 
owners’ as an escrowable asset when seeking a bank loan.  
The third risk that worries most of the banks is the mismatch between life 
cycles of the carbon element and physical element of a CDM project. 
Most of the capital intensive investments, such as the wind farms, have a 
life-cycle of over 20 years and loan facilities arranged to finance these 
activities are often within a maturity period in accordance with the life 
span of the project. But the revenue generated from CERs is expected to 
cease at the end of 2012 with the expiration of the first commitment 
period of the KP. In such a case most lenders would not consider CERs as 
an additional source of income or a risk mitigation factor if CER related 
income appears to be temporary and covers only part of the project’s 
operational period. LX1 mentioned in the interview that they once 
persuaded a bank to consider separate arrangements for one investment 
prior to and after 2012, but the bank finally gave up the effort for its
‘technical complexity’.  
In general, the field study indicates that CDM has yet provided any 
meaningful financial resources for the project investment. Bankers would 
not underwrite the loan facility to an investment project based on the 
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CER revenue, which is small, temporary, and backed up by buyers with 
less credibility. They would often stick to its traditional financing policies 
and procedures regardless of if the project is likely to be labeled as CDM 
or not. Industrial Bank of China is known as the only bank that would 
like to provide loans for project owners with potential carbon assets, but 
according to the bank’s policy, only projects that are already registered 
with EB can apply for a working capital loan subject to the amount of 
expected CERs (Industrial Bank’s Website, 2012). Yet considering that 
most of projects are already near the end of their construction phase when 
it is registered as a CDM, such loans, although packaged and promoted as 
the flagship program of CDM financing, are also unlikely to produce any 
significant help for the projects investors who needs start up finance for 
the project investment. 
However, many project investors expressed their understanding of 
commercial banks’ perception on CDM and their persistence on the 
traditional risk management model. For example, LX believed that 
commercial banks are comparatively speaking conservative comparing to 
other business groups in the market. 
“But I think it is only natural (banks’ negative attitude) because they as 
bankers would like to lend to reliable projects. It has nothing to do with 
financial creativity or innovation. It is the problem of the carbon market 
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itself. The market is not mature and robust enough to change bankers’ 
perception.’ 
------ Interview transcript with LX1 
7.4. Conclusion and implications 
In this chapter I have presented the various perceptions, preferences and 
internal policies among different business groups related to the CDM 
business in China. I argue that the CDM can be viewed as the extension 
of a strong carbon coalition from developed countries into the developing 
world. However, there is clear evidence that international companies have 
different strategic preferences compared to local businesses as they often 
enjoy greater leverage at the international policy making level and 
advocate a better governance structure at the international level. Chinese 
local companies, however, often regard the CDM as a ‘western 
mechanism’ rather than an international offset program. They are 
relatively indifferent to the international rules and instead prefer to 
change, revert or advance domestic protectionist policies for the sake of 
economic profit only. International companies cannot compete with 
domestic companies in terms of their closeness to the Chinese 
officialdom but their contractual advantage often allows them to defy 
some of the protectionist policies.  
The development of wind and solar projects in China represents another 
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form of conflict among companies in the carbon market. The analysis 
identifies a policy trend in both solar and wind sectors, which have lured 
large state corporations into the renewables market and pushed small and 
medium sized companies out of both renewable energy production and 
CDM business. The consequence of this tendency is a swift expansion of 
the renewables market and a rapid drop in production cost. Yet whether 
this trend would be sustainable is doubtful because of a mounting 
complaint about the inefficiency of the massive market advancement led 
by state corporations, as some of their investments are obviously 
recklessly planned and carried out. The idea of ‘the bigger the better’ may 
no longer be unanimously supported by both policy makers and the 
market actors.  
The third implication is that carbon finance as a rhetorical buzz word has 
little concrete meaning at least in the CDM context. The mechanism 
provides neither additional financial resources nor significant collaterals 
to the project investment and consequently the financial arrangement of 
CDM projects is largely identical to those non CDM projects. CER 
trading in this regard has yet to change the industrial-financial 
relationship in the realm of capital intensive project investment such as 
wind farms or solar power stations. If the CDM remains dependent on 
private finance in the host countries, as is seen today, the domestic banks 
would remain the crucial gate keepers and decision makers for the 
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development of the CDM market, which is a major constraint for most of 
small sized investment.  
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8. Conclusion and implications for future 
studies 
China’s embrace of market instruments to address its environmental 
challenges provide a strong case of the country’s rather unique power 
dynamics between the state and business actors. On the one hand, flexible 
mechanisms such as the CDM delegated considerable authority to private 
actors, who help to create and implement ‘on the ground’ rules and shape 
the participants behaviour pattern accordingly (Green, 2013). On the 
other hand, the structural change in state-market relationships due to the 
China’s grand economic reform since early 1980s provide critical 
contexts for the rise of private actors in climate change politics and 
governance. Consequently, although China is still regarded in many cases 
as an authoritarian regime, the influence of business community to the 
national and local polity and officialdom can no longer be ignored. As 
Kennedy (2005) points out almost all the business actors, regardless of 
their different ownership and nationality, are involved in the political 
process to gain a policy advantage. Hence, the traditional notion that a 
strong leadership dominate China’s politics and command the 
bureaucratic control over the nation, is no longer a precise description of 
the political economy in present China. 
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Based on this understanding this research set out the task of analysing the 
features and performance of climate governance in China via the lens of 
the business power and influence in the most innovative and nascent 
instrument, namely the ‘regulated’ carbon market or the CDM. In the 
preceding chapters, I have discussed the relationships between the 
business actors and central as well as local governments in the CDM 
market. I also investigate the inter-business relationships to understand 
how these allied or confrontational interests can shape or constraint their 
influence regarding the policies around CDM or clean development.  
In this concluding chapter, I would firstly revisit the research questions 
that are laid out in Chapter 1, and examine how the findings of this 
research are responding to these questions. The first set of research 
questions are asking about the range of actors that are involved in the 
governance of CDM market in China. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I 
identified the most active business actors both at central and local level. I 
also illustrated the role of these actors in the governing the CDM 
activities. The key findings is that CDM has been developed around the 
strategic interests of giant SOEs who are capable of developing and 
wholesaling carbon credits to the carbon credits buyers from the Annex-1 
countries. Therefore, the key elements of project implementation, such as 
the transaction pattern and favourable projects types, are largely 
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determined by the strong coalition of business actors rather than central 
or local state officers. 
The second set of research questions are dealing with the business power. 
In chapter 5 and 6, I illustrated that business actors, particularly carbon 
credit buyers and consultancies in the CDM market possess unique 
advantages to promote market development and on the ground rules or 
standards. In Chapter 6, SOEs’ economic and institutional power, 
particularly at the localities or project sites, is at the centre of 
interrogation.  However, I also discussed the limitation of business power 
in Chapter 5 and 7 by revealing that business actors also needs state 
actors to legitimize their actions and inter-business conflicts may thwart 
particular business interests and priorities.  
The third set of research questions ask about the consequences of 
business power in the CDM market. I discussed the relationship between 
business influence in the market and the overall performance of Chinese 
CDM activities. In Chapter 5 I identified that there is gap between the 
present additionality check of CDM projects and the reality of Chinese 
political economy. So the projects themselves may be unprofitable if 
without CDM support, yet they are to be built anyway due to SOE’s 
rather unique business strategy as quasi-state actors. In Chapter 6, 
analytical focus has been given to the CDM’s contribution to the local 
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sustainability and I revealed why local officers are not able to serve as a 
credible checker for CDM’s SD benefits. In Chapter 7, the major 
argument is that it is hard to predict the future carbon trading or offset 
market in China since the inter-business conflicts make such task almost 
impossible. 
After presenting key answers for the research questions set out in the 
beginning of this thesis, in the next section, I would like to emphasis and 
highlight some of the theoretical and empirical implications achieved in 
this research. This chapter will end with the discussion of some 
limitations of this research and identify the areas that need to be further 
explored by future studies of the role of business actors in climate 
governance.  
8.1. Theoretical implications 
This research both confirms and challenges earlier studies on Chinese 
state-market relationships and its environmental governance. It offers a 
new research approach to unify these relatively two separate issue areas 
and suggests the needs to change some generally accepted conceptions of 
Chinese environmental politics. I argue that besides the national political 
institutions and policies, two other dynamic elements need to be 
integrated into the analysis of environmental governance in China, 
namely the local state-business relationships, and inter-business 
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constraints or confrontations. Based on the analysis of these three 
elements of power dynamics, following implications can be drawn.  
8.1.1. Not a single state, not a single market 
At outset, it is clear that neither state nor market should be treated as a 
monolithic group. The analysis in the chapter 5 and chapter 6 reveal the 
contrasting interests and motivations among various segments of the 
officialdom of all levels in supporting the development of the CDM. 
Central officers wish to expand their bureaucratic power but local officers 
mainly look at the economic potentials of CDM activities. Meanwhile, 
different ministries and local government institutions that are related to 
the CDM regulation and policies all have their own institutional interests 
at stake. Lack of integrated coordination and central-local conflicts have 
been well documented in the previous studies of China’s policy process 
and environmental governance (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Wu, 
2009). The findings of this research echoes with their observation that, at 
least at the central level, multi-sectoral coordination is particularly 
difficult for environmental governance.  
However, the new governance space or administrative responsibilities 
that are created after the introduction of market instruments have not yet 
generated any significant bureaucratic reconfiguration or friction with the 
existing governing institutions. This is mainly due to the CDM regulators’ 
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conscious avoidance of conflicts with the existing regulating agencies on 
renewable energy, environmental protection or energy saving domains in 
China. But such conflict-aversion attitude does not diminish the 
bureaucratic complications since most of the overt policy contradictions 
between the new CDM rules and existing industrial policies are simply 
being left untouched and are only dealt with at implementation level, 
often on a case by case basis. In this regard, the lack of coordination does 
not originate from competition over bureaucratic power but, rather on the 
contrary, from a tacit agreement of allocation and arrangement of the 
responsibilities and authorities between various state institutions. In 
another words, ‘fragmented authority’ can be either an intended or 
unintended consequence.  
At the same time, the business community in the CDM market is also not 
of a piece. First of all, the different roles that business actors play in the 
project cycle as CER buyers, DOEs, carbon consultancies, and project 
owners largely determines that they have often contrasting interests and 
preferences over certain policies and regulations. Since CDM regulations 
or policies may affect all the participants in the market, there are strong 
incentives for the business actors to craft out relevant political strategy in 
order to take the policy advantage over others. In this regard, policy is 
business.  
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Secondly, the various ownership structure, company size, and nationality 
of the companies also shape their strategic priorities and influencing 
tactics in the CDM market. The analysis in the previous chapters also 
indicates that business in different geographic locations and economic 
sectors (between renewables and non-renewables) have different 
standpoints, behaviour patterns and political preferences for the 
development of their CDM business. For example, companies or CDM 
centres from relatively underdeveloped areas often conceal their origins 
when doing CDM business outside their purview. While Beijing based 
SOEs and consultancies often show off their superiority in experts and or 
political resources when dealing with local business partners and state 
officers. Meanwhile, it is found that wind energy sector is the strongest 
supporter of CDM as they are the largest beneficiary of CER sales, while 
other biased sectors are more cynical and critical about this mechanism, 
even if their voices are not often heard in the public.  
8.1.2. Non-linear progression and uneven distribution of 
business power 
The second implication is closely linked to the first one. Although the rise 
of business power in Chinese polity is a direct consequence of the 
transformation from a centrally planned economy to a more market 
oriented one (Kennedy, 2005). It should not be taken for granted that such 
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process is a linear progression. On the country, the party government 
never loosens its grip on key economic sectors. Since early 1990s, bands 
of national championship SOEs were established with relentless support 
of central government in each of these strategically important sectors. 
Foreign and private investments in these areas were pressed and 
sometimes were squeezed out of the market completely. The wind and 
solar market is the typical examples of this trend, as illustrated in Chapter 
6 and Chapter 7.  
Therefore, the boom of a CDM market in China largely owes to the rise 
of state owned utilities with ambiguous ownership statues and massive 
economic or financial strength. It explained why China could develop 
such large quantity of projects within a rather short time span, and why 
the project portfolio is so highly concentrated on a couple of project types, 
namely the renewables. The finding of this research echoes with Huang’s 
(2008) argument that privatization process in China have been 
intentionally slowed down by the Party at least in major industrial sectors 
since 1989. Hence the synergy of public and private interests in the CDM 
market, as well as their close alliance in promoting CDM activities, 
shows that any analytical effort to distinguish the public and private 
contribution to the CDM development would bound to be a futile task. 
Hybrid actors like large SOEs or local CDM officers have crept into the 
governance space or the grey zones between the public and private 
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spheres, which challenge the claim that CDM is a triumph of market 
instruments or neoliberal ideology over the traditional governance mode. 
Yet one of the important observations of this research is that Chinese 
government is now subjective to the pressures and influence of these 
hybrid actors that it once created and supported. Large SOEs could be 
stronger than local officers in both political and economic resources and 
local CDM offices are found establishing business operations outside 
their political purviews to escape the supervision of the local officers. It is 
hard to define the nature of these relationships because it is neither pure 
public-private nor inter-ministerial in a traditional sense. Probably more 
importantly, the outcomes for such interactions are far from certain, 
because hybrid actors also rely heavily on state actors’ support to deter 
competition from private or foreign business. Hence my argument is that 
even it is clear that there is observable growth of business influence in 
China’s polity, this process is far from linear and steady. 
In the same vein, it is also critical to notice that business influence is not 
evenly distributed across various localities and economic sectors. Chapter 
6 indicates that underdeveloped regions are more subject to the business 
leverage since these areas are more desperate to attract additional 
investment for poverty alleviation and economic development. In 
addition, the overall institutional capacities in these localities are 
considerably lower, so the local officers rely heavily on the expertise and 
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knowledge of the private actors in dealing with complex issues like CDM 
and low carbon transition. For example, Chapter 6 illustrates that 
relatively wealthy provinces such as Inner Mongolia have obviously 
larger autonomy to manage its renewable resources than the rather 
underdeveloped Gansu province. Hence the economic power of the 
localities stands out as the crucial factor that constrains the degree of 
business influence in the policy process. 
As for the companies, getting access to the polity does not necessarily 
mean having influence (Fuchs, 2005). It is noted in this research that the 
economic and financial strength is a crucial factor to determine the 
effectiveness of business influence in the policy process. Large sized 
corporations or the leading companies in the market are found more often 
to be consulted by the state officers in the relevant policy making process 
for the market information and propositions. Their opinions and interests 
are often highly appreciated by the policy makers, who will often turn a 
deaf ear to similar requests of small business actors. In addition, the case 
of CDM also illustrate that ownership structure matters in China, between 
SOEs and private companies, or between home and foreign companies, 
there is a clear policy tendency to protect and support SOEs and home 
companies, while bias or deter private and foreign actors in the market. 
The orthodox pro-market neoliberal ideology never truly prevails in 
China.  
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8.1.3. Business lobbying with Chinese characters 
It is also noted in this research that economic factor is not the only source 
of business influence since political norms and traditions in China are 
also shaping state-business relationship in many ways. In this regard, 
newly developed CDM market presents little differences to many other 
traditional economic sectors. At the outset, there is the very limited role 
of various business associations involved in the lobbying activities. Until 
today, carbon market is only created a decade ago and there is no formal 
association established within China to represent the overall interests of 
major market participants. China New Energy Chamber of Commerce 
(CNECC) is probably the most relevant business association regarding 
the CDM business due to the dominant share of renewable projects in 
China’s CDM market. However, most of the interviewees doubt the 
capability of this association in terms of pressing the state because it is 
essentially another affiliated government institution under the state-
controlled umbrella institution called All-China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce (ACFIC).  
Consequently, the dominant pattern of state-market interaction is a back 
to back and direct communication process between individual business 
and state actors. Kennedy (2005) points out that this form of interaction is 
rather a legacy of planned economy when regulators had to consult the 
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individual factory leaders about the important elements of the production 
plan in order to secure its feasibility. But in today’s CDM market, 
business actors of all forms of ownership are involved in direct 
interaction with the officers almost on daily basis. Similarly to other 
sectors, SOEs always sit at the top of the hierarchy of direct interactions 
with the state institutions, while foreign and private companies are found 
contacting state officers in a less frequent manner. SOEs closeness to the 
officialdom is another source of their leverage, beside their economic 
power, to influence the regulation and policies, particularly over case-
specific issues such as loans or project approvals. This research also 
noted SOEs capability to utilize their close relationship with the state 
officers to press other business actors such as DOEs from time to time, as 
illustrated in Chapter 5.  
One of the direct consequences of such interaction pattern is the lack of 
transparency in the policy process. When back-to-back negotiations or 
bargaining became a norm in the state-market relationship, it is very hard 
to establish the causal link between the policy outcome and business’ 
political investment on their preferred policies. The specific information 
that is exchanged between the top-level management and officers behind 
the closed doors is hard to trace by the public even if such direct 
interaction is a well-known strategy of corporate lobbying in China today. 
Although previous studies reveal that this form of direct interaction is 
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also gaining prominence in other parts of the world including developed 
countries like US and EU (Kaiser, 2000; Verba and Orren, 1985), the 
Chinese government generally faces less pressure to disclose individual 
business interests and preferences behind each newly passed regulations. 
Similarly, since the Chinese party-state is not yet a democratic system, no 
campaign finance can be possibly traced even if patronage loyalty fees at 
all levels are rampant and well-known even by the ordinary Chinese 
people. The CDM market is a relatively transparent domain where all the 
project information can be accessed via NDRC’s website, yet its 
approving process and evaluation meetings is never open to NGOs and 
public. The majority of interviewees also confirmed to the researcher that 
they prefer to use direct contacts within the government to have their 
voice and preferences heard rather than via any association like 
institutions. 
Hence the research shows that the lack of transparency has been exploited 
by both state and market actors to capture the benefits of the insiders 
knowledge of the CDM market. Such finding explains why companies 
tend to avoid challenging state actors’ authorities directly even if the later 
lacks expertise, experiences and financial resources, as illustrated in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Therefore it is noted in this research that the 
common strategy for the business actors is to convince the state officers 
that their proposal is consistent with the regulators’ own interests. In 
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CDM market, ‘win-win solutions’ is a buzz word as it captures not only 
the relationship between the Annex-1 and Non-annex 1 parties, or 
economic development and climate benefits. Instead, it describes the 
relationship between the government and market actors.  
Although it is impossible to trace down numerous direct interactions 
between business and state actors, their aggregate policy effect can be 
somehow easily observed. In China’s CDM market, business influence 
can be found behind most of policy making, implementation, and policy 
changes. In addition, for those policies which are against business 
interests, such as the promotion policy for coal-bed methane or energy 
efficiency projects, are facing difficulties in implementation without 
business support.  The aggregate effect of business influence is also 
manifested in the lack of proper regulations on CDM’s project financial 
arrangement or transaction pattern, which is the crucial element for the 
market development, and therefore would never circumvent regulatory 
supervision if without influence of business actors. The same negligence 
can also be found in the sustainability element of CDM projects due to 
the similar reasons.  
In chapter 3, I explain that the research is based on the neo-pluralist 
approach to understand the state-market relationships in China’s CDM 
market. Here in the concluding chapter, it is obvious that China’s political 
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economy in the carbon sector is not strictly plural even if we categorize 
hybrid institutions, such as SOEs or local CDM offices, as private actors. 
There are multiple political economies at play in China’s CDM market or 
carbon governance in a broadly sense. State-market relation varies from 
one locality to another; and from one economic sector to another. At 
macro level, there is no linear trend from a state-controlled governance 
system to pro-market one. At the micro level, business influence differs 
significantly due to actors’ rather unbalanced economic resources and 
political power. Traditional political culture of centrally planned 
economy is still at play and sometimes local corporatism or patronage 
relationships have not completely vanished. Therefore, the neo-pluralistic 
approach is no more than a starting point, rather than the end, of analysis. 
In addition, I argue that none of the single existing models of state-market 
relationships can precisely capture its complexity and dynamics of 
China’s political economy and carbon governance today.  
8.2. Empirical implications 
At the time of writing, the CDM market has been frozen almost 
completely in China. The EU decided that after 2012 only projects from 
less-developed countries would be eligible under the EU ETS, meaning 
that India, China and Brazil will no longer be able to sell the most 
common CERs to the world's largest market. CER price plunged by over 
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90% from 25 Euros a few years ago to less than 1 Euro today. According 
to NDRC’s website, the newly approved projects since 2013 are mostly 
unilateral CDMs, meaning these projects are no longer interested by the 
international CER buyers. The sudden boom and death of the CDM 
market in China provide important lessons of how flexible instruments 
should be governed at the global, national and local level. At the outset, it 
is clear that market appetites, rather than political will, determine the 
flourish of the flexible mechanisms. Secondly, markets are different from 
one country to another, and from one industrial sector to another. They 
are subject to their unique political and economic context, and market 
forces respond to the top-down regulations with their distinct resources 
and capabilities. Hence, some of the problems of CDM are no more than 
a manifestation of individual host country’s domestic symptom. It may 
not be universal problems yet sometimes they can be serious enough to 
crush the integrity and justification of the international mechanism as a 
whole. In the same vein, I argue that it is at least simplistic to suggest that 
these inefficiencies or problems can be settled by some top-down reforms 
or restructures from the international level. Via the lens of business power 
and influences, this research provides a clue of why this once applauded 
mechanism failed the expectation of the public in such a short duration. 
The empirical evidences and implications can be drawn and shed some 
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light on the future of carbon offset mechanism both in China and around 
the globe. 
8.2.1. Domestic carbon market 
Many companies sink as the market plunges and the hardest hit are the 
local carbon consultancies of CDM project developers whose core 
business is confined to the CDM development. Project owners, however, 
are less affected because, as explained in Chapter 5, most of the 
investments would take place even without the CDM consideration. 
DOEs are also less worried since verification or validation for CDM 
projects constitute often an insignificant section of their overall business. 
For most of the companies that are in deep crises, their only remedy can 
be the establishment of the domestic carbon trading system, which 
Chinese government has promised to deliver in 2015. However, regarding 
this theoretically world largest emission trading system in the future, 
there are simply ‘louder thunders with few raindrops’, meaning only little 
actions have been done despite its grand promise.  
The success or failure of this experiment will not only determine the 
future of climate governance in China, but to a large extent the fate of 
market instrument at global level, particular after the symbolic collapse of 
Chicago Climate Exchange in 2010. Many scholars are hence drawn to 
evaluate the progress so far and challenges that lay ahead (Han el all, 
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2012; Lo, 2013). In this research, the ambition and sincerity of the 
Chinese government to promote cap-and-trade system has been well 
evidenced, yet at the same time, there are worries that a market 
mechanism would not be well adapted into the Chinese strong statist 
political system (Lo, 2013).  
This research on CDM would provide some crucial insights on the 
prospect of China’s domestic carbon trading system, as they would be 
eventually operated in the same political and economic context. At the 
outset, I argue that from the CDM experience, the development of 
domestic carbon market depends critically on the active involvement of 
business actors. However, the rather sluggish pace of preparation for the 
trading system at present stage indicates a hesitating or even indifferent 
attitude of major business groups in participating in this grand program. 
Although ambitious state actors may efficiently create top-down 
regulatory frameworks, for the program to start functioning properly, 
other implementation elements such as measurement, methodologies, 
standards, data, rules, and norms have to grow in a rather bottom-up 
fashion. A ‘learning by doing’ process is thus inevitable and its success 
relies heavily on the private actors’ willingness to ‘cross the river by 
counting the stones’ with the state actors. The CDM’s story in China 
illustrated that it is these bottom-up factors, rather than the governance 
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architecture designed from the above, that ultimately determines the 
outcome and overall quality of the carbon offset scheme.  
In addition, drawn from the CDM story, it is the critical to understand the 
roles of those hybrid actors in the carbon market, particularly the SOEs in 
emission intensive sectors. On the one hand, unlike the CDM market 
where SOEs can earn extra profits from selling CERs, setting up domestic 
carbon market means that there would be winners and losers this time. 
The idea of ‘win-win’ solution may no longer hold true in many SOEs’ 
point of view because this time they may have to become a buyer and pay 
a price for the carbon emission. It is almost certain that some of these 
giant companies would not welcome the idea of a full-fledged domestic 
carbon trading scheme as they once did to the CDM. In addition, they 
may oppose any quantified reduction target within China since without 
the ‘cap’ there would definitely no ‘trading’. Given the findings of this 
research regarding the political leverage of these quasi state actors, I 
would argue that SOEs’ resistance or reluctance would inevitably 
generate profound impact on the efficiencies of the Chinese cap-and-trade 
system. Besides, it is noted that many local governments lack emission 
data from the key sectors, some of these data can only be acquired from 
the SOEs who often keep the original record of their operation and energy 
consumption. Considering the already unbalanced power dynamics 
between SOEs and local governments, as illustrated in the Chapter 6, 
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such situation would further promote SOE’s prominence in the carbon 
market.   
That doesn’t mean that the role of local states in carbon market can be 
neglected. On the country, in the past few years, local governments 
throughout China exhibited unprecedented enthusiasm regarding 
domestic carbon market. Many major cities around the country have 
applied to NDRC to establish Climate Exchange Centre within their 
political purview. This fervent attitude reminds people of local states’ 
similar eagerness to develop CDM projects only a decade ago. It should 
be noted that behind the local enthusiasm for Climate Exchange Centre it 
is the same desire of promoting economic development via carbon market. 
In this regard, the priority and logic of the local officers has not yet 
changed. However, at least theoretically, there is no strong causality 
between setting up a carbon trading platform and promoting local 
economic development or additional investment. In addition, local states’ 
capacity to promote carbon offset deals would be rather limited as 
illustrated in this research. It is highly probable that the role of the trading 
platform to promote low carbon investment within the area can be much 
lower than local officers’ expectation. If that is the case the local state 
would almost certainly shift their attitudes towards carbon market in the 
next couple of years, and hence became a major destabilizing force for 
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the development of domestic carbon trading program, just as happened in 
the CDM market.  
In general, although the Chinese domestic carbon market has received 
much academic and political attention even if it is still in its preliminary 
preparation stage, my argument is that it is unlikely to have an impressive 
take off as the CDM once did. This is because creating and sustaining a 
coalition with business and local states is a much more difficult task 
compared to the CDM case. Many previous case studies on carbon 
coalitions in the Western countries illustrated that business only embrace 
the benefits of carbon market when they are convinced the inevitability of 
imposing a quantified emission cap (Falkner, 2008; Levy and Newell, 
2005; Meckling, 2012). But in the case of China, such consensus has yet 
to be achieved within either business or government actors. Therefore 
struggles or resistance to a domestic carbon market will persist for 
considerably long time. In a recent event, the minister of China’s 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, Mr. Xie Zhenhua claimed that 
‘China’s domestic carbon market shall draw upon the successful 
experience of EU-ETS and other trading systems in advanced economies, 
but it has to retain its Chinese characteristics.’ (China Shenzhen Emission 
Exchange website, 2013) However, the CDM experience presented in this 
research illustrates that it is these ‘Chinese characteristics’ that actually 
impose severe challenges to effectiveness of the CDM market, and in the 
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same vein, these factors may probably affect the domestic carbon trading 
schemes in the future. 
8.2.2. Global carbon market with integrity and SD 
benefits 
A critical focus of this research is to interrogate the relationship between 
the rise of business power and the overall quality of the CDM market. 
The findings of the research reveal that business influence has profound 
implications for the quality of the scheme, even though these 
consequences are not from business actors’ intentional behaviors. Some 
Chinese CDM scandals such as HFC23 projects or skeptical wind farm 
projects are clearly against CDM’s original mission statement, but it is 
also obvious that most of the project developers and owners in China did 
not knowingly hurt the integrity of the system. On the contrary, their 
behaviors not just follow the market logic but are subject to the political 
and economic context that the designers of the flexible mechanisms did 
not fully appreciate at the time.  For example, most of the SOEs in China 
do not always follow the golden rule of profit maximization while 
making large capital-intensive investment and their business strategies 
can be wildly different from their counterpart utility companies in the 
Western economies. Therefore, the existing EB’s criteria to evaluate 
projects’ additionality are completely misleading in the cases of SOEs’ 
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CDM projects. At project level one may find these activities additional 
since the expected return of investment is so low, but at company level 
these non-profitable investments are absolutely ‘business as usual’.  
Cases like this illustrate the mismatch between the high-above design of 
the mechanism and actual reality of the market. The consequence is an 
observable deviation of the original purpose of the carbon offset 
instrument. It should be noted that there will be no quick fix for the 
problems like this as it is almost impossible for the international 
regulators to change the rules or policies only to fit a specific national 
political or economic context. Neither the national political economies 
would change even slightly to adapt to the newly created market 
mechanisms. This research argues that we should not expect global 
mechanisms like CDMs to operate independently from the host countries 
political reality and outperform other industrial sectors in terms of its 
integrity. The fact that DOEs are constantly pressed by powerful business 
and state actors, or the internal conflicts between on the ground validators 
and their senior managers in head office, are vivid examples of these 
struggles. In such cases, merely increasing the number and salary of 
validators would not help much to enhance the quality of the projects. 
In the same vein, the sustainability benefits of the CDM would not be 
easily fixed, because it is essentially a political issue as no actor in the 
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project cycle has proper motivations to safeguard the social and 
environmental benefits of carbon offset projects. Pro-development local 
governments at all levels are only interested in the economic benefits 
accompanied by renewable investment or CDMs. Their reluctance to 
reject investment opportunities for the sake of environmental or social 
setbacks is arguably the major cause for many environmental problems in 
China in the first place. As long as the economic benefits are at the top 
priority of the local political agenda over environmental or social benefits 
issues, government officers would not sincerely interrogate the SD 
benefits of these renewable or carbon offset projects even if they are 
delegated the authority to do so. As for the central government, the 
asymmetric information between the projects participants and state 
officers would prevent the latter from investigating the actual SD benefits 
of each project even if they wish to do so in a serious manner.  
Unfortunately, in the case of China, there is no other actor group that is 
capable of taking up the role to safeguard the SD benefits of carbon offset 
projects. Environmental activists and NGOs are only emerging in China 
and they often operate in a very limited political space (Carter and Mol, 
2006). Given the appalling environmental problems in China, these often 
understaffed environmental NGOs have more pressing environmental 
issues to deal with other than monitor the problems of slack supervision 
on SD contribution of the CDM projects, which is de facto a common 
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phenomenon among most of the capital intensive industries in China. For 
the business actors there is certainly no incentive to strengthen the slack 
supervision of SD of their own investment. The result is that although the 
lack of SD contribution has been intensively discussed among academics 
since the inception of this mechanism, the field study of this research 
shows that in reality few actors within the CDM project cycle actually 
treat it seriously.  
The implication of these findings is that lacking SD benefits and integrity 
is almost an inevitable consequence and it can hardly be addressed by 
changing either the governance structures from above, or major actors’ 
incentives or behavior pattern from below. In such a case to exclude the 
CERs from China seems to be the only option to maintain the original 
resolution of the CDM. Yet the price of such a decision is high. Firstly, 
without large developing countries like China or India, the supply of 
CERs would be trivial. The existing model of the CDM is essentially 
depending on host country’s industrial and financial capabilities in 
promoting low carbon investment, rather than bilateral technology or 
financial transfer. Hence few countries in the less developed countries are 
able to promote and invest in such large scale clean development 
activities by their own. Secondly, some of the problems presented in the 
Chinese CDM market may well be rooted in many other developing 
countries too, where the state-market relationships and governance 
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structure are considerably different from most other developed countries. 
The assumption that without Chinese projects the whole mechanism’s 
integrity would be largely enhanced cannot be taken for granted. 
8.3. Limitations and future studies on climate politics in China  
Due to the time constraint and access difficulties of the informants in the 
field study, this research bears several notable limitations that shall be 
clarified. Firstly, Chinese academics are important source of the carbon 
coalition in terms of the knowledge dissemination and policy design 
about carbon offset and trading. They also serve as important source of 
consultancy to the major business actors in the field. Therefore they are 
essentially another group of hybrid actors that have important role to play 
in the CDM market. Yet due the access difficulties this element of 
governance input has not been investigated. But the empirical evidence 
from the fieldwork indicates that academics are increasingly involved in 
the alliance of this political and market elites in the carbon market. 
Academics’ voice and attitudes are also crucial to shape the public 
opinions or discourse when government statements or business claims are 
not always convincing.  
This research focus primarily on the business actors’ influence in the 
domestic carbon offset market. But increasingly, Chinese companies 
started to extend their influence beyond borders and generate an impact 
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on global climate governance. On the one hand, many developing 
countries wish to duplicate China’s successful story of renewable 
investment and carbon market. Many Chinese carbon consultancies are 
now invited to these governments to continue their project development 
business in their countries. On the other hand, Chinese investors in wind 
farms and solar power stations also started to invest globally, particularly 
in the less developing countries, when the domestic market saturation is 
imminent after a decade of fervent renewable rush. 
Previously, the role and implication of multinational corporations (MNCs) 
in global environmental governance has been well studied (Biermann and 
Pattberg, 2008; Falkner, 2003; Hass, 2004; Levy and Newell, 2005). Yet 
few studies focus China. On the contrary, the large amount of studies on 
China’s massive overseas investment in the last two decades (Buckley el 
al, 2008; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Wang, 2002) have not yet captured 
the current trend of Chinese clean and renewable investment overseas, as 
well as its impact on global environmental or climate governance.  
In general, I suggest that two areas can be explored in the future studies 
to sharpen our understanding on the role of Chinese business actors in 
climate politics. Domestically, other power dynamics with important 
impacts should be carefully examined further. The studies on business 
relationships with academics, media and NGOs can be strong 
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complementary works to this research which primarily focus on state-
business interactions. For example, the role of NGOs in designing and 
promoting the domestic carbon market would be an important 
manifestation of the increasing power of civil society in the Chinese 
environmental governance. Surveys and in-depth interviews can be used 
to study NGO’s contribution in maintaining the quality of the offset 
programs. 
Internationally, the role of Chinese companies and their overseas 
investment on clean development and its impact on global climate 
governance should be attached with greater academic attentions. One of 
the target companies of this research, Longyuan Group, has initiated huge 
investment in Africa on wind farms. Other giant SOEs in China are 
believed to follow Longyuan’s step very soon since the domestic wind 
energy market is reaching to its full potential. Understanding the moves 
of Chinese companies into other developing countries’ political economy 
can be highly valuable. Yet it would be a challenging task since the 
researcher would have to access to the informants within both China and 
the investment destination to gather sufficient data at both ends. However, 
such studies, if carried out eventually, would provide important insights 
of the implications on both local clean development and global 
environmental governance. 
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Appendix 1: Lists of Interview Participants  
No. Names (Codes) Job Title Place of Interview Date of Interview 
1 AF Project Owner Office 2011.5 
2 BJZ Government Officer Office 2011.9 
3 DW Validator Office 2011.6 
4 HP Validator Cafe 2011.7 
5 FJG Engineer Cafe 2011.11 
6 FY Local CDM Centre Cafe 2011.11 
7 GJ Project Developer Office 2011.10 
8 HSD Project Owner Office 2011.9 
9 JKJ Government Officer Office 2011.10 
10 KWW Project Developer Cafe 2010.11 
11 LHL Project Developer Cafe 2010.11 
12 LX1 Project Developer Cafe 2011.4 
13 LX2 Project Developer Cafe 2011.7 
14 LY NGO Office 2011.11 
15 LYR Carbon Fund Office 2010.12 
16 LYS Project Owner Office 2011.5 
17 MC Government Officer Office 2010.12 
18 MXN Project Developer Office 2011.4 
19 MZM Project Developer Office 2010.11 
20 MZM 2 Project Developer Office 2011.7 
21 MQF Project Owner Cafe 2011.2 
22 PJH Researcher Office 2011.3 
23 PP Project Developer Office 2010.12 
24 QLM Government Officer Office 2011.5 
25 QY Validator Cafe 2011.9 
26 SZQ Local CDM Centre Office 2011.10 
27 WLY Government Officer Office 2011.8 
28 WAW Project Developer Office 2010.12 
29 YAM Project Developer Office 2011.11 
30 YM Carbon Fund Office 2011.9 
31 ZH Project Developer Cafe 2011.8 
32 ZL1 Project Developer Cafe 2010.11 
33 ZL2 Project Developer Cafe 2011.5 
34 ZJJ Project Developer Cafe 2011.2 
35 ZNW Project Owner Office 2010.11 
36 AL (English) Carbon Fund Office 2011.9 
37 CL (English) Carbon Fund Office 2011.9 
38 MC (English) Carbon Fund Office 2011.10 
39 RP (English) International Officer Office 2011.10 
40 TA (English) Carbon Fund Office 2011.9 
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Appendix 2: Document list 
No. Document Name Document Type 
1 Key Information about CDM in China Policy 
2 Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development 
Mechanism Projects in China 
Policy 
3 China's National Climate Change Programme (Full text) Policy 
4 China's Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change (Full text) Policy 
5 Notice on Adding RMB Yuan as Price Unit to Examine CER’s Price   Policy 
6 Format for CDM Project Application in China Policy 
7 Arrangements for the Implementation of Clean Development 
Mechanism Projects in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Policy 
8 Notification Requirement of CDM Projects Starting on or after 02 
August 2008 
Policy 
9 China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change(Full text)   Policy 
10 Clarification on grid tariff of Renewable Energy Projects in China Policy 
11 Notes on the Issue of China Wind Power Generation Reduction Policy 
12 China's Regional Grid Baseline Emission Factors 2009 revealed Report 
13 Study Report on Development of Policy of Chinese Wind Power Tariff Report 
14 Supplementary Notes for Hong Kong enterprises to implement CDM 
projects on the Mainland   
Policy 
15 China's Regional Grid Baseline Emission Factors 2010 Report 
16 风电场工程建设用地和环境保护管理暂行办法 Policy 
17 关于规范中国 CDM项目咨询服务及评估工作的重要公告 Policy 
18 CDM项目申报审批流程 Policy 
19 我国现行建设项目环评的相关规定 Policy 
20 关于中国清洁发展机制基金及清洁发展机制项目实施企业 
有关企业所得税政策问题的通知 
Policy 
21 关于办理二氧化碳减排量等环境权益跨境交易有关外汇业务问题
的通知 
Policy 
22 关于开展碳排放权交易试点工作的通知 Policy 
23 “十二五”控制温室气体排放工作方案 Policy 
24 关于做好中国清洁发展机制基金赠款项目和有偿使用项目申报管
理工作的通知 
Policy 
25 中华人民共和国环境保护法 Law 
26 中华人民共和国大气污染防治法 Law 
27 中华人民共和国环境影响评价法 Law 
28 中华人民共和国清洁生产促进法 Law 
29 中华人民共和国循环经济促进法 Law 
30 中华人民共和国节约能源法 Law 
31 中华人民共和国可再生能源法 Law 
32 建设项目环境保护管理条例 Policy 
33 可再生能源产业发展指导目录 Policy 
34 风电场工程建设用地和环境保护管理暂行办法 Policy 
35 可再生能源发电有关管理规定 Policy 
36 促进风电产业发展实施意见 Policy 
37 关于加强中央企业节能减排工作的意见 Policy 
38 中央企业任期节能减排管理目标 Policy 
39 中央企业节能减排监督管理暂行办法 Policy 
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40 国务院批转节能减排统计监测及考核实施方案和办法的通知 Policy 
41 龙源电力 2012年度报告 Report 
42 龙源电力 2011年度报告 Report 
43 温室气体自愿减排交易管理暂行办法 Policy 
44 中国电力行业年度发展报告 2011 Report 
45 大气污染防治行动计划 Policy 
46 可再生能源发电价格和费用分摊管理试行办法 Policy 
47 《中国的能源状况与政策》白皮书 Policy 
48 关于加快风力发电技术装备国产化的指导意见 Policy 
49 可再生能源产业发展指导目录 Policy 
50 可再生能源发电有关管理规定 Policy 
51 中华人民共和国电力法 Law 
52 河流水电规划报告及规划环境影响报告书审查暂行办法 Policy 
53 关于加强风电并网和消纳工作有关要求的通知 Policy 
54 风电发电科技发展“十二五”专项规划 Policy 
55 “十二五”第二批风电项目核准计划 Policy 
56 “十二五”第一批拟核准风电项目计划 Policy 
57 关于规范风电开发建设管理有关要求 Policy 
58 风电功率预报与电网协调运行实施细则（试行） Policy 
59 关于加强风电安全工作的意见 Policy 
60 海上风电开发建设管理实施细则 Policy 
61 分散式接入风电开发的通知 Policy 
62 风电开发建设管理暂行办法 Policy 
 
 
 
